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JAKUB FILONIK
ATHENIAN IMPIETY TRIALS: A REAPPRAISAL*
Abstract
This paper aims to critically analyse the testimonies concerning Athenian im-
piety trials of the classical period. First, it reaffirms the arguments that some 
of them must have been an invention of Hellenistic and later authors. Second, 
it presents a likely political background behind the historical cases. Third, it 
discusses a number of legal issues, along with new arguments concerning the 
procedures employed. Finally, it examines some less well-known material from 
the fourth century BCE. Overall, it seeks to provide a possibly coherent and com-
prehensive framework of Athenian impiety trials based on their shared charac-
teristics.
L’articolo intende condurre un’analisi critica delle testimonianze riguardanti 
i processi per empietà nell’Atene del periodo classico. Prima di tutto riafferma 
che alcuni di essi devono essere considerati invenzioni di autori ellenistici o an-
che più tardi. In secondo luogo mira a ricostruire il probabile retroscena politico 
dei casi che si possono considerare storicamente dati. In terzo luogo approfon-
disce un certo numero di problemi giuridici, presentando in particolare nuovi 
argomenti relativi alle procedure impiegate. Infine vengono esaminate alcune 
fonti meno note risalenti al IV sec. a.C. In generale si sforza di ricostruire un 
quadro il più possibile coerente ed esaustivo dei processi per empietà ateniesi, 
mettendone in luce le caratteristiche comuni.
* An earlier version of this paper is scheduled to appear in two consecutive 
issues of Meander (in Polish). This revised study would not have been possible 
without the generous support of the Hardt Foundation and the exchange pro-
gramme at Indiana University Bloomington for which I am very grateful. Mo-
reover, I remain immensely indebted to all those who devoted their time and 
attention to either version, especially Ilias Arnaoutoglou, Bogdan Burliga, Chris 
Carey, Matthew R. Christ, Michael Gagarin, Edward M. Harris, Leopold Hess, Ja-
nek Kucharski, Eric W. Robinson, Lene Rubinstein, Hannah Tor, Robert W. Walla-
ce, Marek Wȩcowski, and, last but not least, Marek Winiarczyk. I am particularly 
grateful to Michael Young for his careful copy-editing. It will not be an over-
statement to say that without all of the aforementioned this paper would never 
have reached the present form. I would also like to thank the participants of se-
minars and conferences at University of Warsaw, Poland and of a web conference 
held by Yaroslavl State University, Russia for very stimulating discussions. Alas, 
it is the author of this piece alone who is to blame for any mistakes that remain, 
not to mention its final length. 
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Some excuse might be necessary for attempting to deal again with 
Athenian impiety trials. It remains striking that although scholars 
have long been interested in this subject1, there has been no compre-
hensive study on it since Derenne (1930), who chose to focus on the 
‘trials of philosophers’ and the reaction to ‘impious doctrines’. Der-
enne, along with numerous later studies2, does not seem to critically 
evaluate the surviving sources or later authors’ suspicious ‘knowl-
edge’ of classical Athens. Most works which, to various degrees, adopt 
a more critical approach have in turn focused either on selected trials 
or issues, or were composed as broader and thought-provoking but 
limited studies3.
The most influential work to date on the historicity of these tri-
als has been done by Dover (1988c [1976]) and Wallace (1994, 1996a) 
who—having dealt with eight selected cases—argued that numerous 
late testimonies should probably be considered false based on their 
incongruities and prejudices of their authors. Similar problems have 
been touched upon by the studies of Lefkowitz (1981, rev. 2012; 1987) 
and Stone (1988). In respect to legal questions, Lipsius (1905-15) and 
MacDowell (1978) have proved to be particularly helpful for general 
issues (although accepting the sources as authentic as a rule), with 
numerous studies adding more detail on the specifics, while Cohen 
(1989, 1991: 203-17) and Parker (2005) have focused on the legal defi-
nition of impiety. Bauman (1990), Smarczyk (1990), O’Sullivan (1997), 
and Rubel (2000) have all presented insightful analyses of the political 
significance of various notorious trials. However indebted this study 
remains to all previous scholarship, it attempts to venture into more 
detailed and more comprehensive questions about all Athenian impi-
ety trials known to us today (with a good part of it placed in the foot-
notes due to compositional challenges). It provides a commentary to 
individual cases, yet hopes to grasp a broader picture based on their 
shared characteristics.
In order to present such a detailed reading of the issues which 
emerge from studying Athenian impiety trials, this paper attempts to 
focus on several themes. First, it examines the historicity of the alleged 
trials for impiety in fifth- and fourth-century Athens, highlighting the 
anecdotal nature of the vast majority of the surviving testimonies and 
the reasons for their appearance in the later sources. It thus seeks to 
understand the modes in which ἀσέβεια is spoken of in the classical 
period, as opposed to later eras. Second, it aims to reveal the political 
aspects and motives which—I argue—lay behind the great majority of 
the cases discussed. Third, it proposes an updated reading of the legal 
1. See bibliography listed in Winiarczyk 1994.
2. See Baslez 2007 for one of recent examples.
3. Among them, various contributions of merit referred to later in this paper. 
I believe that brief studies by Marasco (1976) and Longo (2011), meant as general 
treatment of this matter, are far from providing more insight into the subject, 
however useful in attempts to summarise it.
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issues connected with trials for impiety, looking for what distinguishes 
this kind of accusation from other offences in Athenian law and what it 
has with them in common, including the question of the legal measures 
employed in the extant cases. In order to shed more light on ancient 
testimonies, the structure of this study aims to present all important 
sources and discuss problems which they pose respectively.
How was the lack of reverence a crime?
As we are to ask questions about the trials for ἀσέβεια (‘impiety’), 
it would be useful to learn what ἀσέβεια meant to the Greeks. Unfor-
tunately, we lack a precise definition of the term, all the more its pos-
sible legal scope (see further below). Quite likely it was assumed that 
every citizen would understand what counted as ἀσέβεια, or rather 
that he should decide on it on the basis of every single case. On the 
other hand, we could wonder whether the law on impiety—had it been 
preserved—would have told us much about its meaning. A common op-
position was made between ἀσέβεια and εὐσέβεια, a broad term which 
comprised showing reverence in accordance with tradition towards 
the gods, one’s parents, the dead, or even the fatherland4, although we 
should be safe in assuming that the legal scope of the term in the cases 
of a formal charge was narrower5. There also existed another term, 
ὁσιότης, to denote proper religious conduct6. At some point, ἀσέβεια 
(impiety) began to signify something different from ἀθεότης (athe-
ism), although the distinction was not yet clear in classical Greece7. 
4. See [Arist.] Vir. 1251a30-33 (ἀσέβεια μὲν ἡ περὶ θεοὺς πλημμέλεια καὶ περὶ 
δαίμονας ἢ καὶ περὶ τοὺς κατοιχομένους, καὶ περὶ γονεῖς καὶ περὶ πατρίδα); Thgn. 
1179-80; Antiph. Tetr. G.α.2; Lys. 30.17-21; Xen. Mem. 1.1.16, 1.1.20 (Θαυμάζω οὖν 
ὅπως ποτὲ ἐπείσθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι Σωκράτην περὶ θεοὺς μὴ σωφρονεῖν, τὸν ἀσεβὲς 
μὲν οὐδέν ποτε περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς οὔτ’ εἰπόντα οὔτε πράξαντα, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ λέγοντα 
καὶ πράττοντα περὶ θεῶν οἷά τις ἂν καὶ λέγων καὶ πράττων εἴη τε καὶ νομίζοιτο 
εὐσεβέστατος); Xen. Cyn. 13.16-17; Pl. Symp. 188c (ἀσέβεια φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι […] 
καὶ περὶ γονέας καὶ ζῶντας καὶ τετελευτηκότας καὶ περὶ θεούς), Euthphr. 5c, 12e, 
Crat. 394e, Resp. X, 615c, Leg. IV, 716d-718a, X, 907d-e; Lycurg. Leocr. 93-94, 129 
(περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀσεβοῦσι), passim; IG II² 204.51-54 (= RO 58.51-54); Polyb. 36.9.15 
(ἀσέβημα μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας 
ἁμαρτάνειν); as one can note, the gods were often emphasised as the non-obvious 
object of ἀσεβει =ν. Protecting family tombs and shrines was portrayed as a pivotal 
aspect of citizenship and duties that came with it, see e.g. Aeschin. 2.23, Lycurg. 
Leocr. 25, 38, 76, 150 et al.; cf. Mikalson 1983: 91-105. On εὐσέβεια, see in particular 
Pl. Euthphr. passim, Xen. Mem. 4.6.2ff.
5. See Cohen 1989, 1991a: 203-17; cf. Parker 2005a.
6. See Dover 1974: 250-54 on the scope of both; cf. Bruit Zaidman 2001: 157-61.
7. Apart from a single testimony (Pl. Ap. 26c), in the classical period the meaning 
of both terms seems to have been comparable; in the extant literature the epithet 
ἄθεος most often has the meaning of ‘god-forsaken’, ‘god-less’ (in the sense of ‘de-
prived of god’), or simply ‘impious’, see Bacchyl. Epin. 11.109, Pind. Pyth. 4.162, Aesch. 
Pers. 808, Eum. 151, 541, Soph. El. 124, 1181, OT 254, 661, 1360, Trach. 1036, Eur. Hcld. 
107, Or. 925; cf. Pl. Leg. X, 908-10. Later, they became clearly distinguished (just as to-
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We find words from the ἀσεβ- stem already in the fragments of Hip-
ponax’ poetry (fr. 85.4 West = 87.4 Degani) and in the Theognidea (1179-
80), yet within the surviving sources they appear regularly only since 
the fifth century8. In a purely linguistic sense, there existed different 
objects of εὐσεβ- and ἀσεβ-, not necessarily the gods or their affairs, 
but rather everything that deserved to be paid respect9.
In the texts of the classical period the noun ἀσέβεια and verb 
ἀσεβει =ν usually signify the lack of reverence towards and profana-
tion of the ‘sacred matters’10 (sacred places; monuments of the gods; 
religious festivals, functions, or rituals, etc.). The charge of impiety 
would thus simply be a charge of neglect of the sacred, including the 
violation of laws perceived as ‘natural’ and the breaking of an oath11. 
It could also refer to an improper ritual conduct, such as making sac-
rifices on the wrong day or in an untraditional manner, or the lack 
of acceptance of the cult officially recognised by the polis. It appears 
that religious duties of the citizen boiled down to the maintenance of 
cult objects, participation in religious activities (festivals, rites), du-
ties of those in priestly service, and avoidance of anything that might 
be considered impious12. Impiety was sometimes juxtaposed with vio-
lation of the law, or simply ‘lawlessness’ (ἀνομία or παρανομία)13, so 
that the two concepts could both complement each other and relate to 
different levels of the order which was not to be transgressed. None-
theless, the later distinction between the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane’ 
was yet far from clear14. According to traditional beliefs, religious pol-
lution (μίασμα) of one individual put the blame both on the family of 
the transgressor and on all citizens. Thus the wellbeing and survival 
of the entire community could depend on godly manners of its single 
member and the way such a grave issue was dealt with. It is, however, 
far from obvious whether this concept functioned as anything more 
than a rhetorical scarecrow in the classical period15.
day, worshipping the gods in an inappropriate manner is commonly regarded as di-
stinct from not acknowledging their existence), see Rubel 2000: 82-90; cf. Winiarczyk 
1990, 1992b; Parker 2013a; LSJ, s.v. ἄθεος; see also n. 13 below.
8. All dates in this paper will be BCE, unless stated otherwise.
9. Cf. Foerster 1971 [1966].
10. Cf. LSJ, s.v. ἀσέβεια, ἀσεβέω; Burkert 2011: 408-11. See e.g. Soph. Ant. 920-28.
11. Cf. Dover 1974: 246-50.
12. Cf. Liddel 2007: 300.
13. See Isocr. 11.42, Lys. fr. 195-96 Carey; cf. Xen. Mem. 1.2.2; Eur. Ba. 263, 387, 
476, 502, 997, 1015 et al.; Polyb. 18.54.10. Similarly, for the connection of ἄθεος and 
ἄδικος or ἄνομος, see for example their conventional use in Euripides: Andr. 491, 
HF 433, Hel. 1148, Ba. 995, 1015; cf. Ar. Thesm. 670-71, Pl. Gorg. 481a5, 523b2. See also 
Furley 1996: 109-16 on the use of the term ἀλιτήριος in religious context.
14. See Rudhardt 1958: 7, 21-22 et al., Connor 1988, Samons 2000: 325-29, Han-
sen 2006: 118-21, Mikalson 1983.
15. See e.g. Gagarin 1997: 218, opp. Garland 1996: 96-97.
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How to punish the impious
Athenian legal documents provide no precise basis for the charge of 
impiety, a fact which has been variously ascribed both to the nature 
of Greek law in general16 and the peculiarity of this kind of accusation. 
Presumably, the prosecutors had a wide range of possible procedures 
to choose from, just as in the cases for the attempted overthrow of de-
mocracy (κατάλυσις του = δήμου), for which the punishment was death. 
In fact, both charges were merged in the trials for the mutilation of 
the Hermae and the profanation of the Mysteries of 415, so that the 
courts would gain additional powers to prosecute (And. 1.36, Thuc. 
6.27-28, 53; cf. Lys. 13.20). Bauman (1990: 64-65) compares it to the 
crimen maiestatis accusation in the Roman Empire and stresses that it 
was the only possible way to interrogate (through torture, βάσανος) 
dozens of slaves who were brought to courts as witnesses without the 
approval of their masters and without further ‘formalities’17.
What can be inferred from the sources concerning the legal procedure 
appropriate for prosecuting ἀσέβεια leaves us with much uncertainty. 
In respect to the fifth century, the only indubitable legal remarks on this 
matter are those connected with the 415 affairs. The εἰσαγγελία (‘im-
peachment’) procedure was most likely applied in this case (see below), 
which normally required a preliminary hearing in the Assembly and/
or in the Council (Hansen 1975: 21-28, 77-82). Nevertheless, it should 
be safe to assume that the regular forensic procedure in prosecuting 
ἀσέβεια would be the γραφή (‘public indictment’ or a written plaint in 
it)18, a procedure employed ordinarily in ‘public’ cases, which could be 
initiated by anyone, not only a party of the dispute. The γραϕαί had to be 
brought before a body of δικασταί (‘jurors’ or ‘judges’, also ‘dicasts’) in a 
δικαστήριον (‘popular court’) by the relevant magistrate, and settled by 
16. In earlier studies, the procedural aspects of Athenian legal regulations 
and forensic practice were rather overemphasised. In contrast, recent scho-
larship tends to stress the balance between the procedural (adjective) and sub-
stantive (material) aspects of the Athenian legal system, along with litigants’ 
awareness of its ‘open texture’ (or ‘procedural flexibility’), that is the need to in-
terpret each time the general terms in which the laws were phrased (Harris 1994: 
138-40, 2000, 2004, 2009/10; cf. Rubinstein 2000: 221-24, Carey 2004a). One should 
also note that due to the lack of the institution of public prosecutor, it was the 
plaintiff who each time had to decide whether he dared to risk the penalty of 
partial disfranchisement and a substantial fine for frivolous prosecution (cf. Har-
ris 1999). In conjunction with the accountability of the magistrates and severe 
penalties for abuse of office, we should be safe in assuming that few accusations 
would actually be turned down in the preliminary stages of legal proceedings, 
before turning the written plaint to an actual court (cf. e.g. Harris 2000, 2013b).
17. See And. 1.22, 64, 43, Isocr. 16.6-7; cf. Smarczyk 1990: 270, n. 324; cf. Carey 
2004a: 128. Among the accused was Andocides (see [Lys.] 6.22-23, And. 1.32-46), 
acquitted for the information provided, only to be tried for impiety again some 
years later (see below).
18. Cf. Lipsius 1905-1915: 358-68, MacDowell 1978: 199. See also remarks on the 
fourth-century γραϕαὶ ἀσεβείας in part II below. See Harris (2013b) on the plaint.
16 Jakub Filonik
the majority of votes19. Nonetheless, we first encounter γραϕαί in impi-
ety trials only in the fourth century, beginning with that of Socrates in 
399 (we learn from Plato that the entire procedure took up to one day20). 
Probably less frequently impiety cases were brought before the more 
elite Areopagus Council, consisting of the ex-archons, who were invest-
ed with the power to watch over certain religious offences, at least in 
the late fourth century21. Before the late fourth century, however, the 
only reliable evidence for this is a trial concerning the sacred olive trees 
(see below), which could but did not have to be an impiety case.
We can assume that the legal reforms after the restoration of de-
mocracy in 403 influenced the measures for bringing impiety tri-
als, although there is no certainty as to the extent and rapidity of 
these changes. In Against Androtion (22.27) from the mid-350s, Demos-
thenes mentions various forensic procedures possible in prosecuting 
ἀσέβεια. He ascribes these regulations to Solon, following a common 
Greek, and especially Athenian, ‘fashion’22, and enumerates (1) the 
ἀπαγωγή23, (2) the γραφή, (3) the possibility to turn to the Eumolpi-
19. Citizens-dicasts who volunteered and were drawn by lot for the day had 
to be at least 30 years of age (normally 500 of them in each session in public 
trials, as in the case of Socrates); since 403 and throughout the fourth centu-
ry the mechanism of drawing jurors by lot developed further, cf. Boegehold 
1991, 1995. The body of 6,000 dicasts in classical Athens might be a scholarly 
invention, see Surikov 2009. Todd (1990) has argued that the dikasteria consi-
sted mainly of Athenian citizens-farmers of various income but the common 
values addressed in court ‘were a matter of consensus rather than of division’. 
Harris (2013a) emphasises that the dicasts were obliged to follow the ‘rule of 
fairness’ (ἐπιείκεια) in their judgments. On the problem of rendering δικασταί 
into a modern equivalent (such as ‘jurors’ or ‘judges’), see e.g. Todd 1993: 82-
83, Harris 1994: 136, Carey 2012: 5-9, and a brief overview of this discussion in 
Kremmydas 2012: 176-77.
20. See Pl. Ap. 37a; cf. MacDowell 2000.
21. See Lys. 7; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 60.2; [Dem.] 59.78-83; IG II2 204.16-19 (= RO 
58.16-19); cf. Wallace 1989: 94-97, 106-12, de Bruyn 1995: 113-16, 126-42; the Ar-
eopagus’ supervision over religious and moral matters was either invented or 
significantly broadened in the late fourth century, see e.g. Din. 1.3-5, 62, 82-83; 
Lycurg. Leocr. 52; Dem. 18.133-34; Aeschin. 1.81-83; cf. Dem. 23.65-70; cf. Wallace 
1989; Sullivan 2003; for restrictions on public morals in general proposed by Lyc-
urgus in the late fourth century, see Wallace (1989: 195-98; 2005: 371) and Liddel 
2007: 146-48, see also de Bruyn 1995: 117-46, 166-72 on ἀπόϕασις.
22. Cf. e.g. Harrison 1955, MacDowell 1975, Clinton 1982.
23. Basically a ‘citizen arrest’, after catching the perpetrator (usually of 
a theft) in flagrante delicto, and a preliminary questioning before the Eleven, 
a board of magistrates watching over the prison; depending on his confes-
sion, the case could go to court or not. Demosthenes probably had in mind the 
procedure employed in the cases for temple robbery or theft of other sacred 
objects (cf. Hansen 1976: 41-43). In practice, the procedure was widely used 
and abused, just as various others (see e.g. Lys. 13). On the procedure in gene-
ral see Harris 2006a: 373-90, Hansen 1976, Harrison 1971: 221-29, and Lipsius 
1905-1915: 319-31.
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dae24 through a δίκη25, and (4) initiating the case before the archon 
basileus. Their use, besides the well-known (2), is scantly attested 
in the extant sources but by no means implausible in impiety cases. 
Nevertheless, the list was brought up by the orator as an argument 
for the special use of the procedure in his case against Androtion, 
which might indicate some more exotic applications of legal meas-
ures (Carey 2004a: 129).
The last (4) possibility mentioned by Demosthenes reads φράζειν πρὸς 
τὸν βασιλέα in most manuscripts, which in the modern editions is gen-
erally accepted as φαίνειν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα. This is Weil’s emendation 
based on the scholiast’s remarks to this passage26. Φάσις (‘showing’) 
was a multi-faced procedure, which would normally involve some kind 
of denunciation, a feature not exclusive to this particular procedure27. 
We cannot be sure how it would be applied in impiety cases, although 
there exists a parallel in fourth-century regulations of the Eleusin-
ian Mysteries28. The emendation remains nonetheless arbitrary, and, 
with some help from other sources, one can see how the original read-
ing could be retained. There is at least one similar example of φράζειν 
before a magistrate in literary sources. In Plato’s Laws (XII, 955a) we 
read about the proper conduct in athletic, musical, or other contests, 
where in the case of illegal competition one shall report (φραζέτω) his 
issue to the relevant magistrates, being the patrons of the games (τοῖς 
ἀθλοθέταις)29. Similarly, the so-called Epistatai Decree on the treasure 
of the Two Goddesses at Eleusis (IG I3 32.14-17) instructs its overse-
ers (ἐπιστάται, assumed from ἐπισ[τε]ναι in l. 11)—if any debt owed to 
the Goddesses is discovered—to approach the Council, give informa-
tion (φρά[ζ]εν), and exact payment (ἀ[ν]απρά[τ]τεν)30. In impiety cases 
someone would, respectively, inform the basileus about the violation 
24. The priestly family in charge of the Eleusinian Mysteries (see below, with 
n. 129).
25. The term is mentioned among other procedures which are named expli-
citly, and thus needs to signify a specific procedure, rather than a ‘trial’ in gene-
ral sense (cf. n. 134 and 153 below).
26. Schol. 84 Dilts: ἵνα ὁ βασιλεὺς τὴν φάσιν λαβὼν (φάσις δὲ κατηγορίας 
ὄνομα) τοῖς θεσμοθέταις φανερὰν καταστήσῃ καὶ παρὰ τῶν θεσμοθετῶν γνωρισθῇ 
τοῖς δικάζουσι τὰ ἐγκλήματα. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς εἷς καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρχων κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν τῶν 
ἐννέα καλουμένων, ὃς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν ἱερῶν.
27. See MacDowell 1991, Wallace 2003.
28. See Hesperia 49 (1980): 263, vv. 28-29, cf. MacDowell 1991: 197-98, Wallace 
2003: 175-76. On the scantly attested procedure of ϕάσις in general, see MacDo-
well 1991 (with Hansen’s reply) and Wallace 2003; cf. [Dem.] 58.8.
29. ἐὰν δὲ ἀνταγωνιστὴν γυμναστικῆς ἢ μουσικῆς ἤ τινος ἀγῶνος ἑτέρου 
διακωλύῃ τις βίᾳ μὴ παραγίγνεσθαι, φραζέτω μὲν ὁ ἐθέλων τοῖς ἀθλοθέταις, οἱ δ’ 
εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἐλεύθερον ἀφιέντων τὸν ἐθέλοντα ἀγωνίζεσθαι […].
30. See Cavanaugh 1996: 1-17 on the epistatai, and pp. 19-27 on the dating of 
the decree (early 440s vs 432); cf. pp. 119-216 on IG I3 386-387 (a record of activi-
ties of the epistatai in 408/7); cf. Rosivach 1997.
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relevant to his responsibilities first, and the latter would then take 
the case further without involving the informer. In fact, in the trials 
of the mutilators and profaners of 415 many denunciations (μηνύσεις) 
came from citizens, metics, and slaves who did not need to take part 
in the rest of the prosecution themselves. The way that the scholiast 
speaks of φάσις as the basileus’ action to the thesmothetae points to 
what could either be the entire procedure (which would mean he had 
φαίνειν in his MS) or just one after receiving the initial report. Thus 
Weil’s emendation remains a possibility, but we can tentatively accept 
φράζειν even if φάσις was to follow; both remain only an assumption, 
unless further evidence is found.
Besides the γραφή, we know of no actual trials involving the other 
three procedures in impiety cases. It seems striking that the Eumolpi-
dae would possess any additional legal powers in Athens. What we 
learn from other sources, is that they dealt with the ritual calendar, 
took part in processions, and had the right to pass their interpreta-
tion of the sacred matters involving the Mysteries, without the power 
to penalise31. Furthermore, Pseudo-Lysias (6.11-12) describes a pros-
ecution of Archippus as a ‘δίκη ἀσεβείας before the archon basileus’ 
(discussed further). Moreover, we know that Andocides himself was 
accused of impiety by ἔνδειξις (see below). The author of the pseudo-
Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (57.2) remarks also on the possibility of 
turning to the archon basileus with an accusation of impiety in the 
cases involving the Mysteries (see pp. 45-46 below). Hyperides (Eux. 
6), in turn, speaks of a γραφή before the archon basileus as another 
possibility in impiety cases. 
Based on the surviving sources, it can be inferred that, besides the 
charges of violating the protection of the sacred olive trees, the tri-
als for impiety were subject to a separate vote on the penalty32 (ἀγὼν 
τιμητός). The choices available to the accusers in public procedures 
would normally involve capital punishment, exile, fines, confiscation 
of property, and disfranchisement. In the historical cases for impiety 
the most common type of punishment is death, attested several times 
(Dem. 24.7 speaks of death and loss of property as an expected out-
come); apparently, there were also more lenient penalties involved, 
while some defendants were acquitted (see below). As noted by Mac-
Dowell (1963: 115), the practice of allowing the convict to go into exile 
before the dicasts agreed on his guilt was not a humane way of dealing 
with him, but could be (1) an expedient assumption that it would be 
too difficult to prosecute someone beyond the boundaries of the state, 
31. Cf. MacDowell 1978: 193, Clinton 1974: 89-93, Garland 1984: 115-16; but 
the case from Dem. 47.68-70 seems particularly intriguing in this context. The 
institution of the exegetai itself could have been, however, a post-403 invention, 
see Clinton 1974: 90-93, Gagné 2009: 225 with notes. See part II below, with n. 129 
for a more detailed discussion of their (assumed) powers and responsibilities in 
the case of impiety trials.
32. Cf. Harrison 1971: 80-82; Todd 1993: 133-35.
19Athenian impiety trials: a reappraisal
or (2) an attempt to avoid pollution. The idea of prison as a punish-
ment was strange to Greek thought and to the Athenian penal system.
We also know of penalties imposed for the profanation of the Mys-
teries or the Dionysia. We are given a handful of examples of pros-
ecution by the procedure of προβολή in Dem. 21.175-82, including a 
recent trial of a certain Evandrus of Thespiae and a case of the imposi-
tion of the death penalty for ‘treating free men like slaves’ by publicly 
hitting a citizen during the festival by another Athenian citizen, one 
Ctesicles. Anyone—not just the victim—could initiate the προβολή33. 
The magistrates34 were then supposed to add it to the list of issues to 
be discussed during the meetings of the Council and the Assembly to 
follow. The details of these proceedings are quite unclear; we cannot 
be sure whether προβολή was only the preliminary vote in the Assem-
bly, which did not have to result in a trial (Harris 1992, 2008: 79-80, 
2013c: 211-16), or the name for the entire procedure (MacDowell 1990: 
13-17). The case against Meidias was also initiated by the προβολή, 
although Demosthenes argues that—had he wished so—he could have 
brought a prosecution for ἀσέβεια35 (which shows that the προβολή 
was considered a procedure distinct from the prosecution for impiety 
in court; cf. MacDowell 1978: 196).
One can assume that much was open to the interpretation of the 
moment (Wallace 1996b), as in many cases covered by the Atheni-
an legal system. There is no evidence for a specific law which would 
forbid introducing new gods to Athens, but—as Parker36 rightly ob-
serves—introducing wrong gods at the wrong moment could lead to 
a trial for impiety; therefore, the most sensible thing to do was to 
worship the gods in accordance to the custom and law. On the other 
hand, already in the fifth century we see many instances of intro-
ducing ‘new gods’ (also those described as ‘foreign’ by scholars) to 
Athens, while none of their being expelled37, as was often the case 
in Rome. The reasons for ‘importing’ foreign deities, however, were 
more often political or economic rather than religious (Simms 1985). 
33. The name of the procedure is sometimes translated as ‘denunciation’ (but 
as such it should not be confused with another procedure often bearing that 
name, μήνυσις, for which see MacDowell 1978: 181-83).
34. Only the proedroi, if we discount the law in Dem. 21.8 speaking of the pryta-
neis as inauthentic; see Harris 2013c: 211-16.
35. Dem. 21.51, 55, 130.
36. Parker 2005a: 65-68; cf. Parker 2002. The success of these proposals pro-
bably depended vastly on the support given to them (or the opposition to them) 
before the demos in the Assembly (and earlier before the Council) by both the 
inhabitants of Athens in general and the priests specifically, cf. Garland 1992: 
19-20.
37. Versnel 1990: 102-23, 128; Parker 1996: 152-98 (who argues that introdu-
cing new gods in place of the old ones is a regular trait of a polytheistic religion); 
Parker 2001: 61.
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There existed many private associations in Athens, and most of them 
were able to exist and meet regularly without any major hindrance. 
But whenever they were considered a social threat, their leaders 
could fairly easily fall prey to the accusation of impiety or magic, just 
as it seems to have happened with some fourth-century trials (see 
part II below). If this was the case, it is rather surprising to hear so 
little about such attempts, especially when we consider Athenian ‘li-
tigiousness’38 and the number of other known trials, particularly the 
instances of capital punishment passed within the εἰσαγγελία proce-
dure in the cases for treason or unlawful conduct in office. There are 
a few dozen examples of the latter known from the classical period, 
with probably hundreds unknown (Hansen 1975: 11 et al.; see below 
on Hansen’s catalogue).
Various links could be drawn between democracy and polis in general 
on the one hand and the nature of polytheism and religious tolerance on 
the other, but very often they seem far from straightforward39. Contrary 
to what one might expect, it was the Assembly which had the supreme 
power over many religious practices, including communal consulting of 
the oracles and supervising the shrines and temples40. Introducing a new 
god would require a group willing to do so, and we know of various pri-
vate associations that existed and operated in Athens without any major 
constraint. Although since the late fifth century the elitist political clubs 
called ἑταιρει =αι were commonly taken for the birthplace of anti-dem-
ocratic political thought and even oligarchic coups d’état (sometimes 
deservedly; see e.g. Lys. 12.43), they appear to have been very common. 
Sometimes they were even juxtaposed with συνωμοσίαι (conspiracies) 
and στάσεις (‘seditions’, but also groups aiming for them)41. Among them 
there emerged numerous cult associations42. Their members offered sac-
38. So keenly derided by Aristophanes, i.a. in the Clouds, Wasps, and Birds; cf. 
Christ 1998.
39. See discussion on the problems concerning such an approach in Schmitt 
Pantel 2010, Jameson 1998, Sourvinou-Inwood 2000a [1990], 2000b [1988], Ver-
snel 1995, Parker 2005b, Boedeker 2007: 57-59, and Osborne 2013: 285-92. Many 
cults existed before democracy, some new ones emerged over time on both po-
lis- and deme-level along with increased participation. Part of the democratic 
political practice influenced the cult, but a good deal of ritual practice and many 
religious beliefs remained unaffected by it, especially still in the fifth century.
40. Cf. e.g. Parker 1996: 61-62.
41. See Thuc. 6.60 (Thucydides’ first remark on the συνωμοσίαι appears in his 
description of the Hermocopidae affair, cf. Stone 1988: 141-44); cf. Isocr. 16.6. 
For more on the types of associations, see e.g. Arist. EN VIII 1160a8-30, EE VII 
1241b24-29, Is. 2.14; see also discussion below. On dangers seen in various types 
of associations and on linking them to foreign cults later in antiquity, see Cass. 
Dio 52.36.2; cf. Versnel 1990: 130-31.
42. Cf. Jones 1999: 13, 30, 216-20, 249-67 et al.; Calhoun 1913 (overemphasising 
the role of the associations in Athenian politics, see the summary in Rubinstein 
2000: 20, with n. 14); see e.g. IG II2 1252; Parker (1996: 128-42) gives a long list of 
various local and private cult associations in Athens, cf. Mikalson 1983: 83-90. 
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rifices to a variety of deities in public and in private. This included the 
widespread ὀργεώνες and now scarcely known θίασοι (Arnaoutoglou 
2003: 31-67). There was no law aimed specifically against them, but vari-
ous constraints existed and could influence the life of associations. For 
example, metics—normally not allowed to own land in Athens—wishing 
to build a temple would each time have to ask the demos at the Assembly 
for their consent to granting them this privilege (ἔγκτησις).
The first in the extant sources to speak of the law on associations 
in Athens is the Roman jurist Gaius (2nd cent. CE) cited in The Digest 
(47.22.4) from the 6th century CE. The ‘Solonian’ law cited in this col-
lection was said to have recognised inner arrangements of the associa-
tions as valid provided that they remained consistent with common 
Athenian laws43 (δημόσια γράμματα). Arnaoutoglou (1998, 2003: 49-57) 
has argued—based on the wording of this law—that it should be dated 
at Hadrian’s rather than Solonian times, while Ismard (2010: 44-57; cf. 
Jones 1999: 311-20) that it may have partly preserved the language of 
the archaic period. We know of no other law that would prohibit or 
limit the existence of associations in democratic Athens (Ismard 2010: 
146-62, cf. 2007), if we disregard the late fourth-century laws meant 
to protect democracy against any attempts to overthrow it (Hyp. Eux. 
8, SEG xii 87). If there existed certain limitations, they were shaped by 
social rather than legal context44.
A particularly interesting example of the acceptance of even ex-
treme forms of associations is provided by a fragment of a scantly 
preserved speech by Lysias cited by Athenaeus (XII, 551d–552b = 
fr. 195 Carey)45. It speaks of the members of a certain Athenian cult 
group calling themselves Κακοδαιμονισταί (which can be understood 
as either ‘The Unfortunate’ or ‘The Worshippers of the Evil Spirit’, 
in contrast to the ‘Good Genius’, to whom banqueters would drink 
toasts, cf. Ar. Vesp. 525). Lysias then explains that they have chosen 
this, apparently shocking (Jones 1999: 225), name to mock the gods 
and Athenian morals. The orator then relates how the members of 
the club did their best to feast during the days which were recognised 
as inauspicious (ἡμέραι ἀποϕράδες). Perhaps it was a part of a sym-
potic ritual of pledge-making (πίστις), meant to bind all members of a 
club or conspiracy together in a shared transgression46. Lysias further 
notes that the gods did not remain irresponsive and most of the fel-
lows died young.
Some deities enjoyed private cult separate from the official one, cf. Simms 1985. 
For local cult associations, see Sourvinou-Inwood 2000b [1988]: 42-45.
43. Cf. Jones 1999: 33-45, 311-20; Arnaoutoglou 1998: 37.
44. Cf. Ismard 2010 146-62 (cf. Ismard 2007), Arnaoutoglou 1998: 76, passim; 
Parker 2011: 57-61.
45. See translation and introduction in Todd 2000a: 356-59.
46. For this kind of bond in political associations, see e.g. Thuc. 3.82.6, 8.73.3, 
cf. MacDowell 1962: 192, Gomme 1956: 377, Murray 1990.
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What is striking in this story (however anecdotal) is that, despite 
Lysias’ and perhaps other Athenians’ knowledge of the existence of 
such a club, there is no remark of any human, as opposed to divine 
punishment being applied, even though one of these men, Cinesias, 
is called ‘the most impious of all’. This is of course only if we are in-
clined to believe at least part of this account to be true, rather than 
treat it as an element of oratorical slander (διαβολή), for the fragment 
comes from a defence speech written by Lysias for a certain Phanias 
accused by Cinesias of introducing an illegal decree. That such din-
ing and drinking groups of young males of aristocratic background 
and inclinations were more common in Athens, however, is shown 
by Demosthenes’ Against Conon (54.39; cf. §34; cf. Furley 1996: 90-91). 
The orator speaks of a group of men named Triballoi, meeting regu-
larly under an oath to gather offerings meant for Hecate and dine on 
them themselves. He mentions that one of them, named Bacchius, was 
sentenced to death (for reason unknown to us). It remains debatable 
whether Triballos from Aristophanes’ Birds has anything to do with it 
(Katz 1976: 357-59). The name points to a Thracian tribe, which sug-
gests that the club might be connected—at least by Demosthenes’ audi-
ence—to some rites perceived as ‘foreign’, which could prove enough 
of an excuse for a rhetorical attack in court. It is, nevertheless, worth 
noticing that all forms of punishment for impiety in Athenian popular 
religion applied only to worldly existence and did not extend to the 
afterlife (Mikalson 1983: 104).
The modes of executing the death penalty in Athens are not well at-
tested, but since the late fifth century would probably involve drink-
ing poisonous hemlock as an expensive citizen privilege, with the 
less fortunate doomed to be bound to plank to die out of thirst and 
exhaustion (ἀποτυμπανίζειν, used especially in the case of traitors, 
murderers, and thieves), some of them—including temple robbers and 
traitors—having been refused proper burial in Attic soil47. More sel-
dom, s/he could be thrown into the pit with sharp rocks (βάραθρον, 
apparently employed in the case of crimes against the demos, perhaps 
mainly for the disposal of the bodies). We cannot be sure which of the 
above would be used in the case of individuals condemned for impi-
ety (Socrates apart), but by no means can we rule out the use of any 
of these methods (cf. Dem. 24.7 on an unpleasant death as a result of 
γραφὴ ἀσεβείας).
I. The Fifth Century to 399 BCE
In the sources from various periods of antiquity we can trace nu-
merous remarks on several trials for ἀσέβεια which reportedly took 
place in fifth-century Athens. Despite several notorious trials well at-
47. See Thuc. 1.138, Xen. Hell. 1.7.22; cf. Lycurg. Leocr. 89, 113, [Plut.] X or. 
834b; cf. Allen 2000: 200-2, 216-23, 232-37, Tetlow 2005: 93, M.D. Hall 1996: 82-83, 
Todd 2000b, MacDowell 1963: 111-13; on hemlock, see n. 161 below; on stoning, 
see n. 55 below.
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tested in the contemporary sources, these remarks can often be dated 
many centuries later than the events which they describe, sometimes 
even as late as the biographical writings of Diogenes Laertius (ca. 3rd 
cent. CE) or Plutarch (1st/2nd cent. CE). Within the following list of 
the alleged or actual trials for impiety, I will—whenever possible—try 
to present the cases in a chronological order.
The earliest cases: the Alcmaeonidae, Aeschylus, and an unknown 
Megarian
In classical and later sources48, there exist scattered remarks about 
the condemnation of the aristocratic family of Alcmaeonidae for not 
respecting the sanctity of the suppliants, traditionally guarded by 
Greek religious customs. Megacles, shortly after Cylon’s attempted 
coup (usually dated 632), killed the to-be tyrant and his supporters 
after they took refuge at a shrine. The Alcmaeonidae were then re-
portedly brought to trial by a certain Myron of Phlya, as a result of 
which those still alive were banished from Athens, while the bodies 
of the dead were dug out of the ground and left outside of the bor-
ders of Attica, either not long after the coup or a century later, after 
the reiteration of the curse in 508/7 (Thuc. 1.126.12; cf. Rhodes 1981: 
80). There can be no certainty as to the actual charge, while impiety 
is nowhere spoken of directly, but we do hear of the accusation of 
and curse for ‘religious guilt’49. The surviving evidence may not be 
enough to count it as the first impiety trial in Athens, but it certainly 
falls close.
The first alleged impiety trial from the classical period might thus 
rather be that of Aeschylus the tragedian (ca. 525 – 456), who was said 
by some late sources to have been accused of revealing the secrets 
concerning the Mysteries in several of his plays50 and to have tried 
justifying it in his own defence by saying that as a non-initiate he 
had not been aware of their secrets. In a single-sentence reference 
to Aeschylus, Aristotle simply states (Arist. EN III 1, 1111a8-10 = T 93a 
Radt), while speaking of an excuse for one’s ignorance: ‘But someone 
could be ignorant of what he is doing – for example, people declare 
that they had a slip of the tongue while speaking; or that they did not 
know that what they said was forbidden, as Aeschylus said about the 
Mysteries [ἢ οὐκ εἰέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα η ]ν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τά μυστικά]’ 
(trans. R.C. Barlett & S.D. Collins).
48. Thuc. 1.126, Hdt. 5.71, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 1, Plut. Sol. 12, and the scholia to Ari-
stophanes (Eq. 445); cf. Rhodes 1981: 79-83.
49. Thuc. 1.126.11: ἐναγεῖς καὶ ἀλιτήριοι τῆς θεοῦ (cf. Hdt. 5.71, Plut. Sol. 12.2, Σ 
Ar. Eq. 445); ἄγος: Ath. Pol. 1, Plut. Sol. 12.1, Σ Ar. Eq. 445. Cf. de Bruyn 1995: 74-76. 
On the refusal of burial in Attica, see n. 47 above.
50. See also Librán Moreno 2004 for a detailed analysis of the testimonies con-
cerning this incident.
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According to the account of late anonymous commentaries on Ar-
istotle’s Nicomachean Ethics51, Heraclides Ponticus (4th cent.) already 
remarked on the trial of Aeschylus in Book I of his commentary on 
Homer. Aeschylus was said to have been tried by the Areopagus52 
and acquitted because of his own and his brother’s Cynegeirus’ mer-
its in the Battle of Marathon53. Then, several centuries later, Clem-
ent of Alexandria (2nd/3rd cent. CE) made a similar brief remark 
in his Stromata (2.14 = T 93d Radt). Also in reference to making an 
excuse for one’s ignorance, he mentioned Aeschylus, who had to 
face trial before the Areopagus Council54. He was being prosecuted 
for revealing the secrets of the Mysteries before the skene and later 
acquitted, for he convinced the jurors he had not been initiated into 
the Mysteries.
Among all these remarks only Aelian (ca. 175 – ca. 235 CE) in his 
Various History (5.19 = T 94 Radt) speaks of ἀσέβεια with reference 
to Aeschylus, yet along with some quite incredible circumstances. 
He describes how the Athenians were about to stone the tragedian, 
when his younger brother, Ameinias, exposed a stump of his arm to 
show that he had lost it fighting with some exceptional bravery in 
the Battle of Salamis, which led to Aeschylus’ acquittal. Even though 
the variation on the theme of courageous soldiers remains within 
the expected limits (Heraclides speaks of a different battle and gives 
another name of the brother), one needs to be very suspicious of 
the possibility of stoning in fifth-century Athens under these condi-
tions, which had to be Aelian’s authorial invention. As far as we can 
tell, stoning (καταλεύειν) was not practised in fifth-century Athens 
– we know of only two cases from the entire classical period of a 
public stoning conducted by the Athenians, both in extreme condi-
51. T 93b Radt ap. Anon. in Arist. EN III 2 p. 145 Heylbut, CAG 20.145.23 (= Hera-
clid. Pont. fr. 170 Wehrli = fr. 97 Schütrumpf) and T 93c Radt ap. Aspas. in Arist. l.c. 
Heylbut, CAG 19.1.64.29.
52. After which he might have been tried by a dikasterion, but ὑπαχθῆναι εἰς 
δικαστήριον may actually mean ‘be brought to justice’, without pointing to the 
type of the court, cf. de Bruyn 1995: 76-78, LSJ s.v. ὑπάγω.
53. Here, Cynegeirus is said to have lost his arm in battle. Herodotus (6.114) 
mentions losing the arm in battle as the reason of death of a certain Cynegeirus, 
son of Euphorion, whose son, according to other sources, was also Aeschylus; cf. 
Aesch. T 16-48 Radt. The former was keenly panegyrised as Marathonomachos 
throughout antiquity. Polemon of Laodicea (2nd cent. CE), a member of the Se-
cond Sophistic, dedicated two orations to him. He is known from various artistic 
representations, and he could have even been one of the few chief Marathono-
machoi on the wooden painting in the Stoa Poikile from the fifth century, descri-
bed in later sources (Polański 2002: 153-54, 157-59).
54. Even if we were to take this account in deadly earnest, it should be worth 
noting that it would probably not be the Areopagus Council but a dikasterion that 
would deal with such affairs (sometimes, perhaps, consisting only of the citizens 
initiated into the Mysteries, just as in the case of the trials of 415, cf. And. 1.31).
25Athenian impiety trials: a reappraisal
tions of war55. It cannot be ruled out that there was a trial against 
Aeschylus, of unknown procedure and substance, yet the accounts 
covering it are particularly disputable and include some clearly ficti-
tious elements. Most likely the whole story grew out of one remark 
by either Aristotle or Heraclides (known for his talent for writing 
down miscellaneous fabricated plots, both on legendary and histori-
cal figures56), the meaning of which we cannot be sure to compre-
hend. Moreover, the appearance of the Areopagus Council in later 
sources suspiciously points to a late fourth-century rather than an 
early fifth-century parallel, and indicates a probable inspiration for 
the emergence of such accounts.
There is one more early suspect to consider, mentioned in the last 
words of Against Andocides by Pseudo-Lysias (6.54). The speaker claims 
that his grandfather Diocles, a son of a hierophant Zacorus (a telling 
name) advised the Athenians to conduct a fair trial of a certain Megar-
ian who had acted impiously and whom the Athenians were about to 
kill without trial (ἄκριτον). We learn nothing more about this case, but 
the remark itself constitutes an important example of an attempt to 
follow proper legal conduct, even in the face of violations especially 
detestable to the Athenians and in spite of a generally hostile attitude 
towards the accused. Even so, it is worth noting that this episode is 
being recalled by the speaker with an agenda. He attempts to encour-
age the conviction of Andocides for impiety by saying that the dicasts 
should take their time and reconsider charges issued against him to 
become certain of his guilt. One could speculate on the connection of 
this episode to Athenian conflict with Megara preceding the outbreak 
of the Peloponnesian War described by Thucydides (1.139), when the 
Athenians accused the Megarians of (impiously) cultivating the sacred 
land57 at the border of the two poleis. However, there are two more is-
sues to be considered here. First, the authorship and the date of com-
position of [Lys.] 6 are unknown, which makes solving chronological 
issues problematic if not impossible, and second, we cannot be sure if 
the case—if there was any—reached the stage of a proper trial. This 
should be enough to exclude it from the list of the historical trials but 
it remains an interesting possibility.
55. The case of Lycides in 479 (see Hdt. 9.5), whose name according to De-
mosthenes (18.204) was Cyrsilus, and one of Alcibiades, a cousin of the famous 
Alcibiades, in 409 (Rosivach 1987; cf. Allen 2000: 142-45). There are, of course, 
other known cases of stoning outside of Athens, predominantly during the war 
campaigns or political struggles, described e.g. in Hdt. 5.38 (the Mitylenians sto-
ning Coes) and 9.120 (the Elaeusians hanging Artayctes and stoning his son); cf. 
Hdt. 1.167. See n. 47 above on modes of executing the death sentence in Athens.
56. Cf. Lefkowitz 1981: 172-73; see e.g. Heraclid. fr. 43 Schütrumpf ap. Athen. 
XII, 533c on Pericles and fr. 98 Schütrumpf ap. D.L. 2.43-44 on Homer, Euripides, 
and others.
57. See IG II² 204 = RO 58 (dated 352/1) which speaks of forbidding any kind of 
impious behaviour towards the sacred land (ἱερὰ ὀργάς); see also Gomme 1945: 
447-50 for the roots and details of the conflict. For more on the sacred land in 
Greek poleis, see Rousset 2013.
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The ‘circle of Pericles’ and the ‘decree of Diopeithes’ (430s)
A more absorbing case and one very popular in the Roman era is the 
tradition concerning the trial of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (ca. 500 
– ca. 428?58). Although not an Athenian citizen, he became one of the 
leading advisers of Pericles59. He taught that Helios and Selene were 
not of divine nature, the former being just an extremely heated metal, 
the latter an inhabited world (Pl. Ap. 26d, D.L. 2.8, 12, Orig. Cels. 5.11). 
He questioned popular religious beliefs, including those concerning 
thunderbolts thrown down by Zeus, and for all this he was said to have 
been accused of impiety based on the decree of a certain Diopeithes60 
proposed specifically against the philosopher.
The first to mention the trial of Anaxagoras in the extant sources, 
after the much disputed remark in Plato’s Apology (see further), was 
Diodorus Siculus61 (1st cent.) in his description of the years antedat-
ing the Peloponnesian War. The author notes that Pericles’ enemies, 
among other actions, ‘falsely accused the sophist (sic! cf. Lib. Decl. 1.153-
54) Anaxagoras, the teacher of Pericles, of impiety towards the gods’ 
as part of the attack against friends of Pericles62. In the same chap-
ter of his Library, he describes the accusation of sacrilege (ἱεροσυλία) 
against Pheidias, issued by political opponents of Pericles, which they 
said Pericles himself had certainly known about. The historiographer 
speaks of (1) Pheidias’ assistants acting as suppliants to reveal the sac-
rilege committed by the sculptor and Pericles, (2) the meeting of the 
Assembly to discuss the information given by them, (3) some further 
58. According to most scholars (based on the citation from Apollodorus in 
D.L. 2.7). For a short summary of various proposed dates, see Cleve 1973: 1-3; cf. 
Derenne 1930: 30-38 on some proposed dates of the alleged trial; see e.g. Man-
sfeld 1979, 1980 for the date of 438/7. More often than not, the dating of Anaxa-
goras’ life rests on the presumption that he was tried in Athens.
59. T 15 D-K ap. Pl. Phaedr. 270a, Isocr. 15.235, Plut. Per. 4; cf. Dem. 61.45.
60. Probably not to be confused with Diopeithes the χρησμολόγος, i.e. the in-
terpreter of the written oracles (cf. Flower 2008: 124-25, 63, passim), mentioned 
by Xen. Hell. 3.3.3, see Sommerstein 1981: 202, Dunbar 1995: 550. Various seers 
certainly had much to say in the case of cultic regulations, as we learn also from 
non-literary sources, see IG I2 76 (= IG I3 78 = ML 73 = Fornara 140), IG II2 47 (= IG 
I3 123 = ML 92 = Fornara 165), cf. Osborne 2009: 124.
61. Allegedly following Ephorus (FGrHist70 F 196 ap. Diod. 12.41.1), while in 
reality probably some unpreserved anti-Periclean source, cf. Oldfather 1946: 450, 
n. 2 (or perhaps Ephorus’ account based on such sources?).
62. Diod. 12.39.2: διόπερ ἐκκλησίας συνελθούσης περὶ τούτων, οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ τοῦ 
Περικλέους ἔπεισαν τὸν δῆμον συλλαβεῖν τὸν Φειδίαν, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Περικλέους 
κατηγόρουν ἱεροσυλίαν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ἀναξαγόραν τὸν σοφιστήν, διδάσκαλον 
ὄντα Περικλέους, ὡς ἀσεβοῦντα εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς ἐσυκοφάντουν· συνέπλεκον δ’ ἐν 
ταῖς κατηγορίαις καὶ διαβολαῖς τὸν Περικλέα, διὰ τὸν φθόνον σπεύδοντες διαβαλεῖν 
τὴν τἀνδρὸς ὑπεροχήν τε καὶ δόξαν. See Raaflaub 2000 for a more detailed study 
of the issues connected to the trials in the ‘circle of Pericles’, not only those for 
impiety; cf. Stadter 1989: 284-305 (the author presents some useful references to 
various sources and studies, but does not always analyse them critically).
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(prosecutorial?) action by Pericles’ enemies, leading to (4) the arrest 
of Pheidias, (5) the trial of Pericles, and (6) the accusation of ‘impiety 
towards the gods’ against Anaxagoras. All of this is very unclear, as 
far as legal procedure is concerned. Diodorus sums up this brief de-
scription of the proceedings by a surprising statement that Pericles 
triggered the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War to divert attention 
away from the accusations aimed at him (12.39.3, 12.40.5; cf. Plut. Per. 
32, where he also sends Anaxagoras away from the city). This remark 
is then ‘supported’ by the fragments of comedies taken out of context 
(12.40.6): Aristophanes’ Peace (603-6, 609-11) of 421 and The Acharnians 
(530-31) of 425, along with one fragment of an unpreserved comedy 
Demes by Eupolis (fr. 102 PCG), where someone says that ‘Persuasion 
rested on his lips’, connected by Diodorus and later authors to the 
disposition of Pericles (see PCG ad loc.). Both places in Aristophanes’ 
comedies in fact speak vaguely of some private reasons for Pericles’ 
passing of the Megarian Decree. It is justifiable to suspect that the tale 
about these events was partly based on another trial of Pericles, that 
of 430/29, well-documented in the sources of the classical period. It 
was brought for embezzlement of public funds (κλοπή), and most like-
ly produced by the political climate prevalent in Athens in the first 
years of the war63.
It remains no secret that Hellenistic and later biographers drew 
from comedy as a historical source eagerly and in quite an unre-
strained manner. In the passage from Peace which Diodorus cites in 
support of his narrative, there is in fact a mention of some unfor-
tunate event relating to Pheidias (v. 605), but the context does not 
provide for any certain conclusions regarding its nature or histo-
ricity. According to Plutarch (Per. 31.4), Pheidias was charged with 
sculpting the effigies among the mythological figures on the shield 
of Athena that confusingly resembled Pericles and himself. We can-
not be sure what Aristophanes’ joke really concerned, yet it had to 
be comprehensible for the audience of 421, and thus refer to quite 
a well-known event, even if its relation to the war was a new idea 
of the comic poet, leaving both Trygaeus and the chorus in the play 
wondering (Pelling 2000: 152). It seems that at some point all the re-
marks found in earlier sources (including comedy) about Diopeithes, 
Pheidias, Pericles, and Anaxagoras were merged to find its way to 
Diodorus’ account of the causes of the Peloponnesian War. The notes 
on their piety and impiety were easily brought together to support a 
coherent scheme of events.
We see no mention of the accusation of Pheidias in Plato who re-
fers to him several times in his dialogues. According to other sources, 
Pheidias was said to have spent his last years in Elis. Pausanias (2nd 
cent. CE) informs us that the artist worked there on his statue of Zeus 
63. See Thuc. 2.59, 2.65.3, Pl. Gorg. 515e-516a, Dem 26.6; cf. Plut. Per. 16.3; cf. 
Raaflaub 2000: 98-100. Modern scholars who accept the historicity of the trial of 
Pheidias for embezzlement usually date it either 438/7 or 433/2 (Prandi 1977, 
Ameling 1986).
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(5.11.3), and his descendants were said to have lived in Elis (5.14.5). 
Davison (1953: 43) asserts that there is no proof for Pheidias’ stay in 
Athens after 438/7. These two traditions were apparently mixed up in 
the scholia to the Peace (FGrHist 328 F 121 ap. Σ RV Ar. Pax 605)64. Both 
scholiasts rely on the Attidographer Philochorus (3rd cent.), who—
they claim—maintained that Pheidias fled Athens and came to Elis af-
ter the trial for theft. While one of them tells us Philochorus spoke of 
stealing ivory from the statue of Athena, the other believes he men-
tioned gold (as do most of the testimonies), which raises doubts about 
what sources were actually available to our commentators65. Nonethe-
less, this is one of the less significant differences between the extant 
accounts, for Pheidias is known to have used the technique of chryse-
lephantine, which connected both elements. Furthermore, both state 
that he was said to have made a statue of Zeus in Elis and then to have 
been killed by the Eleans. For decades the attempts to establish the 
‘true biography’ of Pheidias have been meeting the same problems, re-
sulting from the existence of different variants of the story about his 
fate in antiquity and impossibility of solving the puzzle definitively66.
In the Life of Pericles (32), Plutarch makes a remark on the charge of 
ἀσέβεια against Aspasia, Pericles’ ‘concubine’ (named so only by the 
later tradition, see Wallace 1996c). According to the biographer, the 
charge was brought by Hermippus the comic writer claiming that As-
pasia was helping free women to rendez-vous with Pericles. The latter 
was also said to have guaranteed his concubine’s acquittal by shedding 
a flood of tears over her fate before the jurors (Plutarch makes this Ae-
schines’ of Sphettus story), and, feeling concerned about Anaxagoras 
in turn, to have sent him out of the city and cause the outbreak of the 
war to cover the bad climate surrounding him. A weeping Pericles in 
fact seems an easily adaptable motif for a play. Anecdotes about Aspa-
sia’s conduct could be also easily drawn out of anti-Periclean polemics 
found in Plato and elsewhere (Gomme 1945: 65-70, Raaflaub 2000: 107). 
Furthermore, both Aspasia and Pericles were under constant fire from 
comic writers67, while Hermippus, from what we can tell based on the 
extant fragments, was especially keen on taking a jibe at Pericles and 
his alleged debauchery (fr. 47 PCG). Seen in this context, it does not 
appear we should treat Athenaeus’ (2nd/3rd cent. CE) remark (XIII, 
589e) on the trials against Aspasia and Pericles any more seriously: 
‘And Antisthenes, the pupil of Socrates, tells us that Pericles, being 
in love with Aspasia, used to kiss her [ἀσπάζεσθαι, a pun] twice every 
64. Cf. FGrHist comment. ad loc. (pp. 484-96); it seems Philochorus had no 
doubts concerning Pheidias’ embezzlement, if the ‘citation’ in the scholia is to 
be trusted (see the section ‘Quellenforschung’ below).
65. Cf. Podlecki 1998: 104, Bauman 1990: 40. It is worth noting that tragic mi-
stakes also took place in Athens in connection to similar accusations, see Antiph. 
5.69-70.
66. Cf. Gomme 1956: 186-87.
67. Cf. Schwarze 1971: 110-13, passim, Henry 1995: 19-28, Vickers 1997.
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day, once when he entered her house, and once when he left it. And 
when she was impeached for impiety [φευγούσης … γραφὴν ἀσεβείας], 
he himself spoke in her behalf, and shed more tears for her sake than 
he did when his own property and his own life were imperilled’ (trans. 
C.D. Yonge, notes JF).
In the same passage of his Life of Pericles, the biographer states that 
Diopeithes, a seer mentioned numerous times in comedy, brought in 
a decree (ψήϕισμα), soon accepted by the people, which prescribed 
prosecuting by εἰσαγγελία all those who did not recognise the gods and 
taught about the celestial phenomena (τὰ μετάρσια)68. This was meant 
to cast suspicion on Pericles through his relations with Anaxagoras. 
Similarly, in the Life of Nicias (23; cf. De superst. 169f) the author tells us 
that Anaxagoras, accused of propagating his views, was barely saved 
from confinement by Pericles; he gets compared to Protagoras, who 
‘had to go into exile’, and Socrates, sentenced to death ‘for philosophy’.
Diodorus—whether following Ephorus or not—most likely trans-
ferred the stage humour of the comic writer Hermippus to an imagi-
nary lawsuit and cause of war69. Then it could be adopted by posterior 
sources, among the surviving ones for instance Flavius Josephus (Ap. 
2.265 = T 19 D-K) or Plutarch, perhaps through an intermediary. Stone 
(1988: 240) has further noted that Diodorus might have used ‘the same 
lost comedy by Hermippus that Plutarch seems to have echoed’; nev-
ertheless, there is no mention of Anaxagoras in the extant fragments 
of Old Comedy, including the ones cited by Diodorus70. It is also the 
only source speaking of the story about a series of attacks against 
Pericles, rather than its being an isolated case (Bollansée 1999b: 473). 
Apart from that, the first reference to the trial of Anaxagoras is both 
late and uncertain, and furthermore linked to a historical commen-
tary of dubious value.
Plutarch was apparently eager to accept this biographical tradition 
with sensational storyline based on anecdotes and remarks found in 
68. Plut. Per. 32.1: καὶ ψήφισμα Διοπείθης ἔγραψεν εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι τοὺς τὰ 
θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδάσκοντας, ἀπερειδόμενος εἰς 
Περικλέα δι’ Ἀναξαγόρου τὴν ὑπόνοιαν.
69. Cf. Dover 1988c: 138, Pelling 2000: 128; see also next section below.
70. Cf. Dover 1988c: 139. Other references in The Life of Pericles also point to 
the use of unreliable sources. In 6.2, Anaxagoras acts as a quasi-seer in support of 
Pericles and against Lampon the seer, cutting the ram’s head in two and giving a 
natural explanation (as befits a philosopher who used to praise the Mind), while 
in 16.7 we see him on the deathbed giving a witty, allegorical anecdote, so com-
mon in the biographical tradition. In fact, one surviving fragment of unknown 
genre and torn out of context mentions a certain Anaxagoras without telling us 
much about him, see Ar. fr. 676b Kock = Alex. Aetol. fr. 7 Pow. (= fr. 7 Magnelli). 
Comedies mocking philosophers’ impiety started to appear only in the 420s, if 
the dating of Cratinus’ Panoptai to shortly before the first staging of Aristopha-
nes’ Clouds in 423 is correct (see Bremmer 2007: 14; cf. Banfi 1999: 29-30); see also 
Furley 1996: 131-45 on the comic remarks about the Mysteries after 415.
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comedy71. The key argument here, however, seems to be chronology. Out 
of tens of known or alleged cases of the employment of the εἰσαγγελία 
procedure in the fifth and fourth centuries, only five cases were dated 
by Hansen to the times preceding the Peloponnesian War, all of them 
aimed at a single citizen, not a group, and concerning the accusation of 
treason72; and even those five trials were listed as εἰσαγγελίαι by Hansen 
based on tentative assumptions, not having been described as such by 
the sources and sometimes having even been called otherwise. Moreo-
ver, it would be an isolated example from classical Athens of the comic 
poet repeating his insults from the stage in court.
Diogenes Laertius (ca. 3rd cent. CE) presents us with four different 
versions of the narrative (2.12-14) about the incidents involving Anax-
agoras, without even trying to decide which could be more plausible 
than the other. According to Sotion’s (3rd-2nd cent.) account, Anax-
agoras was accused of impiety by Cleon, and defended by Pericles. 
He was then sentenced to exile and a penalty of five talents. Accord-
ing to Satyrus, (3rd cent.) he was accused of impiety and ‘Medism’ by 
Thucydides73 (the politician, son of Melesias, not the historian, son of 
Olorus), and then sentenced to death absente reo (F 16 Schorn). Accord-
ing to the Hellenistic biographer (not the comic writer) Hermippus of 
Smyrna74 (3rd-2nd cent.), Anaxagoras was already in jail when Pericles 
convinced the people in the Assembly to acquit the philosopher, but 
the former then committed suicide, for he could not bear the insult. 
Last but not least, Hieronymus of Rhodes (3rd cent.) believed that the 
philosopher, weakened by disease, was acquitted out of pity. After list-
ing all these variants, Diogenes Laertius simply states that Anaxagoras 
spent his last days in Lampsacus(!) where he died.
The reference to the accusations by Thucydides or Cleon looks sus-
picious, at least for chronological reasons, not to mention the impos-
71. Hermippus and other comic poets are the usual suspects, see e.g. Gomme 
1945: 449, Lefkowitz 1987: 157, Podlecki 1998: 116-17, and Raaflaub 2000: 101-7. 
See also Wallace 1994: 131-32 (along with the bibliography cited in n. 16), who 
mentions a fourth-century Socratic philosopher Aeschines of Sphettus, the au-
thor of a dialogue entitled Aspasia (SSR VI A 59-72) cited by Plutarch, as a pro-
bable source of the story, apparently continuing the tradition of philosophical 
invective and making some references to comedies; cf. Dover 1988c: 140.
72. Cf. Hansen 1975: 69-120 (see pp. 69-71 for those first alleged instances; 
Hansen’s list includes 130 examples of the—attested or presupposed—use of the 
procedure of εἰσαγγελία before the Assembly, with just about a dozen introduced 
only before the Council; see below on the cases of 415).
73. For controversies on Thucydides, son of Melesias, anti-Periclean opposi-
tion in Athens, and Plutarch’s account of these ‘events’, see Andrewes 1978 and 
Raaflaub 2000: 98-100; cf. Ferrarese 1975.
74. FGrHist IV A 3, 1026 T 6b = F 65. Hermippus was known for his passion for 
sensational stories (which is a common trait of Hellenistic biographical writings 
in general) and placing the trials for impiety and other thrilling events in pseu-
do-historical, fictitious setting, cf. Bollansée 1999a: 118ff., 182-84.
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sibility of simultaneously condemning anyone to death on the one 
hand and a fine and exile on the other, which leaves little doubt that 
these traditions had to be mutually exclusive (Davison 1953: 41). Stone 
(1988: 241) notes that three out of four authors cited were Alexan-
drians of the third century, while out of all of them Satyrus, the au-
thor of the imaginative Life of Euripides, is particularly known for using 
both comedy and tragedy as historical sources (Lefkowitz 2012: 87) – 
though the same could be said for Hermippus.
It has also been noted that Plato puts in the mouths of the characters 
of his dialogues various opinions concerning the philosophy of Anax-
agoras, for example when speaking of the trial of Socrates which would 
form a perfect opportunity for the comparison of both cases75. Never-
theless, he does not make any mention of it, just like Cicero, a contem-
porary of Diodorus, who frequently recalls Anaxagoras, yet without any 
references to his trial or any other trouble resulting from his spreading 
of the controversial opinions. Both authors refer to him as the teacher 
of Pericles, but surprisingly forget to mention any exciting accounts of 
the affairs from that period concerning the famous general.
Moreover, Plutarch (Nic. 23 = T 18 D-K) states that Anaxagoras’ 
beliefs on the ‘phases of the Moon’ were secret and known only to 
few. This is particularly worth confronting with a testimony by Pla-
to, borne about the time of Anaxagoras’ presumed death in 428, who 
lets his Socrates say in the Apology that anyone who wishes to do so 
can relatively cheaply buy Anaxagoras’ teachings (not necessarily his 
writings76) in the market77 (Ap. 26d-e). Socrates scolds Meletus while 
saying this, as the latter mistakes the well-known opinions of Anax-
agoras with those propagated by Socrates. And although all of this 
is happening during the trial of the latter and the defendant himself 
speaks of the writings by Anaxagoras and his beliefs about the gods, 
neither he nor anyone else says a word about the alleged prosecution.
Some scholars indeed took this passage to be an argument for 
the existence of such a trial78, for Socrates comments on Meletus’ 
charge of not recognising Helios79 and Selene as gods by responding 
75. See e.g. Stone 1988: 241-43, Dover 1988c: 146-47, Raaflaub 2000: 107.
76. See de Strycker & Slings 1994: 308.
77. See Miller & Platter 2010: 75 for possible interpretations of the word 
ὀρχήστρα in this passage.
78. See discussion in Wallace 1994: 150, n. 49.
79. Montuori (1988: 167-75) believes that it could not form a real charge 
against Anaxagoras, for Helios and Selene did not enjoy a significant role in fifth-
century Athenian cult, and even had they enjoyed one, no one would have expect 
a metic to be involved in it. These arguments have to be rejected, as it appears it 
would suffice for Helios and Selene to be deemed divinities to require everyone 
staying in Athens, a citizen or not, to pay respect towards them; see Pl. Symp. 
220d, Leg. X, 887e, XI, 931a, Hes. Op. 339; cf. Parker 2013b.
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to him: ‘Do you think you are accusing Anaxagoras? [Ἀναξαγόρου 
οἴει κατηγορεῖν;]’. Such an argument seems neither particularly con-
vincing nor justified, although the remark on the unrestrained cir-
culation of his teachings does not unequivocally refute it, for there 
is no evidence for the destruction of someone’s writings in classical 
Greece. It could be treated as an argument for his being prosecuted 
and then released, but nothing supports this view, while some actu-
ally argued that Plato’s remark could have been the beginning of 
a later tale about the trial80. The term κατηγορει =ν does not have to 
bear technical meaning. However the argument based on the lack of 
similar remarks in the contemporary accounts is troublesome due to 
the fact that beside the works of Plato and Xenophon we barely hear 
of the trial of Socrates in the extant fourth-century material81, the 
suspicious incongruities between the surviving sources all attest to 
the fabrication of this case later in antiquity.
The existence of the decree of Diopeithes itself, to which our only 
source is Plutarch (Per. 32), seems unlikely, all the more if we take 
into account the silence of the authors referring to Anaxagoras and 
his opinions who had plenty of excuses to tell such a story. We find 
only three other mentions of Diopeithes as a seer in Aristophanic 
comedy and just several more in the fragments of lost comedies by 
other authors (all up to the year 414), where he is described as ‘mad’82. 
Plutarch’s plot is set within a larger narrative of scandals concern-
ing the ‘circle of Pericles’, including charges against Aspasia. Similar 
accusations against Aspasia and Pericles were often brought forward 
80. See e.g. Gershenson & Greenberg 1962: 348: ‘Socrates’ question was read 
as an allusion to a historical event, rather than as an outraged protest at the 
absurdity of accusing him of corrupting the youth through doctrines everyone 
knew to be Anaxagoras’ and not his. Of course there would have been no point 
in Socrates referring to Anaxagoras’ books if Anaxagoras had in fact been tried 
earlier for hiding the doctrines at issue’; cf. Wallace 1994: 136-37.
81. There are only two other remarks preserved from the fourth-century 
sources, both in forensic oratory, one of them passed on by the indirect tradition 
(Aeschin. 1.173 and Hyp. fr. 55 Jensen), followed by countless later writings; cf. 
Lenfant 2002: 138. It is worth adding that we also know of Socratic ‘Defences’ 
written by several fourth-century authors, of which some fragments have survi-
ved, among them that of Lysias (Lys fr. 271-76 Carey, clearly epideictic, pace Cic. 
De or. 1.231), Theodectes (Arist. Rh. II 23, 1399a7-10), and Demetrius of Phalerum 
(frr. 91-98 Wehrli = frr. 102-9 SOD), with apparently more remaining unmentio-
ned by name (Xen. Ap. 1); Polycrates, in turn, wrote an epideictic Prosecution of 
Socrates (Isocr. 11.4), to which Lysias’ defence speech was a response according 
to the scholiasts (fr. 272a-273 Carey). Aristotle (Poet. 1447b1-3, Rh. III 16, 1417a19-
21) speaks of the entire ‘genre’ of what he called ‘the Socratic dialogues’ (or 
‘speeches’, cf. Isocr. 11.4-6), cf. Ford 2009, 2010, Waterfield 2013: 11-13 (with a list 
of ancient authors involved in such activities).
82. Ar. Eq. 1085 and Vesp. 380 with schol., Av. 988; Ameipsias fr. 10 PCG, Phi-
letairus fr. 9 PCG, Phrynichus Kronos fr. 9 PCG, and Teleclides Amphiktyones fr. 7 
PCG (perhaps also Eupolis fr. 264 PCG, see Sommerstein 1987: 263); cf. IG I2 57 = IG 
I3 61 = ML 65 = Fornara 128 (a decree on the status of Methone proposed ca. 430 
by a certain D[iopei]thes, if the emendation is correct); cf. Rubel 2000: 109-19.
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by comic writers whose ideas Plutarch eagerly incorporated into his 
biographies (see also pp. 63-66 below on Phryne). The first to explic-
itly speak of false accusations of Pericles and his circle by comic poets 
was, to our surprise, Plutarch himself (Per. 13.9-10). As Dover (1988b) 
acutely notes, it is very difficult to explain to someone who has nev-
er experienced it what παῤῥησία, democratic frank speech, actually 
means – hence the later authors’ lack of understanding for the reality 
of Athenian democracy.
The historicity of the decree of Diopeithes has to be rejected on sev-
eral grounds. In addition to the convincing arguments noticed by ear-
lier scholarship emphasising all the comic aspects of Plutarch’s sen-
sational story, it is legal chronology that should be emphasised as the 
main argument for disproving its authenticity. On the other hand, the 
frequently mentioned linguistic argument does not seem conclusive, 
for it is perfectly convenient for the later authors to paraphrase the 
source and restate the original content in new, contemporary word-
ing (for example, using the newly-coined adjective μετάρσιος in place 
of classical Attic μετέωρος). Of course, one may assume that Plutarch 
cited here word-by-word a decree clumsily forged by an earlier au-
thor, the authority of whom he believed. Yet when connected with 
the rest of the evidence, the linguistic arguments provide a final point 
in support of the view that the decree was a later forgery. The trial of 
Anaxagoras itself seems unlikely but cannot be deemed unhistorical 
with all certainty. The one against Aspasia has all the traits of a story 
based on comic invective, while the case against Pheidias—if any—ap-
parently did not include a charge of impiety.
Quellenforschung: ancient biographers
Ancient scholars found many ways to invent circumstances that 
would show the character of the portrayed person based on a widely 
understood ‘likelihood’83. They used their sources freely, often para-
phrasing them under the guise of citations, more often than not making 
use of the recent popular excerpts instead of reading original authors 
(cf. Plin. Epist. 3.5.10, about Pliny the Elder: liber legebatur, adnotabat 
excerpebatque. Nihil enim legit, quod non excerperet). These extracts were 
regularly written down without proper context, merged one with an-
other by mere resemblance of source or subject; quite often, the origi-
nal meaning was long lost or misunderstood84. They very rarely used 
line numbering; not infrequently they omitted a title and book number 
of the quoted work altogether (Jacob 2000). This had to lead to much 
confusion when the source was excerpted, rewritten, retold, or simply 
recalled several times, which was the case with much of the material 
used by Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, or Athenaeus.
83. See Hägg 2012: 67-98; cf. Bing 1993 for Hellenistic and later attempts to 
‘dramatise’ biographies.
84. Cf. Mejer 1978: 7-29; Fairweather 1974; Bollansée 1999b: 384, with n. 17 (an 
example of Athenaeus).
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Lefkowitz (1981: 110-11; 2012: 93-95, 104-12), having analysed the 
Hellenistic ‘lives of the poets’ in detail, has tentatively suggested that 
Athenian impiety trials, and particularly the trial of Aspasia and the 
decree of Diopeithes, are a product of imagination of later biogra-
phers who—for various reasons—made efforts to prove that the trial 
of Socrates was not the first ‘ideological’ trial in Athens. Earlier pros-
ecution of ‘free thinkers’ could then form a precedent for sentencing 
Socrates, which would prove useful for the narrative introducing his 
example as a general trait of Athenian democracy. Many ‘biographi-
cal’ tales were invented by Hellenistic and later biographers simply 
on the basis of the content of the works left by the authors whose life 
at that point remained otherwise unknown. While doing so, they have 
often widely cited all available sources, including comic and oratori-
cal invective, without applying any critical method, and apparently 
following the principle ‘se non è vero, è ben trovato’. A single remark 
suitable for sensational plot was enough to become grist for the gos-
sip’s mill. For example, Demosthenes teased Aeschines in the speech 
On the Crown by saying that Aeschines’ father had been formerly a 
slave named Tromes, while his mother a prostitute called Empousa (a 
telling name), which was then without a second thought repeated by 
Aeschines’ biographers as historical facts (Cooper 1995: 304).
A few curious examples of this approach have been listed by Dover 
(1988c: 138-42). A scholiast commenting on Aristophanes’ Frogs (Σ Ar. 
Ran. 405) on the basis of a fragment from a comedy by Strattis (fr. 16 
PCG), where a dithyrambic poet Cinesias (cf. Maas 1921) is derided as 
the chorus-slayer (χοροκτόνος), draws a conclusion that the choregia 
were abolished on the initiative of Cinesias in the beginning of the 
fourth century. Satyrus, in turn, in his Life of Euripides (F 6 Schorn fr. 
39 col. X) treats the plot of Aristophanes’ Thesmophoriazousae, in which 
the Athenian women conspire together against Euripides, as a descrip-
tion of a historical event85. Similarly, if we were to believe Plutarch’s 
account (Per. 35) concerning Pericles’ attempt to overcome his great 
superstitious fear of the solar eclipse during the arrangements for the 
naval expedition against Epidaurus at the beginning of the Peloponne-
sian War, we would have to discredit Thucydides’ version of the story 
(2.56), according to which the expedition took place in the summer 
of 430, for the nearest solar eclipse (mentioned in Thuc. 2.28) was in 
August of 43186.
The question of intermediaries should be added to this, for Diogenes 
Laertius had not always read the authors whom he ‘cited’, primarily 
using quotations in other works, which blurs the question of his ‘im-
mediate sources’87. Plutarch, another widely cited historian from the 
85. See also Lefkowitz 1987: 152 and Wallace 1994: 131 (with the bibliography 
cited by the author in n. 17).
86. Cf. Munro 1919.
87. Goulet 1997: 151-56; Bollansée 2001a: 64-72; Mejer 1978; Gigante 1986; Mo-
raux 1986: 252-53.
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Roman era, in his selection of sources willingly made references to 
the testimonies of other historians, but in his, often anecdotal, narra-
tive he frequently followed comic writers, especially when describing 
sensational events concerning ancient celebrities. Plutarch’s ‘unre-
strained’ use of various sources in his Lives included merging different 
accounts that appeared similar, chronological shifts, inventing the 
supporting details, and other similar techniques88.
It is commonly recognised that biography bears strong connection 
not only to historiography but also epideictic oratory, following its 
patterns of praise and blame (Burridge 1997, Hägg 2012). This is true 
even more for antiquity. Plutarch, as many of his fellow writers, did 
not attempt to conceal the moralising purpose of his biographies, by 
means of which he wished to reveal the ‘virtue and wickedness’ of their 
characters, ready to sketch timeless moral exempla (παραδείγματα), 
which should be enough of a warning to his reader89. Furthermore, he 
openly believed the aristocratic government to be the best and—like 
many of his contemporaries—worshipped Plato while despising the 
Athenian democrats, which had to significantly influence his view of 
classical Athens. Plutarch evidently did not understand the nature of 
democratic government and disliked the demos90, taking it alternative-
ly for a tyrant or a shapeless mass which can be easily manipulated. 
We know he also tried to add some spice to his plots (occasionally with 
a certain naivety), following the general tendency of Hellenistic and 
later biographical writings, which resulted in his vivid but historically 
ambiguous ‘Lives’.
Historical accuracy in the descriptions of classical Athens was, to put 
it mildly, also not the forte of Diodorus, the author of our first testi-
mony to the trials in the ‘circle of Pericles’91. Although traditionally per-
ceived simply as a compiler, he was a writer conscious of his goals as a 
historian (Chamoux 1993: XVIII-XLII). He, too, regarded historiography 
clearly as a moralistic and epideictic genre, with its most notable indi-
viduals set as examples for the future; he thus generally favoured out-
standing individuals and portrayed them as by nature opposed to the 
‘crowd’ (ὄχλος)92. Diodorus saw in Athens the fate of countless empires 
– gradual decline of moral principles and tyrannical aspirations rising 
88. Pelling 1979, 1980, 1990; but see Pelling 1992 for a more approving tone; 
cf. Gomme 1945: 58-59.
89. His moralising aim is clearly stated in introductions to the Lives of Ae-
milius Paulus and… Pericles, see Plut. Aem. 1.1-3, Per. 1.3-4, 2.1-3; cf. Hägg 2012: 
272-77, Gomme 1945: 54-57.
90. This trait can be noticed in almost all of his descriptions of the Athenian 
demos, see e.g. Plut. Thes. 25, Cam. 36, Tim. 37, Mar. 28 (cf. Russell 1966).
91. On Diodorus’ use of sources, see e.g. Drews 1962, Palm 1955: 15-63, Sacks 
1994, 1990: 77, passim.
92. Cf. Wirth 1993: 26-32; on Diodorus’ moral assumptions (‘history as a moral 
force’), see Sacks 1990: 81-82, 93-108, 215, 229 et al.
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along with military growth. Sketching a similar scenario for Athens was 
not particularly challenging. Remarks found in his Hellenistic sources 
based on anti-Periclean rhetoric were enough to form Book XII of the 
Library, with its eagerness to describe all the events that would support 
the Thucydidean view of the war as the ‘severest of Athenian defeats’. 
As the next section will discuss, such political assumptions could prove 
useful in sketching the life and death of famous individuals living in the 
classical period and their relation to the contemporary people.
Protagoras and ancient book-burning
Protagoras of Abdera (ca. 490 – ca. 421?) was reportedly charged 
with impiety and either killed or exiled from Athens, while his books 
were burnt by the Athenians. This famous sophist was the author of 
the treatise On the Gods, illustrating the principles of his agnosticism 
(Cic. N.D. 1.63, Sext. Emp. Math. 9.56; F 4 D-K ap. D.L. 9.51). All available 
sources on his trial are both from a later period and mostly dubious as 
well. The earliest of them was written four centuries after the events 
it describes. In his dialogue De Natura Deorum (1.63), Cicero juxtapos-
es Protagoras with Diagoras ‘called the Atheist’ and with the famous 
Greek atheist Theodorus of Cyrene (see pp. 75-76 below). He claims 
that Protagoras, sentenced by the Athenians, was exiled out of Attic 
soil (urbe atque agro) and his writings were publicly burnt during the 
meeting of the Assembly (in contione). A century later, Flavius Josephus 
(Ap. 2.265 = T 19 D-K) wrote that the Athenians—by a small majority of 
votes—condemned Anaxagoras to death for his views on the Sun and 
set a money prize for either seizing or killing Diagoras of Melos (see 
pp. 46-51 below). The author further explains that Protagoras escaped 
the city just in time, coming within a hair’s breadth of losing his life 
after the Athenians agreed to kill him for his writings about the gods 
which they found incongruous with their own beliefs.
In his Life of Nicias (23.4), Plutarch also mentions Protagoras and his 
flight from Athens, comparing his case with those of Anaxagoras and 
Socrates. In the treatise Against the Mathematicians (i.e. ‘scholars’ in 
general), Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160 – ca. 210 CE) says that Protagoras 
was condemned to death by the Athenians, and died in a shipwreck 
when trying to escape (9.56 = T 12 D-K; cf. Philochorus FGrHist 328 F 
217 ap. D.L. 9.55), referring to a fate commonly ascribed to the impious 
throughout antiquity (Nestle 1948: 584). He adds that Timon of Phlius 
(3rd cent.) refers this episode in Book II of his satirical Silloi (fr. 5 Diels 
= fr. 5 Di Marco), where he claims that the Athenians were to burn Pro-
tagoras’ books because of what he had written about the gods. Even if 
we turn a blind eye to the frequently raised objections to Sextus’ care-
less habits concerning citations from earlier philosophers, we should 
note that Timon was another author known for his passion for and 
attention given to scandalous stories of the past93. Finally, Diogenes 
93. He wrote i.a. that Plato had committed plagiarism by adopting in his Ti-
maeus the matter from a Pythagorean treatise (fr. 54 Diels = fr. 54 Di Marco ap. 
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Laertius asserts (9.52 = T 1 D-K) that because of (the introduction to) 
Protagoras’ treatise ‘the Athenians expelled him; and they burnt his 
works in the market-place, after sending round a herald to collect 
them from all who had copies in their possession’ (trans. R.D. Hicks). 
The Suda (Π.2958, s.v. Πρωταγόρας) repeats some of these remarks. In 
none of the aforementioned sources is there any direct remark on a)
se/beia, which does not enter the picture until the Christian authors94. 
Laertius further describes the circumstances of this event by stating 
(9.54 = Arist. fr. 67 Rose3 = fr. 867 Gigon):
The first of his books he read in public was that On the Gods, 
the introduction to which we quoted above; he read it at Athens 
in Euripides’ house, or, as some say, in Megaclides’; others again 
make the place the Lyceum and the reader his disciple Archago-
ras, Theodotus’s son, who gave him the benefit of his voice. His 
accuser was Pythodorus, son of Polyzelus, one of the four hun-
dred; Aristotle, however, says it was Euathlus. (trans. R.D. Hicks)
Euathlus does in fact seem to be a frequent prosecutor in various 
trials of that period95. We cannot be sure, however, what trial Aristo-
tle, if cited correctly by Diogenes, had in mind; mentioning a different 
name for the prosecutor arouses suspicion. Diogenes Laertius (9.56; cf. 
Gell. 5.10.3) makes Protagoras and Euathlus heroes of another quarrel, 
this time over a due payment, perhaps confused in the biographer’s 
account (Lenfant 2002: 148-49).
What is particularly striking and what raises many concerns—as 
convincingly discussed by Wallace (1996a)—is the tradition referring 
to book-burning in classical Greece, which can be dated at the Roman 
era (and perhaps just then fabricated). One should not forget that re-
ligion in Rome was supervised by state officials, unlike in the Greek 
poleis where the status of priests was much more complex (they did 
not constitute any coherent ‘social group’, though individual priests 
had some political functions in Greek poleis, see Sourvinou-Inwood 
2000b [1988]). This disparity had to influence a different understand-
ing of any conception of a ‘doctrine’ in the Greek and Roman world. If 
we are to trust Livy (39.16.8), writing two centuries after the notori-
ous senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus of 186, we have to assume that 
before 186 the Senate frequently ordered the officials to gather all 
available copies of prophetic writings (vaticini libri) and burn them. If 
this is so, Dover (1988c: 157-58) was incorrect in stating that the tradi-
Gell. 3.17.4), cf. Wallace 1994: 149, n. 33; on Timon’s Silloi and its reception, see 
also Clayman 2009: 75-173.
94. E.g. Min. Fel. Oct. 8.3, Lact. De Ira 9.1-2, Eus. Praep. Ev. 14.19.10.
95. See Ar. Ach. 710, Vesp. 592; cf. Cratin. fr. 82 PCG ap. Σ Ar. Vesp. 592 b (ca. 430 
BCE); Ar. fr. 424 PCG (423 BCE?), Pl. Comic. fr. 109 PCG; cf. Davison 1953: 35, Olson 
2002: 255; perhaps the remarks about both found in comedy made a link between 
Euathlus and Protagoras possible, see e.g. Eupol. frr. 157 & 158 PCG.
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tion of book-burning did not begin until the death of Cicero. However, 
it should be noted that this inglorious practice gained in popularity 
during the Augustan era and then during the Empire, when it was em-
ployed not solely for the purpose of religious censorship but also in 
political struggles96. Additionally, Roman historiographers97 make a 
mention of the events of 181, when the buried chest with the writings 
which belonged to the king Numa Pompilius was allegedly found, part 
of which was said to be written in Greek and deal with Pythagorean 
philosophy. The Senate commanded the praetor to burn them; and 
although the books were quite obviously a forgery, the act of burning 
matters as a turning point. After beginning its new life over a cen-
tury later during the early Principate and continuing throughout the 
entire duration of the Empire, damnatio memoriae became a solution 
eagerly employed against defiant or inconvenient individuals in an 
attempt to confirm the imperial authority (Polański 2007).
As proof that the Greeks of that period were familiar with this prac-
tice, Dover (1988c: 143) brings up a passage by Aristoxenus (acme 335) 
cited by Diogenes Laertius (9.40) which says: ‘Aristoxenus in his Histori-
cal Notes affirms that Plato wished to burn all the writings of Democri-
tus that he could collect, but that Amyclas and Clinias the Pythagoreans 
prevented him, saying that there was no advantage in doing so, for al-
ready the books were widely circulated’ (trans. R.D. Hicks). Even if we 
were to believe that this anecdotal tale were true, it seems that there 
is a great difference between one such idea being only spoken of (espe-
cially when coming from Plato) and the ‘state’ practice of book-burning.
It is also important to remember that, even during the Republic, Ro-
man political thought and political practice were rather remote from 
their Greek counterparts; in particular, there was no Roman equiva-
lent to the Athenian ideal of παῤῥησία. Roman politicians, on the oth-
er hand, widely assumed that only those in power could speak openly, 
since the debates were held in the Senate, not the Assembly. Had the 
burning of Protagoras’ books happened in Athens as an infamous ex-
ception, it should have drawn considerable attention from contempo-
rary Athenians. We may thus assume that the latter would have left 
some trace of such an episode in their writings, especially in the case 
of a distinguished figure, to whom Plato devoted one of his dialogues. 
Stone (1988: 232; cf. Wallace 1996a: 237-38) summarises it briefly: ‘The 
frequent expulsion of philosophers and other Greek teachers from 
Rome is well attested, and it was natural for writers of that time to as-
sume that the Athenians were equally suspicious and intolerant. That 
also suited their contempt for democracy’. All in all, we know of very 
few individual refugees of the period of the Peloponnesian War98.
96. Cf. Forbes 1936: 119, 122-23; cf. Sarefield 2004; Speyer 1981.
97. See Varro ap. Aug. C.D. 7.34, Liv. 40.29, Val. Max. 1.1.12, Plin. N.H. 13.84-87; 
cf. Plut. Numa 22; Lact. Inst. Div. 1.22.5-8; Anon. De Viris Illust. 3.3; cf. Forbes 1936: 
118; Speyer 1981: 52-53.
98. See Panagopoulos 1979.
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In Plato’s Protagoras, the old sophist speaks of himself by admitting 
that he has never met any trouble because of his being a sophist (317b-
c = T 5 D-K):
[…] So I have gone quite the opposite way from these others, and 
I admit that I am a sophist and that I educate people; I think that an 
admission of that kind is a better precaution than a denial. And I’ve 
taken other precautions as well, so that, touch wood, I’ve never come 
to any harm through admitting to being a sophist. And yet I’ve been 
practising the craft for many years (and indeed I’m a good age now, 
I’m old enough to be the father of any of you). (trans. C.C.W. Taylor)
Furthermore, in Meno (91d-e = T 8 D-K) Socrates replies to Anytus 
who claims that one should refrain from mixing with the sophists to 
avoid corruption:
[…] I know of one man, Protagoras, who earned more money from 
this branch of wisdom than not just Pheidias (the creator of such 
conspicuously beautiful works of art), but ten other sculptors too. 
What you’re saying is extraordinary. If people who mend old shoes 
and repair clothes tried to conceal the fact that they were return-
ing those items in a worse condition than they received them, they 
wouldn’t last thirty days before being found out; if they behaved like 
that, they’d soon starve to death. And yet you’re saying that Protago-
ras took in the whole of Greece: he was corrupting those who associ-
ate with him and sending them back home in a worse condition than 
when he took them on, and no one noticed for … well, it must have 
been more than forty years, because I think he was getting on for 70 
when he died, and so he’d been engaged in his profession for forty 
years. And you’re saying that Protagoras took everyone in for that 
long – right up to the present day, in fact, because his good reputa-
tion has not yet been dented. Actually, it’s not just Protagoras, be-
cause there are a great many others too, some born earlier than him 
and some still alive today. (trans. R. Waterfield)
Most likely, Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius drew from the same tra-
dition, being the aforementioned Hellenistic biographical literature, 
always in search of thrilling motifs and spicy plots. I will come back to 
this proclivity in reference to the trial of Phryne (see pp. 63-66 below). 
To sum up, it should be concluded that the trial of Protagoras, and 
particularly the tradition concerning the exile and public book-burn-
ing, seems highly doubtful when viewed through the prism of Plato’s 
dialogues, while all the testimonies which mention it are late, mostly 
anecdotal, and mutually exclusive99.
99. I do not believe that Pl. Tht. 171d and a fragment from Eupolis’ Flatterers 
cited by Athenaeus (see Wallace 1994: 134) add anything valuable to the discus-
sion about an actual trial.
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Mysteries and superstitions: the Hermae and beyond (415-399)
Unlike the trials of debatable historicity discussed up to this point, 
the events of 415 concerning the trials of the Hermocopidae and the 
profaners of the Mysteries are well attested in the contemporary 
sources100, although themselves not without an agenda101. The atmos-
phere of a witch-hunt, false accusations, and encouraging the delation 
is known to Thucydides’ readers102 (see Thuc. 6.27.2 for a proclamation 
inviting denunciation of any act of impiety). It can be partly justified by 
the fear of the secret ἑταιρει =αι (Thuc. 6.60, Isocr. 16.6; McGlew 1999), 
which were about to leave such a heavy mark on Athenian memory 
during both coups d’état, in 411 and 404. The scale of events concern-
ing the mutilation of the Hermae went clearly beyond the actions of 
a single ἑταιρεία (Pelling 2000: 43). Because of the information given 
as a result of the Hermocopidae proceedings, Alcibiades himself was 
charged with profaning the Eleusinian Mysteries by a sacrilegious pri-
vate performance of their secret rites, most likely meant as a parody103.
Much has been said on the political aspects of these events, quite 
likely an intrigue instigated by political enemies of Alcibiades, in the 
shadow of attempts to deter the Sicilian expedition104. Thucydides ex-
plains that the mutilation of the statues of Hermes posed a bad omen 
for the recently planned military mission (6.27.3) (the presence of a 
‘godless’ individual on the ship was perceived as a threat to the entire 
crew, while Hermes was considered a god of travel)105, although it was 
100. See Thuc. 6.27, 53, 60, Xen. Hell. 1.4.14-23 (both authors, writing about 
the profanation of the Mysteries by Alcibiades, use the verb ἀσεβέω; cf. And. 1, 
Dem. 21.146-47); cf. Hansen 1975: 77-82, MacDowell 1962.
101. See MacDowell 1962: 181 and Pelling 2000: 26-37 on some of Andocides’ 
hidden agenda, and Pelling 2000: 18-25 and Hornblower 2009 on Thucydides’. 
102. It is worth noting, however, that the enquiries were led by the ζητηταί, 
appointed for this purpose by the Council, a fact not stressed by Thucydides, see 
And. 1.14, 36, 40, 65, cf. n. 101 above.
103. See the overview in Smarczyk 1990: 270, n. 324. Murray (1990: 155-56) notes 
that the sources speak only of the performance, not of parodying the rites, but Wal-
lace (1992: 328 n. 2) defends the comic aspect based on some contemporary paral-
lels (to which a later one about Ninos could be added, see Σ Dem. 19.281, 495b: ἐξ 
ἀρχῆς γέλωτα εἶναι καὶ ὕβριν κατὰ τῶν ὄντως μυστηρίων [ὅτι] τὰ τελούμενα ταῦτα 
<νομίζοντες> τὴν ἱέρειαν ἀπέκτειναν). In fact, MacDowell (1962: 211) believed that 
among the denounced there were probably three comic playwrights, a detail which 
would point to mockery rather than simple ‘performance’; cf. Bremmer 1995: 77. For 
more on the gravity of this kind of offence in classical Athens, see Gagné 2009.
104. See e.g. MacDowell 1962: 190-94, passim, Gomme et al. 1970: 276-90, Osbor-
ne 1985; Furley 1996; Rubel 2000: 197-204. For an overview of the scholarship on 
these affairs, see Hornblower 2008: 367-72. The mutilation happened some two 
months after the Assembly meeting which agreed for the Sicilian expedition, see 
MacDowell 1962: 186-89.
105. Cf. Powell 1979; Gomme et al. 1970: 284; Furley 1996: 93-101. The monu-
ments should perhaps be seen as the god’s property and a confirmation of the 
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not the first time such an impious act had happened (6.28). Andocides 
(1.67) tells the dicasts in his trial that the mutilation was the result of 
a ‘pledge’ (πίστις) between the transgressors, a ritual oath conceived 
as a mutual warranty106.
The charges in both cases were initiated by citizens, Pythonicus and 
Diocleides, presumably by the εἰσαγγελία107 initiated before the Coun-
cil108 (at least in the Hermae case), and subsequently taken to popular 
courts109 (which would normally imply γραφαί). All of this was based 
on a series of denunciations (μηνύσεις)110 which came from citizens, 
metics, and slaves111. We cannot be sure of the role of the Assembly in 
all of this. Pythonicus gave some information on the Mysteries before 
the Assembly (And. 1.11-14), and Andocides addressed the dicasts in 
399 by saying ‘the speeches were told before you’ (1.37), but it might 
be wrong to read it as anything else than the rhetorical ‘as you all 
know’ topos112. Diocleides was later separately tried and sentenced to 
death for misinformation in court, probably by a γραφή (And. 1.65-
66). The accusation of impiety was intertwined here with the charge 
passe-partout of attempting to subvert the democracy (κατάλυσις του = 
δήμου), while the two cases were linked by the prosecutors113. As a 
link between him and the Athenians, rather than as his effigy, cf. Osborne 1985, 
Graf 2000: 122-23. For some examples of Athenian ‘superstitions’ (δεισιδαιμονία), 
see e.g. Theophr. Char. 16; cf. Meijer 1981: 259-61.
106. Cf. MacDowell 1962: 192, Leão 2004: 214-215; Murray 1990; Furley 1996: 93-101; 
see also remarks on the Κακοδαιμονισταί above, cf. Thuc. 3.82.6, 8.73.3, And. 1.41.
107. See And. 1. 37, 43 (εἰσαγγέλλειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ περὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου in 1.14 is ap-
parently meant in a non-technical sense: ‘informed at the Assembly about Alcibi-
ades’ (not κατὰ Α.), and thus 1.27 probably refers to this as well; it is possible that 
in other places we should also read the term in its general meaning of μηνύειν, 
cf. LSJ s.v. εἰσαγγέλλω; cf. MacDowell 1962: 73, 81, 88, Rhodes 1979: 110); see also 
Plut. Alc. 19.1-3, 22.2-4 (the authenticity of the ἔγκλημα cited only by Plutarch, 
which is incongruent with other sources, is at least debatable, see Harris (2013b): 
148, n. 21); cf. Hansen 1975: 11, 52, 77-82.
108. That is if we discount Pythonicus’ denunciation before the Assembly, see 
n. 107 above. See And. 1.37, Isocr. 16.6-7; cf. And. 1.15, 65.
109. And. 1.17; cf. 1.28 (trial as an expected outcome implied) and Thuc. 6.60.4: 
κρίσεις ποιήσαντες. This would be the typical course of events within εἰσαγγελία, 
cf. Hansen 1975: 51.
110. See almost fifty occurrences of μηνυ– throughout the entire And. 1 and 
eleven in Thuc. 6.27-29, 53, 60-61. One of the ‘informers’ was Andocides himself 
(Thuc. 6.60.2, And. 1).
111. See Thuc. 6.27-28, 60; And. 1.11-17, 34-35.
112. On the topos, see Arist Rh. 1408a34-36; on the argument about the use of 
ὑμεῖς in And. 1, cf. Rhodes 1979: 109 (n. 56), 111, Pelling 2000: 30. Based on Han-
sen’s model, one would have to assume that in this type of εἰσαγγελία the Assem-
bly would at some point become involved, cf. Rhodes 1979: 110-11.
113. Cf. And. 1.36, Thuc. 6.27-28, 53, 60-61, Isocr. 16.6-7 (Thucydides speaks 
of ἀσέβημα and ἀσεβου =ντες in both the case of the Mysteries and the Hermae, 
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result, 22 individuals were sentenced to death and confiscation of 
property for both crimes, some of whom fled Athens114; the sentences 
were then inscribed and publicly displayed on stelae115. Similarly, Al-
cibiades and ‘his companions’ were sentenced to death in absentia, 
because—technically speaking—they ‘failed to appear’ in court (Thuc. 
6.61.7: ἐρήμῃ δίκῃ)116.
One of the principal defendants—and, soon, chief denunciators—
in these trials was Andocides the orator who had to go into exile af-
ter giving evidence during his arrest in return for immunity (ἄδεια) 
in the on-going trials117. Other informers pivotal to the case of the 
Hermae were Andromachus and Teucrus who gained enormous 
prizes for testifying (And. 1.28, 40; there was also a price put on the 
heads of fugitives, see Thuc. 6.60.4; cf. Eur. El. 32-33). Andocides’ 
part in the mutilation of the Hermae and profanation of the Myster-
ies has been much debated118, but it does not constitute a matter of 
great importance for the present study. Some fifteen years later, he 
tried to trivialise his part in these scandals in the defence speech 
given in a new trial brought against him, again for impiety (And. 
1.32-56)119.
but there is no explicit statement in the sources that the charges in courts were 
brought for ἀσέβεια; it seems, however, that we have no reason to suspect that 
Andocides was barred by the Isotimides’ decree to enter the temples in Athens 
for any other reason than having been found guilty of impiety in 415, since he 
himself tries to disprove the charge of impiety in reference to the past events, 
cf. And. 1.10, 29, 58, 71, 132 et al. & [Lys.] 6); cf. Lys. 13.20; there is, of course, a 
certain rhetorical and legal manipulation involved in it, cf. Lycurg. Leocr. 147, 
passim. See also Furley 1996: 41-48 on the links made between two cases by the 
Athenians; see Dem. 25.29 on other cases which could be deemed an attempt to 
subvert the democracy in Athens.
114. Hansen 1975: 77-82, Gomme et al. 1970: 276-80.
115. See the list of sources in Fornara 1983: 170; cf. Pritchett 1953, Lewis 1966, 
Furley 1996: 45-48.
116. See also And. 1.16, Isocr. 16.7; cf. Hornblower 2008: 457, MacDowell 1990: 
300.
117. See Thuc. 6.27.2, 60.3 (and so did others: And. 1.11-22). In [Lys.] 6.22-23 
there is a mention of an entire year of detention, but an arrest this long does 
seems improbable in this case, cf. Todd 2007: 456-57.
118. See e.g. MacDowell 1962: 167-76, Marr 1971, Edwards 1995: 17-26.
119. Not long after the prosecutions of 415, Isotimides proposed a decree, 
passed soon after, perhaps aimed specifically against Andocides. The new law 
said that whoever had admitted himself guilty of impiety could not enter the 
‘holy places’ (neither the temples of Attica nor the Athenian agora; And. 1.71, 
132), which forced Andocides to leave Athens at that time. After years of exile 
and temporary returns, he chose to settle back in Athens, hoping to be co-
vered by the Amnesty, only to be accused of impiety again and go through a 
proper trial.
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The trial for ἀσέβεια against Andocides in 399 or 400120 involved 
the procedure of ἔνδειξις, which could be employed when someone 
benefited from the rights which s/he should not enjoy, in this case 
the ability to enter the agora and the sanctuaries121. Andocides was 
charged with impiety not only for illegally entering the temples, 
which was prohibited to him earlier by the Isotimides’ decree, but also 
for presumably leaving the branch on the altar of the two goddesses 
in the Eleusinion122 (And. 1.113), for which the punishment was death 
(1.115). Due to the religious nature of the trial it was introduced by the 
archon basileus ([Lys.] 6.11), and the dicasts unusually consisted only 
of the citizens who had been initiated into the Mysteries (And. 1.11, 
29), which emphasised the religious character of the prosecution123. 
Anytus and Meletus, the soon-to-be prosecutors of Socrates, were on 
the opposite sides in this trial, Anytus being a witness for the defence 
(earlier allegedly involved in the murder of Leon of Salamis, see And. 
1.94), Meletus124 a supporting prosecutor (And. 1.71)125. Andocides ex-
culpated himself in the trial and was acquitted126.
The pseudo-Lysianic speech Against Andocides ([Lys.] 6) contains a 
zealous religious argumentation, most likely either from 399 or the 
late fourth century127. What is rather striking in these circumstances 
120. See [Lys.] 6.11-12; see the discussion on the date in MacDowell 1962: 204-5.
121. See And. 1.10, 29, 111 (cf. 76); cf. [Lys.] 6.11-12, 24 (the speaker in [Lys.] 
6.11 mentions δίκη, though the remark proves to be problematic, cf. n. 134 and 
153 and the discussion below); [Plut.] X or. 835a, Harp. s.v. ζητητής; cf. Hansen 
1976 on the procedure. The prosecutor Cephisius argued that Andocides did not 
have the citizen (and thus religious) rights in Athens because of the decree of 
Isotimides from 415, which Cephisius believed was still valid in spite of the Am-
nesty of 403/2. A similar attitude towards the Amnesty can be found for example 
in Lys. 12 and 13. Andocides, on the contrary, argued in his defence that this law 
was not valid anymore, and that it had not applied to him even before (see And. 
1.71-72, passim), not necessarily in agreement with the logical interpretation of 
the law, cf. MacDowell 1962: 200-3.
122. The adverb δίς in [Lys.] 6.30 is variously understood either as two char-
ges in the present trial (see e.g. MacDowell 1962: 62, Todd 2007: 460-61) or two 
lawsuits by ἔνδειξις (see e.g. Hansen 1976: 11, 24, 128).
123. Cf. Martin 2009: 138ff.; see also Scafuro 2010; cf. Gagné 2009 on the offen-
ces against the Mysteries.
124. MacDowell (1962: 208-10) argues that Meletus from the first trial should 
not be identified with the one from the other; Dover (1968a: 78-80), however, 
opts for identifying the two, cf. Nails 2002: 199-202.
125. Cf. Rubinstein 2000: 106, 235.
126. He had to go into exile about a decade later for an entirely different rea-
son, namely a disagreement with the Athenians regarding the conditions of the 
peace treaty proposed by the Athenian embassy (which he was a part of) to Sparta.
127. We cannot be certain that this speech is not a later rhetorical exercise, 
apparently by someone acquainted with Athenian legal system. Todd (2007: 403-
11) believes it was a speech by a supporting prosecutor in the trial of Andocides 
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is that one of the individuals involved in the prosecution was Callias of 
the Kerykes, a wealthy patron of the sophists, better known as a host 
in Plato’s Protagoras and Xenophon’s Symposium, apparently tangled in 
a private dispute with Andocides128. The accusation of impiety is fre-
quently repeated by the author, who also mentions the possibility of 
following in impiety trials some kind of ‘unwritten laws’ subject to the 
interpretation of the Eumolpidae (6.10). This remark, however, raises 
many doubts129. Curiously enough, Andocides himself employed reli-
gious argumentation in his speech, for instance when claiming that 
the gods had saved him during his voyages (1.114, 137-39), most likely 
as a reply to similar arguments by his prosecutors ([Lys.] 6.19), but 
(possibly Meletus), to which And. 1 was a reply, but does not discuss other possi-
bilities in detail. For the discussion of religious terminology in [Lys.] 6, especially 
the accusation of being ἀλιτήριος, see Furley 1996: 109-16.
128. Cf. Clinton 1974: 49-50, Gagné 2009: 230.
129. The classical sources give us little reason to suspect that the Eumolpidae 
had any legal capacity apart from the customary right to give their interpreta-
tion of the rules concerning the Eleusinian Mysteries, which is attested in sev-
eral sources, see IG I2 76 (= IG I3 78 = ML 73 = Fornara 140) in a case of ἀπαρχή (see 
n. 146 below on the dating), see also IG II2 3490, cf. Parker (1996: 295-96, 2004: 
64-65), Hitch 2011: 136, MacDowell 1978: 193, Garland 1996; cf. Pl. Euthphr. 4a-e, 
Is. 8.39, IG II2 1177, Dem. 22.27; cf. Clinton 1974: 13-18, 49, 90. It is, neverthe-
less, interesting to note—however little historical value it might have—that the 
scholiast commenting on Dem. 22.27 (schol. 83 Dilts) believed that they often 
heard cases for impiety (ἱερὸν δὲ γένος οἱ Εὐμολπίδαι, ἱερᾶται δὲ Ἐλευσῖνι, καὶ 
ἐπὶ τούτου πολλάκις ἐδικάζοντο ἀσεβείας οἱ βουλόμενοι). See also And. 1.115-16 
for the interpretation by the Kerykes (cf. IG I2 6 = IG I3 6 = Meritt 1945: 61-81 = 
Fornara 75; cf. Meritt 1946: 249-53). On the other hand, see Dem. 47.68-70 for the 
possible relations between the legal space and exegesis. The citizens selected 
for this purpose could also watch the order of the Mysteries as the ἱεροποιοὶ 
τῶν σεμνω ~ν θεῶν (see Dem. 21.115, Din. fr. VIII, 2 Conomis). The exegetai them-
selves could have been a post-403 invention, see Clinton 1974: 90-93, Gagné 2009: 
225 with notes. Both the Eumolpidae and the Kerykes were themselves subject 
to examination (Aeschin. 3.18). Perhaps we should read the legal term ἄγραϕος 
as opposed to ἀναγράϕειν, that is ‘not written down for public display’ rather 
than generally ‘unwritten’, cf. MacDowell 1962: 202 (who unnecessarily focuses 
on ‘stone’); it could have also been connected to the revision of laws and the 
decree of Teisamenus of 403 (see And. 1.83-84, but see also Canevaro & Harris 
2012 on the problem of its authenticity), cf. Ostwald 1973: 89-92. More generally 
understood ‘laws of nature’ were seen, at least according to Aristotle, as distinct 
from unwritten laws of each polis, cf. Harris (2006a: 54, 2013a: 32). We can thus 
understand the remark about the ἄγραϕος νόμος in [Lys.] 6 as a more general 
point of reference, that is following what is just (δίκαιον) in respect to the gods 
on the one hand and avoiding what is not on the other, having taken into con-
sideration the written laws of the polis, cf. Ostwald 1973; see Xen. Mem. 4.4.19-21 
on piety and the unwritten laws, Pl. Leg. VII, 793a-d, Dem. 18.275; cf. Carey (1994: 
185, 1996: 34-35), who argues that there were social sanctions rather than legal 
penalties involved for breaching the ἄγραϕοι νόμοι in Athens. For the argumen-
tation in And. 1 and [Lys.] 6 as a possible reflection of the physis–nomos debate, 
see Gagné 2009: 226 with n. 85. See also IG II2 1231 for an example of the extension 
of the genos of Eumolpidae to an ‘outsider’, cf. Mikalson 1983: 85.
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perhaps only in the edited version of the speech put in circulation130; 
or when he argued that a lie in regard to the Mysteries on the side of 
his prosecutors was impious, since they falsely stated that the defend-
ant had profaned the Mysteries (1.30). 
It seems even more curious that it was also Andocides who prosecut-
ed a certain Archippus for ἀσέβεια soon after the trial of the Hermo-
copidae and before his own, stating that Archippus ‘acted impiously 
against his own ancestral Herm’ ([Lys.] 6.11)131. The case was report-
edly not brought to court after Andocides agreed to drop charges132 
(which would happen before the ἀνάκρισις), but Archippus did not 
recognise his guilt when offering it ([Lys.] 6.12). The Pseudo-Lysianic 
author of Against Andocides calls this trial ‘δίκη ἀσεβείας before the 
archon basileus’ ([Lys.] 6.11), that is a private suit. According to Harris 
(2006a: 417), this trial had to be a γραφή, for it involved the basileus 
(traditionally responsible for the public religious regulations)133, and 
that δίκη should be read here as a general term with a meaning close 
to a ‘trial’134. There are problems with both stands.
On the one hand, δίκη had to concern a private dispute, that is one 
which would normally not involve the community as a whole. This is 
difficult to understand in the case of impiety, although if we think of 
130. Cf. Dover 1968a: 169; on the protection or wrath of the gods during sea 
travels, cf. Antiph. 5.82, Eur. El. 1352-55, Xen. Cyr. 8.1.25; see also n. 105 above.
131. Out of this remark we neither learn whether it was Andocides’ or Archip-
pus’ Herm, nor why it was ‘ancestral’ (ϕάσκων τὸν Ἄρχιππον ἀσεβεῖν περὶ τὸν 
Ἑρμῆν τὸν αὑτοῦ πατρῷον), but the first possibility seems more justifiable; see 
Furley 1996: 64-65 and Todd 2007: 449-50 on some further questions regarding 
this passage. In the context of the speech, the use of the epithet πατρῳ ~ος appears 
as an additional emphasis put on the importance of this particular Herm, cf. Mi-
kalson 1983: 96. See also And. 1.61-62 for Andocides’ explanation why it was the 
only Herm not mutilated along with all the others.
132. Provided that we believe the account by the author of [Lys.] 6, who stated 
that it was done in return for a compensation, which might be biased, just as the 
insults found in Aeschin. 3.52 about Demosthenes’ settlement of the dispute with 
Meidias and other similar instances of slander typical to Athenian forensic ora-
tory. Wallace (2006) argues that in publics suits such a compensation would be 
subject (only) to a fine. Assuming that the prosecution of Archippus was a public 
suit (which we cannot be sure of), this would make this statement—slanderous 
or not—a denunciation of opponent’s past illegal activity (cf. Lanni 2009). Harris 
(2006b; cf. 1999) opposes this view, emphasising the penalty of fine and partial 
ἀτιμία for the offence of ‘not following through’ with a public case.
133. Cf. Todd 2007: 448-49; cf. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 57.2, Hyp. Eux. 6, Dem. 35.48, Σ 
Pl. Euthphr. 2a.
134. In the classical sources it is possible to meet both δίκη in a general sense 
of a ‘trial’, ‘prosecution’ (see e.g. Isocr. 18.12, Ar. Nu. 758, 770, Thuc. 6.61.7.6), and 
γραφή in a general sense of a ‘written accusation’ (see e.g. Antiph. 1.2), cf. Hansen 
1980: 90. Perhaps also Plutarch writing of the alleged trial against Aspasia (Per. 32.1: 
δίκην ἔϕευγεν ἀσεβείας ‘was charged with impiety’) simply had just a ‘trial’, not any 
specific procedure in mind (regardeless of the actual historicity of these events).
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it simply as the ‘lack of reverence’ towards a god manifested mainly 
by the damage done to private (though sacred) property which did 
not involve anyone else, it is certainly conceivable. It could form an 
offence similar to δίκη βλάβης, especially considering that the Her-
mae did enjoy an ambiguous status in Athens, being somewhere on 
the verge of the public and private135. Yet it is no less strange to our 
understanding of Athenian culture. It might be also worth noting 
that we learn from other sources that the basileus dealt with δίκαι 
in homicide cases136, and the scholion to Pl. Euthphr. 2a reads ‘δίκαι 
πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐλαγχάνοντο ἀσεβείας’, either in the technical or general 
meaning of δίκη (which, however, looks like a curious rewording of 
the Ath. Pol. Passage cited below). On the other hand, the remark in 
[Lys.] 6 reads ‘δίκην … ἔλαχεν’ (‘brought a suit’) which in legal con-
text always presupposes δίκη sensu stricto137. And although [Arist.] Ath. 
Pol. 57.2, speaking of the basileus, reads ‘γραφαὶ δὲ λαγχάνονται πρὸς 
αὐτὸν ἀσεβείας’, we find no parallel in the extant oratorical corpus, 
which in turn shows a few dozen examples of λαγχάνειν δίκην. We are 
also given a late fourth-century example of an impiety case before ba-
sileus in Hyperides’ Against Diondas from the 330s (brought by Diondas 
against Lycurgus), but the procedure is not specified by the orator 
(144v, 19-20)138. Without further evidence, we are left in ignorance, as 
it needs to be concluded that both δίκη and γραφή remain a possibility 
in this case – that is if we believe it to be historical, as there is still no 
certainty among the scholars about the dating of the pseudo-Lysianic 
Against Andocides.
The atheistic poet: Diagoras of Melos (415?)
Another case which was notorious in antiquity is that of Diagoras 
of Melos, who was said to have profaned the Eleusinian Mysteries and 
revealed its secrets, most probably just after the trials for their profa-
nation by Alcibiades and his companions. After the Melian fled Ath-
ens, the Athenians were said to have set a reward for either killing or 
seizing Diagoras. There is no mention in the extant sources, however, 
of his being ever killed or seized.
As far as we can tell, Diagoras was, unlike Protagoras or Anaxagoras, 
a poet, not a philosopher (T 8 Winiarczyk ap. Σ Ar. Ran. 320, cf. MSS of 
Ran. 320). Some remnants of his poetry, for which he was called ‘the 
atheist’, appear in later tradition, but they do not look any more strik-
135. See n. 105 above; cf. Carey 2004a: 127.
136. See Antiph. 6.41-42, Pl. Euthphr. 2a; cf. Gagarin 2000.
137. Cf. Rubinstein 2000: 206, n. 36, Carey 2004a: 127, Todd 2007: 448-49. Prob-
ably because of the practice of drawing lots to set the order of private lawsuits 
for the day, cf. LSJ, s.v. λαγχάνω, I.3: λαγχάνειν δίκην obtain leave to bring a suit 
(esp. a private suit).
138. Λυκοῦρ(γον) δὲ οὐ μόνον παρανόμων ἐδίωξεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσεβείας πρὸς 
τὸν βασιλέα. For the text of Against Diondas, see Carey et al. 2008, Horváth 2010.
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ing than the remarks we find in Aeschylus or Euripides on the ‘god’ 
being an abstract ‘mind’ of the universe (see F 1-2 Win.). Nonethe-
less, there existed certain atheistic works ascribed to him in the cen-
turies following his death, Άποπυργίζοντες Λόγοι and Φρύγιοι Λόγοι, 
the latter most likely being a Hellenistic treatise (Jacoby 1959: 24-31). 
The sources which discuss his beliefs also appear only in the later bio-
graphical and doxographical tradition139.
Our first source to mention Diagoras in a political context is Aris-
tophanes140. He does not tell us much, but in the Clouds he ridicules So-
crates as the ‘Melian’ (830: Σωκράτης ὁ Μήλιος), referring to his ‘god-
less’ beliefs, when Strepsiades explains that there is no Zeus but only 
Dinos, the Vortex. We cannot be certain of the date of this testimony. 
Since the first staged production of the Clouds in 423 at the Great Diony-
sia was not well received, Aristophanes decided to rewrite his play. The 
final editing probably took place in the years 419-17, yet there can be no 
certainty if the revised version was ever staged in Athens141. In the scho-
lia to this passage, Diagoras is juxtaposed with Socrates and described 
as a θεομάχος, ‘fighting against the god’ (Σ Ar. Nu. 830).
A somewhat more peculiar piece of information comes from the 
Birds142 (1072-75), Aristophanes’ play staged in 414, and one full of al-
lusions to the Sicilian expedition and its generals143. The chorus of 
birds trying to settle a new city turns to the audience with something 
that resembles a parody of an Assembly resolution: ‘Listen to the 
City’s notice, specially proclaimed to-day [Τῇδε μέντοι θἠμέρᾳ μάλιστ' 
ἐπαναγορεύεται]: ‘Sirs, Diagoras the Melian whosoever of you slay, 
shall receive, reward, one talent; and another we’ll bestow if you slay 
some ancient tyrant, dead and buried long ago’’ (trans. B.B. Rogers). It 
does sound like an imitation of an actual resolution, which could have 
formed the basis for sending a ‘warrant’ after Diagoras. It also looks 
like a repetitive proclamation (ἐπαναγορεύεται, although it would 
be hazardous to base chronological assumptions solely on the comic 
wording, since we lack evidence other than a non-obvious reading of 
μάλιστα) placing such a proclamation outside of the Dionysia, e.g. in 
the Assembly.
139. See Jacoby’s and Winiarczyk’s works cited here for a detailed register 
and discussion of the sources.
140. A certain Diagoras ‘the Quibbler’ was mentioned ca. 430 by Hermippus 
(fr. 43 PCG), yet we cannot be sure of his identity.
141. See Dover 1968b: lxxx-xcviii, Henderson 1993, Storey 1993 (Kopff 1990 
argues for the latter part of the 410s).
142. I am suspicious of other possible references to Diagoras in the Birds men-
tioned by Romer 1994. However, he also mentions a more probable reference to 
Diagoras’ flight to Pellene in Av. 1421 attested by the quotation from Melanthius 
in the scholia to Av. 1073, already noticed by earlier scholarship, see e.g. Wo-
odbury 1965: 191, n. 37, Katz 1976: 371-72.
143. Cf. Katz 1976, Furley 1996: 136-40.
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We find a similarly sounding ‘decree’ concerning Diagoras in the old 
scholia to this passage (Σ Ar. Av. 1073; cf. Σ Ar. Ran. 320). The scholiasts 
claim that Diagoras, after the fall of Melos, came to Athens and pro-
faned the Mysteries by revealing its secrets to the uninitiated, turn-
ing many of them away from the proper initiation. They then tell us 
that the Athenians ‘made a proclamation against him’ (ἐκήρυξαν κατ’ 
αὐτοῦ) and wrote a sentence on a bronze stele, which, according to the 
scholiast, was the Attidographer Melanthius’ account from his work 
On the Mysteries (FGrHist 326 F 3). Craterus (FGrHist 342 F 16), referred to 
next by the scholiast, mentions a reward of one talent for killing Diag-
oras and two for bringing him back alive. They explain that the reason 
for condemning Diagoras was his impiety (τὸ ἀσεβές), resulting from 
his spreading the secrets of the Mysteries, and thus belittling their 
importance and discouraging those willing to be initiated from doing 
so. The scholia then go back to Melanthius and the stele, and repeat 
in a slightly different wording the reward for either killing or seizing 
the Melian, while adding that it all happened at the time of the cap-
ture of Melos (which ended in a massacre, Thuc. 5.116). Apparently, 
we are dealing with some scattered data, repeated and rephrased by 
our sources one by another and merged by the editors of the scholia144, 
with little hope of finding the Ur-exemplar.
Perhaps some additional tension in Diagoras’ case came in fact both 
from the recent affairs of 415 and his being a Melian in Athens after 
the Melian massacre of 416/5 (during the archonship of Arimnestus). 
Another factor which might have played a role in the cases concerning 
the Mysteries around that time was the apparent attempt to promote 
the latter as a Panhellenic cult and to enforce Athens’ interests through 
‘religious politics’. The First-Fruits Decree (IG I3 78 = ML 73 = Fornara 
140; cf. Isocr. 4.31) ordered not only the Athenian demes but also the al-
lies of Athens to hand over their first crops to the sanctuary at Eleusis145. 
Either not much later or sometime earlier146, the Athenians established 
by the so-called Epistatai Decree (IG I3 32) the board of overseers of the 
treasury at Eleusis, elected by and accountable to the Athenian demos. 
Perhaps some of the parodying of the Mysteries performed ca. 415 was a 
reaction to this aggressive religious propaganda, just like a determined 
response to the profanation was an outcome of the cult’s new role147.
The old scholia to The Frogs (Σ Ar. Ran. 320) call Diagoras an ‘athe-
istic poet’ (μελω ~ν ποιητὴς ἄθεος) who ‘introduced new gods, just like 
144. Cf. Dickey 2007: 29-31 on the editors of the scholia to Aristophanes.
145. See a detailed discussion of the decree and its political significance in 
Smarczyk 1990: 167-298, cf. Furley 1996: 36-38 for a brief summary.
146. See n. 30 above on the dating of the Epistatai Decree. See Cavanaugh 
1996: 73-95 for the new dating of the Aparchai Decree (ca. 435), cf. pp. 29-72 on 
the dates proposed by earlier scholarship; cf. Smarczyk 1990: 224-52 for the early 
417 as another likely date; cf. Rosivach 1997.
147. Cf. Smarczyk 1990: 253-98, Bremmer 1995: 77; cf. Gagné 2009.
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Socrates’. There survives yet another early account. Pseudo-Lysias in 
the speech Against Andocides concerning the aforementioned trial of 
Andocides of the year 399 or 400 attacks the accused by saying that 
he behaved even worse than Diagoras ([Lys.] 6.17). The orator empha-
sises that while the latter acted impiously in his words against the 
sacred rituals and festivals foreign to him, the former committed the 
same not only by deed but also against religion of his native polis. Just 
after this comparison, the author speaks of the reward of one talent 
for either seizing or killing the fugitive. Similarly, Diodorus narrating 
the events of Athenian history of 415 mentions Diagoras called ‘the 
Atheist’ (13.6.7), who, accused of impiety, fled Attica in fear of the 
Athenian demos, which resulted in the Athenians’ setting a prize of 
one talent for killing him. We find similar accounts in numerous later 
sources. Moreover, we know of a prize of 10,000 drachmae (roughly 
1,7 talents, an equivalent of the pay for several decades of work of a 
qualified worker) for information given in the ongoing trials of 415, 
with an additional one set for the killing of the condemned refugees 
(see above). The disagreement on the rewards between these accounts 
and the Attidographers ‘cited’ by the scholia who supposedly had seen 
the inscriptions directly on the stelae remains surprising148.
In connection with the passage from Aristophanes’ Birds and the re-
mark from the speech Against Andocides, the proclamation against Di-
agoras seems plausible, although in this case alike we are left with no 
comprehensive data, especially on the exact wording of the sentence, 
which later authors could have deduced solely from the passages of 
Pseudo-Lysias and Aristophanes. Ostwald (1986: 276) lays stress on the 
fact that in the surviving sources there is no mention of any kind of 
trial in an actual court (if there was one that had happened before, 
it would have to be carried out absente reo), but only of the procla-
mation of the Assembly constantly referred to by the verb κηρύττειν. 
Athenian orators did not necessarily refer to historical exempla very 
accurately, while the date of the composition of [Lys.] 6 remains un-
known, yet it should be safer to assume that the reward of one talent 
for either killing or capturing Diagoras is more likely on the basis of a 
more recent account ([Lys.] 6.18).
If the surviving early testimonies can be trusted, the ‘warrant’ was 
sent after Diagoras for some kind of offence against the Mysteries ([Lys.] 
6.17), not for his writings, as suggested by later sources. Yet nothing is 
known of Diagoras’ beliefs, which is surprising in the presence of the sur-
viving remarks on the ‘religious’ beliefs of Protagoras, Prodicus, Critias, 
or Democritus. We cannot be certain if the genuine writings by Diagoras 
ever existed or, if so, whether they were known during his lifetime149. 
148. Cf. Davies 1996: 34-35.
149. Both atheistic works were probably attributed to him in the following cen-
turies. A similar work, Phrygios Logos, had been earlier ascribed to Democritus. These 
were perhaps some of numerous Hellenistic orientalising treatises concerned with 
religious and philosophical issues, deemed impious and thus attributed to an impious 
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Following the account of Diodorus and the remarks by the Arab philoso-
pher Al-Mubaššir writing in the 11th century CE, it is possible to date 
the decree concerning Diagoras at the archonship of Charias (415/4), 
perhaps the year 415150, just after the mutilation of the Hermae in the 
summer151. What we can assume is that the proclamation against Diago-
ras—if there was one—would have to precede the Birds, staged in 414.
Our earliest source, Aristophanes, certainly does speak of some proc-
lamation of the Assembly against Diagoras, and mentions, just as the au-
thor of [Lys.] 6, the reward of one talent. Neither they nor any later tes-
timony indicates anything close to a court trial. We do not have many 
parallels for this. Perhaps Diagoras was tried and sentenced in absentia, 
just like Alcibiades about that time (cf. Thuc. 6.61.7: ἐρήμῃ δίκῃ). We 
hear of similar proclamations in the fifth century which made it legal 
to kill an outlaw without entailing the pollution for homicide, as in the 
case of Arthmius of Zeleia against whom the proclamation was inscribed 
on a bronze pillar152. If Melanthius and Craterus were cited correctly, 
it would be a convincing argument for the historicity of the proclama-
tion; yet we cannot trust the scholia on this, for the document cited 
differs from the remarks found in [Lys.] 6 (and Diodorus, who—just like 
Aristophanes—mentions only one talent for killing the Atheist). Even 
if we do accept the historicity of some proclamation, as seems sensible, 
based on the passages from the Birds and Against Andocides, supported 
by later remarks, it is still striking and worth having in mind for the 
poet (cf. Jacoby 1959: 28-29; Woodbury 1965: 201-2; Winiarczyk 1980: 58-65; more 
recently, Janko 2001 argued on purely speculative grounds for Diagoras’ authorship 
of an Orphic poem preserved in the Derveni Papyrus). As argued by scholars, the 
Apopyrgizontes Logoi could have been, in turn, a fifth- or fourth-century treatise, as 
only then the metaphorical sense of the noun πύργος and the verb πυργόειν has been 
noted (see e.g. Jacoby 1959: 29-31, Woodbury 1965: 205; cf. Nestle 1948: 584, n. 52).
150. Cf. Winiarczyk (1979: 195ff; 1980); Jacoby 1959: 15, 18-23 (further dating 
attempts by Jacoby were based on several faulty assumptions discussed nume-
rous times since); according to Jacoby (1959: 18), the main source of the date for 
the decree was the Chronicle by Apollodorus of Athens (2nd cent.). Al-Mubaššir 
erroneously attributes many events to the life of Diagoras, for instance when he 
claims that the poet—having fled Athens—was supposed to have lived for ano-
ther 54 years, a number which he had to take—among many improbabilities and 
general ignorance of chronology—from Porphyry of Tyre (3rd/4th cent. CE), who 
had had some unknown Hellenistic source as his basis (cf. e.g. Woodbury 1965: 
188-90). 54 years is exactly the period from 468/7 to 415/4, and both dates sur-
prisingly reappear in various ancient testimonies on Diagoras’ life. The ancient 
biographers placed his acme along with that of Bacchylides in 482/1 or 468/7 (e.g. 
Jerome, following Eusebius), while often mistaking it with his year of birth – the 
fate of many ancient figures. Perhaps the date itself was accepted rather figurati-
vely based on the date of death of Simonides, typically given as 468/7 (see discus-
sion in Woodbury 1965: 188-89, 192 and Winiarczyk 1979: 212-13).
151. Cf. Smarczyk 1990: 278-87 (esp. 282) et al.; opp. Sommerstein 1987: 271-72 
and Henderson 1993: 596-98.
152. See Dem. 9.41-46, 19.271-72; Aes. 3.258 –259, Din. 2.24-25; cf. Worthing-
ton 1992: 309-10.
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sake of other cases how easily the information allegedly coming from 
the stelae directly through the account of the Attidographers could be 
transformed and incongruent with earlier references. Moreover, given 
that—again—there is no certainty as to the authorship and date of com-
position of [Lys.] 6, one cannot be too pleased with the fact that the 
only classical reference to the proclamation remains a comedy by Aris-
tophanes, based on which much could be added later.
Another cup of hemlock? Euripides, Prodicus, and Diogenes of Apollonia
Even more objections could—and have—been raised concerning 
the alleged trial of Euripides. According to Satyrus’ Life of Euripides 
(T 99 Kannicht = F 6 Schorn ap. P. Oxy. 9.1176 fr. 39 col. X), the tra-
gedian was accused of ἀσέβεια by Cleon (the biographer calls the tri-
al δίκη ἀσεβείας153). Lefkowitz (1981, 2012; cf. Dover 1988c: 148-51) 
has argued, however, that ancient authors of the Lives of the poets 
knew about them little more than what they were able to read out of 
their plays, which means they had to follow their wide imagination 
for most of the time to accomplish their task154. Everything indicates 
that the legend about Euripides’ prosecution was a popular one in 
antiquity, appearing on a 3rd-century CE list of rhetorical exercises 
that reads: ‘Euripides, after portraying Heracles mad in a play staged 
at the Dionysia, is being prosecuted for impiety’ (T 100 Kannicht ap. 
P. Oxy. 2400). The image of ‘impious Euripides’ was probably invented 
based on philosophical—and often surprising—views about the gods 
that many of his characters express (including Hecuba, Heracles, and 
Bellerophon). Aristophanes was one of the first to turn it against the 
poet on literary grounds. The tragedian was then commonly jux-
taposed throughout antiquity with both Socrates and Anaxagoras 
(Lefkowitz 1987: 154-55).
Perhaps Aristotle, too, added to it by stating in his Rhetoric (III 15.8, 
1416a28-35) that the line from Euripides’ Hippolytus (612) that reads 
‘my tongue swore but not my mind’ was used against the poet in the 
trial of ἀντίδοσις in which Hygiaenon called him impious (ἀσεβής). 
According to Aristotle, ‘Euripides replied that Hygiaenon himself did 
wrong by transferring the judgments of the Festival of Dionysus to the 
law courts; for there he had given an account of these words, or would 
again if Hygiaenon wished to accuse him there’ (trans. H.C. Lawson-
Tancred). Yet the procedure of ἀντίδοσις concerned the exchange of 
153. It seems that especially in this particular testimony δίκη did not have 
a technical meaning, but could denote a ‘trial’ in general sense (see discussion 
above with n. 134, cf. Poll. 8.41: ἐκαλοῦντο γὰρ αἱ γραφαὶ καὶ δίκαι, οὐ μέντοι καὶ 
αἱ δίκαι γραφαί; cf. Harris 2006a: 417, n. 36).
154. Doubts could also be raised in reference to Cleon’s prosecution of Aristo-
phanes for an ‘offence’ (ἀδικία mentioned by the scholia to Aristophanes (Σ Ar. 
Ach. 378), although the comic poet does in fact speak in his plays of some kind of 
dispute with Cleon and an argument before the Council (Ar. Ach. 377-82, 502-6, 
628-33); cf. Wallace 2005.
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property, meaning that such an accusation would have to be uttered 
solely as a rhetorical argument (in this case, slanderous), rather than 
as as formal charge (Dover 1998c: 144). We cannot even be sure if the 
speech has ever been performed in court, or if, from the very begin-
ning, it was just a rhetorical exercise containing this anecdotal reply. 
Nothing suggests that the poet might have been sentenced. Even the 
Life of Euripides by Satyrus, always looking for an excuse to give the 
sensational version of the story, does not say a word about this. All 
the more, there is a fair reason to believe that the trial itself was a 
later invention, just like countless tales on the poets’ need of taking 
flight from Athens told by Hellenistic biographers as a way of explain-
ing—with no factual basis—the journeys and visits at royal courts of 
foreign monarchs.
A tradition concerning Prodicus’ being sentenced to death by hem-
lock for corrupting the youth is attested only in the Suda (Π 2365, s.v. 
Πρόδικος = T 1 D-K) and the scholia to Plato’s Republic (X, 600c), and 
seems utterly incredible (Dover 1988c: 147-48, Wallace 1994: 130-31). 
Apparently, it was a repetition of both the charges and the sentence 
from Socrates’ case, which was quite commonly linked throughout an-
tiquity with the life and death of other prominent figures, especially 
philosophers.
It seems relevant to note that Demetrius of Phalerum (ca. 350 – ca. 
280) in his Apology of Socrates, written after his expulsion from Athens, 
when complaining about the ill-treatment of Peripatetic philosophers 
(a school of which he was also a member), has reportedly said155 that 
Diogenes of Apollonia, an Ionian philosopher (5th cent.), ‘came close 
to the danger [of the trial or execution]’156 in Athens. Nonetheless, 
there is no explicit mention of impiety here, only the context of Dem-
etrius’ Apology points to the likely connection with the persecution of 
philosophers and the trial of Socrates, which was the reason for the 
emergence of a good part of similar remarks.
Philosophy on trial? The case of Socrates (399)
Any study of impiety in ancient Greece has to at least touch upon 
its most famous trial, the prosecution of Socrates, well attested in the 
contemporary sources, even if tinged with a martyred praise of the 
master by his pupils. It came to have an enormous impact on the im-
agination of later authors writing about classical Athens. The surviving 
sources are in agreement that the procedure employed was the γραφή, 
155. Demetrius FGrHist 228 fr. 42 (= fr. 91 Wehrli = fr. 107 SOD = Diog. Apoll. T 
1 D-K ap. D.L. 9.57).
156. It reads τοῦτόν φησιν ὁ Φαληρεὺς Δημήτριος ἐν τῇ Σωκράτους ἀπολογίᾳ 
διὰ μέγαν φθόνον μικροῦ κινδυνεῦσαι Ἀθήνησιν. The use of the pronoun του ~τον 
would normally indicate in this context in Diogenes Laertius the person to whom 
the entire section is dedicated (Mejer 1978: 24), but one could also read it as the 
last person mentioned, which would point to Anaxagoras, not Diogenes.
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while most of them mention Meletus as the prosecutor157. The charge 
was one of corrupting the youth and impiety, or specifically – of in-
troducing new gods in place of those recognised by the city158. Both 
Plato and the scholia state the procedure and the charge explicitly as 
ἀσεβείας γραφή159. We learn from the Apology that Socrates first had 
to go through a preliminary examination before the archon basileus 
(19b, 24b: ἀντωμοσίαν ‘affidavit’), and then that the trial was held be-
fore the dicasts in a dikasterion, a slight majority of whom found So-
crates guilty160; after a quite immodest second speech by the defend-
ant, this time the prevalent majority sentenced him to the ‘civic’ death 
by hemlock161. One could speculate on whether the prosecutors really 
wished to seek the death penalty, or if they were perhaps thinking, just 
as Socrates’ friends, about the defendant’s exile as an obvious outcome. 
However, they did propose capital punishment in court (Pl. Ap. 36b), 
while Plato’s Socrates in his defence speech suggested the honorary 
meals in the Prytaneum, which in fact would be regarded as a reward 
(36d-37a; within the ἀγὼν τιμητός). As the alternatives commonly pro-
posed in such situations, he mentioned imprisonment, fine (resulting 
in the imprisonment until paid), and exile, which would apparently be 
likely to please the jurors (37b-c; see the section on punishment above).
Socrates himself, as portrayed in Plato's Apology, constantly speaks 
with irony and ridicules his accusers by saying that they—Anytus, Me-
157. See e.g. Pl. Ap. 19b, 26b, 26e, 27a, 27e, 28a, 31d, Euthphr. 2a-c, Tht. 210d; 
Xen. Mem. 1 (passim); see also D.L. 2.40, according to whom Favorinus (1st/2nd 
cent. CE) had seen the sentence deposited in the archives of the Athenian Me-
troon (fr. 34 Bar. = 51 Mensch. = 41 Am.), but it does not openly speak of ἀσέβεια, 
only of breaching the law (ἀδικει =). According to Mejer (1978: 30-32), Diogenes 
had direct access to Favorinus’ work, although it never became his main source.
158. See Xen. Mem. 1.1.1; Pl. Ap. 24b, Euthphr. 3b, 5c et al. (see below). See Ver-
snel 1990: 125-27 on the meaning of ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια from the wording 
of accusation.
159. Pl. Euthphr. 5c (ἀσεβείας ἐγράψατο), Σ Pl. Ap. 18b; there is also a remark 
on the charges of ἀσέβεια by Meletus i.a. in Plato’s Apology (35d), see also n. 157 
above.
160. The often-quoted numbers of ‘280 vs 220’ rest upon Plato’s remark on the 
difference of 30 votes (Ap. 36a–b) and the assumption that in a γραφή 500 dicasts 
would be typically involved. The figure of 501 given by Laertius is probably a 
later author’s confusion caused by the ‘uneven’ dicast added later in the fourth 
century; cf. Boegehold 1995: 34, Todd 1993: 83, n. 10; Rhodes 1981: 729. See n. 19 
above on Athenian ‘dicasts’.
161. Citizens were usually killed by this means after the court sentence, cf. 
Tetlow 2005: 93; cf. the discussion in Todd 2000b. Plato speaks only of the ‘poison’ 
(ϕάρμακον), while later sources supplement this by saying that it was hemlock 
(κώνειον); Enid Bloch (2002) in her brilliant paper presents a detailed analysis 
of the effects of consumption of poison hemlock (as opposed to other types of 
hemlock) based on modern and contemporary medical studies, and comes to the 
conclusion that Plato’s description is authentic and accurate, contrary to earlier 
sceptical opinions of the scholars. On the forms of capital punishment in classi-
cal Athens, see n. 47 above.
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letus, and Lycon—simply felt offended for trifling reasons (Ap. 23e-
24c); he restates the charges known from other testimonies, only with 
the addition of those by Anytus, relating to the principle of ‘making 
the weaker argument appear the stronger’, attributed to Protagoras162. 
When defending his master in the Memorabilia, Xenophon argues that 
Socrates had revered the gods, for he offered sacrifices to them at 
home and at the public altars. It seems, though, that this was not the 
gravest or primary charge against the philosopher.
As has been frequently noted163, the trial was held in very particular 
political circumstances, just after the oligarchic upheaval and deadly 
regime of the Thirty, followed by the law-revision of 403/2 during 
the archonship of Eucleides and the Amnesty proposed by the Patro-
cleides’ decree. The latter was meant to include all cases of previous 
wrongdoings, whether the original wording excluded certain groups 
or not164. At that expense and in fear of social discord (στάσις), the 
Athenians tried to introduce peace in their state under the restored 
democracy, and they pronounced the death penalty for those who 
would attempt prosecuting anyone for the past misdeeds (And. 1.79). 
It seems, on the other hand, that Socrates’ accusers did not have to 
breach the Amnesty (eagerly supported by Anytus; see Isocr. 18.23, 
Lys. 13.78-82, both written ca. 399), for the philosopher could have 
been prosecuted for the beliefs voiced in public between the years 403 
and 399. It remained no secret that he spoke publicly to all who wished 
to listen (without requesting any fee, as opposed to the sophists), and 
his name in Athens was practically synonymous with an eccentric in-
tellectual, at least since the staging of the first Clouds by Aristophanes 
in 423165. In spite of the efforts by Socrates’ pupils writing their ‘Apolo-
gies’ (originally ‘defence speeches’), his religious views had to seem 
rather distant from those traditionally held by the Athenians, and 
actually could have formed the basis for the charge of impiety, espe-
cially in the political circumstances which encouraged it. One should 
note that Socrates in Plato’s Apology does not refute the argument of 
not believing in the polis gods by saying that he acknowledges them. 
Instead, he goes on to state that his δαίμονες are gods as well, and 
constantly refers to ὁ θεός, which can be understood either as ‘god’ or 
‘the god’ (Burnyeat 1997).
The fact that he remained in the city during the coup of 404, when 
numerous pro-democratic citizens had to flee Athens to save their lives 
162. See e.g. Pl. Ap. 18b, 19b, 23d-24c, Euthphr. 3b; cf. Ar. Nu 112ff.
163. Cf. i.a. Derenne 1930: 111-21, Vlastos 1983, Stone 1988, Wallace 1994, 
Hansen 1995, Parker 1996: 199-217, Scholz 2000, lately also some summaries of 
studies in this subject: Ober 2011, Nails 2006; cf. Waterfield 2009.
164. See And. 1.77-79, 88 (along with Canevaro & Harris 2012 on issues of authen-
ticity of the documents preserved in And. 1), Xen. Hell. 2.4.43, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 39.6. 
For doubts concerning Ath. Pol.’s account and the scope of the Amnesty and law-
revision, see Carawan 2004, 2013; cf. Rhodes 1981: 469; see also essays in Sordi 1997.
165. See Santoro 2013 on the links between the Clouds and Plato’s Apology.
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while hundreds of others were killed by the Thirty166, did not testify in 
his favour. After the restoration of democracy such a conduct was fre-
quently used against Athenian citizens in court speeches as a synonym 
for the support given to the oligarchs (however, due to the Amnesty, 
not as a formal charge; cf. Lys. 18.19, 25.1-2, 26.16). Socrates was a friend 
to many pro-oligarchic citizens and outsiders. In Plato’s dialogues he 
often represents their worldview, for example when claiming that the 
‘experts’, rather than the ignorant ‘mob’, should make decisions in the 
political matters as bestowed with exceptional divine ‘virtue’ (see e.g. 
Gorg. 458e–61a, Men. 99e–100b, Prot. 319b–e; cf. Xen. Mem. 1.2.9).
Socrates’ disciples took part in both successful oligarchic coups – in 
411 and 404; in the latter the exceptionally cruel Critias167 was the lead-
er of the ‘radical wing’ and the apparatus of repression of the Thirty. 
It all had an impact on the events taking place just a few years later, in 
399. The philosopher was also a teacher and a friend of the notorious 
Alcibiades, commonly linked to the affairs concerning the profanation 
of the Mysteries in 415 (see above), an extended stay in enemy Sparta, 
and, finally, the oligarchic coup of 411. In fact, he was taken for a politi-
cal teacher in antiquity, in spite of Plato’s reservations (Waterfield 2013: 
16-18). Half a century after the condemnation of Socrates, Aeschines 
the orator put it bluntly in the speech Against Timarchus (1.173): ‘So 
then, men of Athens, you put Socrates the sophist to death, because it 
was found that he had taught Critias, one of the Thirty who overthrew 
the democracy’ (trans. C. Carey). Earlier, it was Socrates’ disciple, Xeno-
phon, who spoke of Critias and Alcibiades as ‘two former pupils of So-
crates’168. Furthermore, five of the Athenians accused in the trials of 415 
had connections to the philosopher (Ostwald 1986: 537-50). All of this 
was a theme underlying the entire accusation and one very cautiously 
referred to in Plato’s Apology (Wallace 2013).
Socrates’ own attitude during the reign of the Thirty was probably 
not helpful either. When they asked him and several other citizens to 
catch and bring to certain death Leon of Salamis, Socrates refused, but 
then simply went home doing nothing, while four other confidants of 
the Thirty sailed off to Salamis (Pl. Ap. 32b). Nowhere do we hear of his 
rationale for not even trying to save the oligarchs’ enemy169. After the 
execution of Leon without a trial (And. 1.94; cf. Lys. 13.44, Xen. Hell. 
2.3.39), Socrates remained in the city, when other moderate oligarchs, 
such as Theramenes, could not anymore believe in the justice of the 
166. See Xen. Hell. 2.4.21 et al., Isocr. 7.67, 20.11, Aeschin. 3.235, [Arist.] Ath. 
Pol. 35.4; cf. Krentz 1982.
167. The death of himself and his supporters led to the fall of the Thirty (Xen. 
Hell. 2.4.19-23). Among Socrates’ friends there were some other public figures ill 
perceived by most of the Athenians (see the list in Hansen 1995: 28; cf. Krentz 
1982: 45-56; cf. Pl. Ep. 7, 324c-d).
168. Xen. Mem. 1.2.12ff., 39; cf. Isocr. 11.5, Pl. Prot. 336d; Aristid. 83.14-23.
169. Cf. Wallace 2013: 109.
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Thirty. Roberts (1994: 73) has observed that it is at least puzzling that 
the deadly usurpers chose to turn with it to Socrates, though—hav-
ing refused them—he met no repercussions, but was later condemned 
by the more approving of various opinions democratic state. Yet we 
could imagine the climate of proscription lists (along with the list of 
the supporters and future citizens) and constant checks on one’s loy-
alty coming out of the fact of being among the few ‘old friends’ trusted 
by the Thirty. Even if we were to treat Roberts’s argument cautiously, 
it is easy to notice how these things could have been envisaged in 399 
by the Athenians whose families suffered so badly as a result of these 
very events only several years earlier170.
Among Socrates’ prosecutors one can observe a wide outline of the 
Athenian ‘middle class’, with no representatives of the aristocracy. The 
latter were, on the other hand, prevalent in the circle of Socrates. As 
Stone (1988: 152-53) notes, Socrates speaking in Plato’s Apology in his 
own defence, when mentioning his friends, was able to mark only one—
Chaerephon—who had not been an enemy of democracy, yet he was not 
there to testify being already dead171. He was a rare exception not only 
in the Apology but also in other writings by Plato and Xenophon172. One 
should remember that it was quite common for the Greeks to hold the 
teacher responsible for his pupil’s deeds173. Plato’s Socrates expressed his 
anti-democratic reasoning already in the early dialogues174, commonly 
referred to—even if somewhat naively—as ‘closer to the historical So-
crates’ (see below). Apart from the aforementioned trial of Andocides (of 
400 or 399), the year 399 saw another remarkable prosecution – that of 
Nicomachus (Lys. 30). He was accused of unlawful alterations during the 
revision and rewriting of Athenian laws, including those concerning the 
calendar of festivals and sacrifices. This trial alike was held in the shadow 
of favouring the oligarchs and under a threat of the death penalty175.
170. The murdering of ca. 1500 citizens by the Thirty soon became a com-
monplace in oratory (cf. Wolpert 2002; see Wallace 2011: 91, n. 11 on the number 
variously attested by the sources).
171. During the reign of the Thirty he had to go into exile and fought under 
Thrasybulus for the democrats. Cf. Pl. Ap. 20e–21a.
172. In several dialogues by Plato there is a mention of other ‘pro-democratic’ 
friends, including Cephalus with sons – Polemarchus and Lysias the orator (on the 
one hand, Socrates could prefer not to mention their example because of the seve-
re fate their family had met under the Thirty and their metic status, while on the 
other they would fit perfectly to the argumentation of the defence as the ‘cham-
pions of democracy’ nearly rewarded with Athenian citizenship for their service).
173. See Aeschin. 1.173, Xen. Mem. 1.2.9; see also Ar. Nu. 1447–53, 1465ff., Pl. 
Gorg. 518e–520b; cf. Pl. Gorg. 514a–515d, Xen. Mem. 1.2.12ff., Cyn. 13.1-8, Isocr. 13, 
passim; but compare also Pl. Gorg. 456d–461a.
174. See the collection of such arguments in the dialogues and the arguments 
concerning Socrates’ political views in Brickhouse & Smith 1994: 155-89. See also 
Wallace 2011.
175. Robertson 1990: 71-75, Rhodes 1991, Todd 1996, and Carawan 2010.
57Athenian impiety trials: a reappraisal
As seen in this particular context, it is easier to understand the spirit 
and reasons which led to the condemnation of the philosopher. It may 
be worth noting that Socrates until his late years could openly express 
his beliefs and try to convince his fellow citizens, while Plato, not long 
after the death of his master, could found the Academy and teach there 
unrestrained in a radically anti-democratic spirit for subsequent dec-
ades176. Nevertheless, according to Hyperides (fr. 55 Jensen) Socrates 
was condemned for what he used to teach (ἐπὶ λόγοις), not for what he 
had done (a common antithesis in classical Greek, especially in the rhe-
torical texts, cf. [Lys.] 6.17). It is likely that what tipped the scale in this 
case was the general animosity towards philosophers, which usually did 
not result in such extreme measures but which can be already traced in 
Aristophanes’ Clouds. It was a widely held conviction that philosophers 
were keen on challenging the respected popular axioms, including the 
beliefs about the gods, trying to search for the principles of the world 
and human nature. The remarks by orators-politicians, Aeschines and 
Hyperides, made before the Athenian demos seem to indicate that the 
sentence did not enjoy good press in the later public memory, unless we 
assume that both authors were somehow biased177.
A separate problem is the value of Plato’s Apology as a source. It is 
certainly not an accurate record of a historical trial and should be 
treated as literary fiction just as any other work on Socrates or any 
other Platonic dialogue for that matter. The sensible question to ask 
is not ‘did Plato recount faithfully all that happened’ but ‘how far did 
his artistic construct reach’. It is clear that the dialogue was written 
to show how the ‘bad demos’ punished the ‘good philosopher’, which 
does not distinguish it in spirit from other Platonic dialogues. This 
problem, long discussed in the scholarship178, will probably remain 
unsolved unless some new sources are found.
The fifth century BCE: a summary
What I have aimed to show in the analysis of extant sources so far 
is that the very existence of the alleged impiety trials before that of 
Socrates is at least questionable, while others pose many puzzles. As ar-
gued up to this point, only the prosecutions connected to the events of 
415, that is both the cases of the mutilators and profaners in 415 and the 
trial of Andocides not long before that of Socrates, all attested in the 
176. Cf. Finley 1996; 134; nonetheless, one should bear in mind Diogenes La-
ertius’ mention (3.6), however suspicious, of Plato’s and other Socratics’ ‘refuge’ 
from Athens after Socrates’ death (see D.L. 3.6, cf. de Strycker & Slings 1994: 208-9).
177. For example, Allen (2010: 89-107), based primarily on some formal simi-
larities and late biographical tradition, argues that Aeschines, Hyperides, and 
Lycurgus were influenced by Plato, perhaps even being his students.
178. On the so-called ‘historical Socrates’ or ‘Socratic question’ and Apology, 
see Guthrie 1971 [1969]: 323-78, Patzer 1987 (a collection of essays), Montouri 
1988, de Strycker & Slings 1994: 5-8, Burnyeat 1997, Döring 2010: 141-59, Patzer 
2012: 118-25, Ralkowski 2013, and Waterfield 2013 (pp. 11-13 on Plato’s Apology).
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classical sources, can undoubtedly be deemed historical. The ‘warrant’ 
sent after Diagoras of Melos is probable, however does not prove the 
trial but only some provisional measures taken against him, while the 
charges against Archippus issued by Andocides according to Pseudo-
Lysias—if factual at all and whether taken to a magistrate or not—did 
not result in a proper court case; finally, the prosecution of a certain 
Megarian mentioned by the same author was reportedly only proposed 
by one Diocles, with unknown result. Only in the cases of the trials of 
415 and Socrates’ own do we possess any certain knowledge of the death 
sentences being carried out. The significance given to the prosecution 
of Socrates by the apologetic writings of his disciples and adopted quite 
commonly in cultural history had to influence the later image of fifth-
century Athens. This tendency represents the primary reason why, al-
ready in antiquity, it became extremely difficult to distinguish between 
the actual charges from before 399 and legends inspired by Socrates’ fig-
ure. Perhaps the most problematic in this respect are the trials against 
Anaxagoras and the ‘circle of Pericles’. In the surviving sources several 
legal procedures employed in impiety trials up to 399 can be singled 
out: εἰσαγγελία based on μηνύσεις, further taken to the popular courts, 
probably in the form of γραφαί (trials of 415, not without doubts), γραφή 
(Socrates in 399), δίκη or γραφή before the archon basileus (Archippus 
ca. 415), and ἔνδειξις (Andocides in 400 or 399). The decree of Diopeithes 
cannot be deemed historical based on several grounds discussed above.
The common distinction made between the ‘religious’ trials (for the 
profanation of the cult) and those for ‘beliefs’ or ‘worldview’ (also re-
ferred to as ‘the freedom of the intellectual’) seems mostly unnecessary 
from the contemporary point of view, not least because of the political 
dimension prevalent in all the cases described and most of the ones to 
follow. Athenians would contrast punishing someone ‘for deeds’ (ἔργον) 
and ‘for words’ (λόγος), but were not always certain of the dividing 
line179. It should not be left unnoticed that in the extant sources there is 
no sight of a citizen or inhabitant of Athens prosecuted for the refusal 
to participate in the so-called ‘polis religion’180. It is also clear that one 
needs to be especially wary of all post-classical sources which mention 
such trials, particularly when faced with a fruitful tradition of alterna-
tive versions of many of such stories. Even the charges against Socrates 
did not result immediately from his teachings, although the latter could 
have prepared the grounds. He was rather put on trial because of the 
role played by his friends and pupils in the oligarchic coup of 404 after 
Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War, the events firmly intertwined 
with his teachings in the eyes of the Athenians. All previous trials for 
impiety well attested in the sources are based on the profanation of 
either the Mysteries or the sacred laws, and are typically set in a very 
particular political context of anxiety or direct threat to the community 
due to upheaval or war. Garland (1996: 95) has even suggested that the 
Athenian demos of the classical period did not bother about the matters 
179. Cf. Aeschin. 1.173 and Hyp. fr. 55 Jensen; [Lys.] 6.17.
180. See also Price 1999: 108-25 on the ‘elective cults’.
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of impiety at times other than during severe political crises181. On the 
other hand, the cases dealt with in a particularly severe manner where 
the ones concerning the Mysteries at the time of Athens’ attempts to 
promote the latter as a Panhellenic cult.
The testimonies from Late Antiquity concerning the trials more of-
ten than not reveal their authors’ incomprehension of the political and 
social reality of classical Athens. The way the classical authors speak of 
impious behaviour and trials for ἀσέβεια does not seem to indicate the 
need to conceal things out of fear of transgressing a taboo (ἀπόρρητα), 
even if the events themselves were not always eagerly recalled. We thus 
have to conclude that the abundance of such information in later writ-
ings in connection with the lack of similar remarks in the works of pro-
lific classical authors should be deemed highly suspicious. We can, of 
course, assume that such events were not the main interest of a certain 
author or genre (and so of the audience), yet in comparison with a vast 
number of more or less evident examples of comic invective repeated by 
Hellenistic and later biographers it all appears as a subsidiary concern. 
However limited any ability of finding historical truth may seem in the 
case of Athenian impiety trials (which is not an exception in ancient his-
tory), the possibility of recognising deliberate or unintentional distor-
tions can constitute a partial compensation.
Impiety trials seem to have been fabricated for a variety of reasons. 
First, the biographers’ perceived audience was a large one, similar to that 
of the modern-day tabloids. This called for an additional emphasis on the 
sensational stories and punchlines. The less could be found in the sourc-
es, the more had to be assumed based on the remarks taken out of their 
proper context, sometimes misunderstood, at another time deliberately 
reworded. Not uncommonly, the events created on the basis of likeli-
hood were based on certain political assumptions and at the same time 
were meant to prove them, especially in regard to the characteristics of 
the demos and democracy. We should also not forget that many authors, 
either as Aristophanes in the Clouds or as Lucian in his Dialogues, would 
take pleasure in playing with the popular motifs at the verge of the bios 
and doxa of earlier thinkers, which could be in turn easily misread by the 
subsequent generations of readers. As observed by Wallace (1994: 149, 
n. 39), the frequent mention of philosophers’ flight from Athens in the 
surviving sources alongside the tradition of their trials may be, at least 
in some cases, the effect of a mistaken reading of the verb ϕεύγειν by 
later biographers182, used in classical Greek both in the meaning of ‘to 
flee, take flight’ (or even ‘to go into exile’) and ‘to be accused, prosecuted 
at law’183. Sometimes it remains unclear which of those meanings the au-
thor had in mind.
181. Cf. Evans 2010: 202 et al.
182. This can create a major hindrance for our attempts to interpret some of 
the Greek texts, see e.g. Plut. Nic. 23; cf. Lenfant 2002: 137.
183. Cf. LSJ, s.v. ϕεύγω, IV.2.
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Quite likely, there were more impiety trials forming a part of a per-
sonal vendetta184 and more charges of the profanation of the cult than 
what we get to know from the surviving testimonies, as suggested by 
some mid-fourth century sources which I will analyse in part II be-
fore giving a summary covering all extant source-material concerning 
Athenian impiety trials of the classical period.
II. The Fourth Century after 399 BCE
An attempt to present the subsequent fourth-century trials in a 
chronological order is particularly troublesome due to the lack of the 
relevant information in the surviving sources. We can assume, with-
out much certainty, that the changes in Athenian legislation after the 
restoration of democracy in 403 had to influence the laws concerning 
the impiety trials in a number of ways (see pp. 16-19 above on the 
procedures attested for the fourth century). What we learn from the 
extant sources forms, in fact, a patchy mosaic. Nonetheless, as will 
soon become clear, a significant amount of the late-fourth century 
events was centred around the tensions in Athenian politics concern-
ing Macedonia and domestic politics referring to it.
The sacred olives and the Thirty (390s)
In the speech On the Olive Stump by Lysias (Lys. 7) from the mid-
390s we find an unnamed Athenian citizen defending himself before 
the Areopagus Council. The charge was one of illegally removing the 
σηκός of a sacred olive tree185 (the stump or just the fence around it) 
in 397/6, while the trial itself was probably held a year or two later 
(Carey 1989: 114). There is no mention of ἀσέβεια in this speech, but 
concealing the exact wording of the plaint in a defence speech is 
nothing peculiar, and it is clear that cutting out the σηκός of the 
sacred olive tree was regarded as a serious religious offence in Ath-
184. On private enmity as motivation in Athenian litigation with an overview 
of recent scholarship on the subject, see Kucharski 2012.
185. For the Areopagus’ legislation concerning the sacred olives in general, 
see Wallace 1989: 109-11 and de Bruyn 1995: 113-16. Some of the olive trees 
in Attica were dedicated to Athena and formed a vital part of local myths and 
history, cf. Burkert 2011: 219, Foxhall 2007: 117-21 (with some exact accounts 
showing there had to be tens of thousands of old sacred olive trees in Attica); 
cf. Pind. Ol. 3.13, Hdt. 8.55, 5.82, Soph. OC 694-706. Perhaps the beginning of this 
rule, as well as its later alleviation after changing the estimation system, was 
linked to the practice of giving the sacred oil as a prize at the Panathenaea sin-
ce the sixth century (Parker 1996: 64). From Lys. 7.25 we learn that there were 
monthly and yearly inspections of the condition of the μορίαι. An account of 
Herodotus (5.82) suggests that even regular olive trees in Attica (ἐλάαι) could 
be surrounded with religious reverence. See also remarks on the sacred land 
(ἱερὰ ὀργάς) between Athens and Megara in part I above, with n. 57. See Carey 
1989: 114-15, 119-20 and Todd 2007: 485-87 for the discussion of the ‘sacred’ 
olives and the term σηκός.
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ens. Earlier, the punishment for such an act could have even been 
death, while at the time of the trial ‘only’ exile and confiscation of 
property186. From the Demosthenic Against Macartatus (43.71) written 
about 360 we learn that the uprooting of an olive tree (referred to 
by a general term ἐλάα, perhaps indicating a regular ‘olive tree’, as 
opposed to the sacred one, μορία was an offence tried by the archons 
which carried a heavy fine (in this case perhaps for economic rather 
than religious reasons). Even if we put this speech aside, the ten-
dency of alleviating the laws concerning the sacred trees over time 
is quite clear.
In Lys. 7, the political dimension of religious accusations can be also 
distinguished. We are told that the defendant stayed in Athens dur-
ing the reign of the Thirty (Lys. 7.9, 27), which was often portrayed 
pejoratively after the restoration of democracy187. We also learn that 
he was a wealthy man, probably not threatened with disfranchise-
ment by the property qualification under the oligarchic regime (Lys. 
7.24, 31-32). The procedure employed was most likely the γραφή188. 
We cannot be sure of the outcome of the trial, even if the survival of 
the speech could sometimes indicate that logographer’s client won 
the case189.
186. Cf. [Arist]. Ath. Pol. 60.2, Lys. 7.3, 32; cf. Xen. Hell. 1.7.20-22; Thuc. 3.70.3-4. 
According to Pseudo-Aristotle, the means of collecting the olive oil, too, changed 
over time.
187. In this case, it could suggest both a buyout of the property liable to con-
fiscation for next to nothing and being in the ‘circle of trust’ of the Thirty. See 
Carey 1989: 133 (cf. Xen. Hell. 2.4.1), Todd 2007: 479-81, 488. See also notes on the 
trial of Socrates above.
188. Cf. Todd 2007: 513, who summarises the long-running discussion on 
ἀπεγράϕην in Lys. 7.2 (if it was to mean the procedure of ἀπογραφή, we would 
see a very unusual example of its use before the Areopagus; it is thus now widely 
accepted that ἀπογράϕομαι here is synonymous to γράϕομαι and could refer to 
any kind of γραφή; cf. Carey 1989: 119).
189. The question of whether the client could put the speech in circulation 
seems to be a problematic one. On the one hand, arguably the client did not 
always want to stress having someone else write the speech for him, while on 
the other, we could expect he would keep his copy of the winning speech (the 
losing one would have a far smaller chance of being preserved), and perhaps put 
in circulation the re-edited version of the words which saved him and for which 
he had to pay a substantial amount; cf. MacDowell 2004: 16. Yet in some cases, we 
can assume that the logographer himself would be likely to put an edited version 
of his speech in circulation, perhaps more often so with the winning speeches, 
but sometimes also those which did not win the case or did not get to court, yet 
were interesting to the readers and potential clients for other reasons, e.g. styli-
stic or political, cf. Dover 1968a: 170-72, Worthington 1993; see also MacDowell 
2009: 7-9. Furthermore, the argumentation of the prosecution, to which Lys. 7 
was supposed to be a response, could have proved insufficient, if there was in 
fact no witness to the alleged offence, as suggested by the defence; cf. Carey 
1989: 118.
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Temple robbery versus impiety (377 – ca. 332/1)
In epigraphic sources we find some scattered remarks on the le-
gal actions dated 377-73, when several190 Delians were charged with 
ἀσέβεια for driving Athenian representatives of the Amphictyony off 
the temple and beating them191. In the trial, probably carried out in 
accordance with the Athenian laws192, they were sentenced to ex-
ile and high fines (from 1,000 to 10,000 drachmae). There have also 
survived remarks about two trials for ‘sacrilege’ or ‘temple-robbery’ 
(ἱεροσυλία) of that period. One Athenian inscription193 informs us 
of a certain citizen named Theosebes (‘God-fearing’) who, having 
found no aid in his pious name, was sentenced for ἱεροσυλία194 ab-
sente reo, since he had fled Attica already before the trial (the in-
scription speaks of putting his house on sale during the archonship 
of Polyzelus in 367/6). Fragmentarily preserved Lys. 5 is also a de-
fence speech, written for delivery by an Athenian citizen on behalf 
of a metic accused of ἱεροσυλία by his own slaves. There is little to 
learn there about this case, just as we cannot be sure if ἱεροσυλία 
was treated as ἀσέβεια in legal terms and whether it could be tried 
as such, considering the lack of a clear distinction between the two 
in other poleis195. Nonetheless, the surviving evidence indicates that 
both offences were treated separately in Athenian law, trials for 
ἱεροσυλία involving the property regarded as sacred. There is also 
an extant remark about the proposal by Aristogeiton from ca. 332/1 
to sentence to death without trial Hierocles, a son of the priestess of 
Artemis Brauronia, for an alleged theft of sacred vestments which 
he was carrying (which, he said, had been ordered by his mother); in 
response, his father prosecuted Aristogeiton for an illegal proposal 
(γραφὴ παρανόμων), for which the latter was eventually fined a sub-
stantial amount of five talents196.
190. Eight names had been listed under the relevant section of the inscrip-
tion, but one of them was later erased.
191. IG II2 1635.134-40 (= RO 28 B(a).24-30); cf. Aeschin. 3.106ff., 126-29 et al.
192. Cf. MacDowell 1978: 197; at that point, the Athenians had already 
regained control over the sanctuary at Delos; also, note that the inscription 
was preserved in Athens, probably in the sanctuary of Apollo Pythios (see 
RO ad loc.).
193. SEG xii 100 (see Crosby 1941, v. 13ff.).
194. Dem. 19.293 speaks of γραφή for a three-day delay in payment to the 
temple treasury; cf. Antiph. 2.1.6.
195. Cf. Cohen 1983: 95ff., 111-14.
196. See Din. 2.12, cf. hypoth. § 24 by Libanius = Dem. 25 hypoth. §§ 1-2, where 
we find a mention of the accusation of ἱεροσυλία and a procedure of ἀπαγογή; cf. 
Todd 1993: 307, n. 19. A full list of the sources is given in Hansen 1974: 37 (cat. 
29) and Hansen 1976: 139-40 (cat. 30). See n. 226 below on the amounts of fines 
in Athens.
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World’s oldest transgression: the case of Phryne (ca. 350-335?)
As far as delving into the sidetracks of the extant testimonies is 
concerned, the most interesting fourth-century impiety trial seems 
to be one of the hetaera Phryne (ca. 350 – 335?197). Late sources give 
a variety of reasons for which Phryne was said to have been accused 
of impiety by Euthias and defended by the famous orator Hyperides 
(ca. 390 – 322). In the later tradition, there also survived several brief 
fragments of the unpreserved defence speech reportedly entitled In 
defence of Phryne, Υπὲρ Φρύνης (frr. 171-80 Jensen, ibid. Kenyon). The 
rather uninformative fragments aside, one of the first surviving tes-
timonies concerning Phryne’s trial comes from a comedy The Woman 
from Ephesus by Poseidippus of Cassandreia (3rd cent.), as cited by Ath-
enaeus (XIII, 591e-f = fr. 13 PCG), describing a scene quite difficult to 
imagine in an Athenian courtroom: ‘Before our time, Phryne was far 
and away the best-known | courtesan there was; because even if you’re 
| younger than that, you’ve heard about her trial. | Even though they 
thought she did terrible damage to people’s lives, | she captured the 
court when she was tried on a capital charge; | and by taking the ju-
rors’ hands, one by one, | she saved her life—although just barely—
with her tears’ (trans. D. Olson). Athenaeus (XIII, 590d-591f) provides 
a popular version of the story, when speaking of Hyperides’ erotic life:
Now Phryne was a native of Thespiae; and being prosecuted by 
Euthias on a capital charge, she was acquitted: on which account 
Euthias was so indignant that he never instituted any prosecution 
afterwards, as Hermippus tells us [FGrHist IV A 3, 1026 F 46a]. But 
Hypereides [fr. 178 Jensen], when pleading Phryne’s cause, as he did 
not succeed at all, but it was plain that the judges were about to 
condemn her, brought her forth into the middle of the court, and, 
tearing open her tunic and displaying her naked bosom, employed 
all the end of his speech, with the highest oratorical art, to excite 
the pity of her judges by the sight of her beauty, and inspired the 
judges with a superstitious fear, so that they were so moved by 
pity as not to be able to stand the idea of condemning to death “a 
prophetess and priestess of Aphrodite.” And when she was acquit-
ted, a decree was drawn up in the following form: “That hereafter 
no orator should endeavour to excite pity on behalf of any one, 
and that no man or woman, when impeached, shall have his or her 
case decided on while present.”198 […] (trans. C.D. Yonge).
197. Cooper 1995: 306, n. 10, following Raubitschek, suggests the date betwe-
en ca. 350 and 340, but later he speculates on the date rather not long after the 
battle of Chaeronea of 338 (2001: 147-48). All chronological assumptions in this 
case remain highly speculative. For the question of identity of Phryne, see Rau-
bitschek 1941 (trial: pp. 903-7). See Cooper 1995 for a detailed analysis of various 
traditions concerning Phryne’s trial.
198. ἦν δ’ ἡ Φρύνη ἐκ Θεσπιῶν. κρινομένη δὲ ὑπὸ Εὐθίου τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ 
ἀπέφυγεν· διόπερ ὀργισθεὶς ὁ Εὐθίας οὐκ ἔτι εἶπεν ἄλλην δίκην, ὥς φησιν Ἕρμιππος. 
ὁ δὲ Ὑπερείδης συναγορεύων τῇ Φρύνῃ, ὡς οὐδὲν ἤνυε λέγων ἐπίδοξοί τε ἦσαν οἱ 
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The decree cited (another curious ψήϕισμα) is, quite obviously, a 
forgery. The narrative makes one recall Plutarch’s tale on the tears 
shed by Pericles in front of the jurors during the trial of Aspasia (see 
p. 28 above). There is no mention here, though, of the basis for such 
an accusation, just as there is none in Pseudo-Plutarch’s note in The 
Lives of the Ten Orators (849e) stating briefly that the hetaera Phryne 
was tried for impiety (ἀσεβει =ν). According to him, Hyperides was 
supposed to begin his speech by saying that he is defending Phryne 
due to their close relationship. He then notes that the jurors, on see-
ing her breasts revealed by the orator, acquitted her for her beauty. 
The reference to the priestess of Aphrodite might concern Phryne’s 
posing as Praxiteles’ model for the statue of the goddess (Athen. XII, 
591a), yet we cannot be sure if it was not the courtesan’s namesake. 
In fact, we may be dealing with a ‘conglomerate’ in most if not all of 
our sources199.
Both Athenaeus and Pseudo-Plutarch, commenting on this story in 
their works full of scandals, catchy concepts, and gossip, admit that 
they have repeated the plot from the Life of Hyperides (of ca. 200) by 
Hermippus of Smyrna, who had, in turn, adopted it himself from Ido-
meneus of Lampsacus (active ca. 300). Those two fragmentarily pre-
served Hellenistic biographers spoke of it in the context of Hyper-
ides’ love affairs that Pseudo-Plutarch and Athenaeus paraphrase in 
a similar fashion200. Both also speak of numerous hetaerae which the 
orator was said to be acquainted with. Bollansée (1999b: 388; cf. 385) 
believes that the dramatic description of Phryne’s trial and its finale 
could have been an authorial invention of Hermippus—known for his 
fondness for putting sensational plots into the narrative201—after he 
had made a collage of various sources.
Idomeneus treated his sources rather lightly, attributing intem-
perate sexual taste not only to Hyperides but also Demosthenes (fr. 
12). To support this statement, Idomeneus described Demosthenes’ 
excesses (FGrHist 338 F 12 ap. Athen. XIII, 592-93), including his goug-
ing out his lover’s, Nicodemus, eyes in a drunken quarrel; apparently, 
the biographer took at face value slanderous accusations issued by 
δικασταὶ καταψηφιούμενοι, παραγαγὼν αὐτὴν εἰς τοὐμφανὲς καὶ περιρήξας τοὺς 
χιτωνίσκους γυμνά τε τὰ στέρνα ποιήσας τοὺς ἐπιλογικοὺς οἴκτους ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως 
αὐτῆς ἐπερρητόρευσεν δεισιδαιμονῆσαί τε ἐποίησεν τοὺς δικαστὰς τὴν ὑποφῆτιν 
καὶ ζάκορον Ἀφροδίτης ἐλέῳ χαρισαμένους μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι. καὶ ἀφεθείσης 
ἐγράφη μετὰ ταῦτα ψήφισμα, μηδένα οἰκτίζεσθαι τῶν λεγόντων ὑπέρ τινος μηδὲ 
βλεπόμενον τὸν κατηγορούμενον ἢ τὴν κατηγορουμένην κρίνεσθαι.
199. Cf. Cooper 1995: 317, n. 39.
200. Cf. Cooper 1995: 305, n. 7.
201. For Hermippus’ search of sensational events and circumstances of death 
and his tendency to add fictitious details, see Bollansée 1999a: 118ff., 182-84, cf. 
Mejer 1978: 32 (see also various quotations from Hermippus in Diogenes Laertius 
who eagerly used excerpts from Hermippus’ works).
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Aeschines and chose to draw on it202. It seems that remarks of simi-
lar value were incorporated into the tale of Phryne’s trial as a duel 
between two lovers, Hyperides and Euthias. Most likely, this aspect 
of the story was a later invention based on the famous court case (cf. 
Alciphr. 4.3, 4.4). Pseudo-Longinus (34.3) and Quintilian (Inst. 10.5.2) 
mention Hyperides’ much respected oration in defence of Phryne in 
their treatises. Cooper (1995: 311) tentatively suggests that the mock-
ery of Euthias might have also been a part of Hyperides’ speech, in 
which the orator would have stated that Euthias has dragged his for-
mer mistress to court for abandoning him, having failed to pay for 
her services. Surviving fragments of Hyperides’ defence speech in fact 
seem to show some usual traits of the orator’s style, including sophis-
ticated argumentation and irony (Bartolini 1977: 118).
In fact, the speech was so popular, it can be assumed it was stored 
in the Library of Alexandria, where Hermippus, an assiduous pupil of 
Callimachus, could access it and use it for inventing his melodramatic 
punchline (Bollansée 1999a: 385-88). It was also translated into Latin 
and appeared in rhetorical exercises, presenting even more opportu-
nities for later additions. The author of the anonymous treatise on 
rhetoric cites a fragment of the alleged speech by Euthias, the author-
ship of which was a matter of dispute already in antiquity (Rhet. Gr. I, 
p. 455 Spengel ap. Anon. Segu. Τέχνη ῥητορική 215). There appears the 
charge of ἀσέβεια for introducing new gods, revelry in Lyceum, and 
leading some, perhaps orgiastic, religious parades (θίασοι), consist-
ing of both men and women. Later sources supplement this by saying 
Phryne tried to introduce the god Isodaites to Athens203.
The disrobing episode resembles a tragic scene, especially one 
involving suppliants or captive women. There is a woman being 
dragged in her shredded vestment, there is her pleading for mercy 
similar to a lament for the fate of the characters in a tragic komos204. 
Several anonymous treatises on rhetoric speak of such a lament and 
‘tearing the robes’205 during Phryne’s trial, which biographers could 
have understood as the orator’s stripping off of Phryne’s clothes. 
Hellenistic biographers could have thus, when writing about Phryne, 
drawn just as easily from tragedy as from comedy. Hermippus might 
have included some additional details concerning Euthias and 
Phryne, for instance by saying that Euthias has never appeared in 
202. See Aeschin. 1.171-72, 2.148, 166, Din. 1.30, 47, Dem. 21.103-4; see the 
reconstruction of these events in MacDowell 1990: 328–30; cf. Cooper 1995: 305.
203. Hsch. s.v. Ἰσοδαίτης; Harp. s.v. Ἰσοδαίτης [= fr. 177 Jensen; cf. frr. 174-
76] (according to Harpocration, mainly women of ill repute). See also O’Connell 
(2013) for an interesting yet highly speculative argument that Poll. 8.123-24 
speaking of the Mysteries is a part of Hyperides’ Defence of Phryne.
204. Cf. Cooper 1995: 312 (cf. Arist. Poet. 1452b12, Soph. Ant. 891-928, 937-43); 
Eur. Andr. 628, Ar. Lys. 628; cf. E. Hall 1995: 43.
205. In several passages, we read the verb περιρρήγνυμι (i.a. frr. 7.335, 4.414 
Walz), cf. Cooper 1995: 313-14.
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court again206. At any rate, the apparent lack of a disrobing scene 
in Poseidippus’ play raises numerous doubts about the subsequent 
variants of the story.
Although the speech in Phryne’s defence could have been composed 
as an exercise, it certainly remains a possibility that the trial actually 
did take place. It might have included a charge of impiety, although 
we cannot be certain of it, just as we can be sure neither of the pro-
cedure nor the motive, and we can only speculate on the date. What 
brings attention, though, is the figure of Hyperides’ political enemy, 
Euthias, acting as a prosecutor. Although the sources are not explicit 
on this, one can clearly see how the accusation of Phryne could have 
been a private attack on Hyperides conducted through public (legal 
and rhetorical) measures. This was apparently enough for the famous 
orator to become involved in his lover’s defence in person and make 
the entire case political sensu stricto.
In the 19th century CE, Jean-Léon Gérôme portrayed Phryne being 
tried before the Areopagus on his famous painting, often recalled in 
modern accounts of these events. Yet extant sources do not make a 
mention of Phryne’s being tried before the Council of Areopagus, but 
speak only of the dicasts. Thus, there is no reason to suspect that the 
trial was held anywhere else than in a regular popular court, dikaste-
rion; on the other hand, we cannot rule out the possibility of its fall-
ing into the (new) capacities of the Areopagus Council (see n. 21 & 
222). Some very insubstantial fragments of the oration so famous in 
antiquity have survived to this day. Since they show some usual traits 
of the orator’s style, and the authors of the theoretical treatises on 
rhetoric did not express any doubts concerning its authenticity, Hy-
perides’ authorship remains at least possible. Meanwhile, the curious 
circumstances of the trial should be regarded as a purely anecdotal 
later invention.
New rites and love potions: Archias, Ninos, and Theoris
Based on both classical and later sources, we learn of the existence 
of several fourth-century trials relating to religious rituals and cult. 
One such instance was a trial of a priest named Archias, mentioned by 
the prosecutor in Apollodorus’ speech Against Neaira ([Dem.] 59.116-
17) of the late 340s. The speaker reminds the Athenians that they 
have sentenced in court the hierophant Archias of the Eumolpidae 
accused of impiety (ἀσεβει =ν). He claims that various charges were 
brought against him, mainly those of offering sacrifices not in ac-
cordance with tradition. His example is being recalled as a rhetorical 
argument, for the prosecutor argues that, since the Athenians pun-
ished the respected priest of a noble family for minor offences (of 
which he disapproves), they should punish Neaira and her daughter 
206. Probably because no other speech by Euthias was listed in Callimachus’ 
Pinakes, cf. Cooper 1995: 317, n. 18.
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for similar wrongdoings, being impiety207. Athenaeus, while mainly 
associating Archias with his fondness for courtesans (XII, 592c)—one 
of them also recalled in Against Neaira,—cites the passage from Apol-
lodorus’ speech referring to him (XII, 594a-b). As Parker (2004: 60) ob-
serves, Archias’ punishment could not be severe, since it is not even 
mentioned in the accusing speech, where such an argument would 
fit perfectly. Possibly Plutarch mixed two characters in his anecdo-
tal narrative on two Archiases, one being a hierophant who was sup-
posed to warn the Theban oligarchs of the coup prepared by Pelopi-
das in 379, the other a philo-Laconian Theban oligarch himself (Pel. 
10.7; De gen. 596e)208. If we were to believe the biographer’s account, it 
should be assumed that the trial was not merely of cultic but also of 
a political character, just like all the others analysed so far, a motive 
perhaps withheld by the orator209.
A certain Ninos was said to have been condemned to death for per-
forming initiations into the cult of new gods, leading the θίασοι210 and 
producing potions, clearly ‘magic’ ones. There is a brief mention of 
it in two speeches Against Boeotus, both preserved under the name of 
Demosthenes (39.1-2, 40.9), perhaps from around the middle of the 
fourth century. In both speeches, using similar wording, the accuser 
speaks of Menecles—portrayed as a sycophant—who was said to have 
‘convicted Ninos’, without giving the reason for bringing charges 
against her or any further explanations (which could mean that the 
case was well known to the audience). Furthermore, in his On the Dis-
honest Embassy (19.281), Demosthenes formulates a slanderous accusa-
tion against Aeschines by saying that his mother, Glaucothea, was a 
207. Neaira was tried by γραφὴ ξενίας, a procedure employed when one's ci-
vic status was at stake due to the suspicion of its usurpation; the charge said that 
the alleged alien Neaira had lived in Athens with an Athenian citizen appearing 
as his lawful wife. What seems interesting here, is linking the law regulating 
morals (perhaps in connection with the ‘ethos of citizenship’ and its high legal 
status) with religion and offending the gods, mostly in the context of Neaira’s 
daughter who had done the honours of religious service as the archon’s wife, 
which according to the prosecutors she had no right to do as a non-citizen (cf. Is. 
6.47, Dem. 43.51). Nevertheless, one should note that Neaira was not prosecuted 
for impiety, which appears in the speech merely as a rhetorical argument or an 
‘informal’ charge (cf. [Dem.] 59.74-77 on the basileus; see also the remarks below 
on the invective connected with impiety in the forensic speeches).
208. See Georgiadou 1997: 89, 117 on different names attested by the sources; 
cf. Parker 1996: 202, n. 12, Clinton 1974: 16-17.
209. Cf. Kapparis 1999: 411.
210. I.e. a ‘cult association’ (cf. Is. 9.30) or, here, rather a quasi-bacchic revelry 
(cf. Dem. 18.260, 19.199-200), cf. Jones 1999: 13, n. 52 et al.; on Athenian θίασοι and 
θίασώται (members of θίασος), see Arnaoutoglou 2003: 31-67, cf. Lambert 1999. 
Perhaps we should, first of all, look for the distrust of the θίασοι in social prejudi-
ce, for they, since their beginnings in Athens, consisted mainly of the poor (those 
not taking part in any ἑταιρεία), while by the mid-fourth century often of the 
non-Athenians as well; not infrequently, they were also connected with the cult 
of the gods ‘imported’ to Athens (regarded as alien, non-Greek), cf. Leiwo 1997.
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leader of the θίασοι – the activity which had earlier led to other priest-
ess’ (ἱέρεια) death. The scholia to this passage claim this priestess was 
Ninos, accused by Menecles for casting love charms (ϕίλτρα) on young 
boys (495a), and that she was condemned to death for deriding and 
performing the Mysteries (495b). We hear of the same Menecles again 
from Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Din. 11), who mentions a speech 
Against Menecles (or. 33 Conomis) of ca. 351-49 wrongfully attributed 
in antiquity to Dinarchus. Dionysius claims that the prosecutor in the 
public case (ἀπαγωγή) for which the speech was written was the son of 
Ninos, convicted because of Menecles.
We know that the use of such potions could have had lethal out-
come, as attested by cases for poisoning tried by Areopagus (Antiph. 
1, [Arist.] Mag. Mor. I 16.2, 1188b29-38). The charge against Glaucothea 
repeated by later sources does not, however, look like anything more 
than rhetorical slander (διαβολή), typical of Athenian oratory, and as 
such should not be given too much credit211. Flavius Josephus (1st cen-
tury CE) also recalled the example of a priestess reportedly sentenced 
to death in democratic Athens for performing initiations into the 
Mysteries of foreign gods (Ap. 2.267; νυ =ν of the MS is emended by some 
editors to Nίνον). Perhaps in this case as well much was added into 
the content of the accusation several centuries after the trial, which 
itself seems to be genuine. There can be no certainty whether the re-
marks about a priestess point to Ninos, but we can at least conclude 
that a ‘priestess’ was at that time tried in Athens for what we would 
call ‘witchcraft’. The later remarks in the scholia and Flavius Josephus 
about initiating into the Mysteries might indicate the confusion with 
other cases. While it cannot be certain based on the aforementioned 
sources whether the charge here was ἀσέβεια, the religious character 
of the trial and the accusations all attest to it.
An otherwise unknown Theoris was also accused of producing mag-
ic potions (ϕάρμακα). In the first speech Against Aristogeiton preserved 
under the name of Demosthenes212, the accuser recalls quite a mys-
terious trial (25.77-80). He claims that the brother of the defendant 
has acquired potions from the ‘hideous Theoris the Lemnian, a witch 
that you have killed with all her family’ (25.79). The lexicographer 
Harpocration (2nd cent. CE) under the entry Θεωρίς cites Philochorus 
(FGrHist 328 F 60), an Attidographer of the 3rd century, while merely 
stating that she was a ‘seer’ (μάντις) sentenced to death for ἀσέβεια213. 
In his Life of Demosthenes (14.6), Plutarch gives an alternative version 
211. See e.g. Dem. 18.259-64, 19.249; cf. Trampedach 2001: 138-39.
212. The oration was considered inauthentic by Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
(Dem. 57), but MacDowell (2009: 298-313) has recently defended its authenticity. 
Collins (2011) suggests that it could be dated at the 338-324 frame, so the trial 
itself would have to be of an earlier date.
213. Philochorus, later killed for his anti-Macedonian activity, was said to 
have been of a priestly family and a seer himself, which might explain his inte-
rest in the case of Theoris; see the Suda, s.v. Φιλόχορος.
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of the story embellished with some additional detail (perhaps just a 
later addition), claiming that (1) Demosthenes himself was an accuser 
of a ‘priestess’214 Theoris, and that (2) he charged her with numerous 
offences (first of all, for teaching slaves how to deceive their masters), 
which led to her being sentenced to death.
What is even more curious is that since ca. 390 the Athenian cleruchs 
at Lemnos enjoyed the legal status of Athenian citizens215. We can-
not be sure whether Theoris came from the original population or an 
Athenian family (LGPN lists seven entries under Θεωρίς, six of which 
come from classical Greece; it is quite striking that our ‘Lemnian’ is 
listed aside four examples from Attica and just one from Sicyon men-
tioned only by Hesychius and the Suda). In the latter case, the remark 
about killing the whole family, vague in itself, looks even more suspi-
cious. We would have to assume the direct responsibility of an Athe-
nian citizen acting as her kyrios, for which we find no attestation from 
the classical period in capital cases. It is not less surprising that the 
names of both Theoris and Ninos appear in the court speeches without 
any mention of their kyrioi, who would normally have to represent a 
citizen woman in court216, as though the orators either believed the 
accused women were of disreputable, non-citizen descent (hetaerae?), 
or tried to portray them as such (Trampedach 2001: 146-47). It makes 
one wonder if we should take the orator’s remarks at their literal val-
ue. Pseudo-Demosthenes’ epithet ‘the Lemnian’ could be also read as 
a metaphor referring to the mythical status of ‘the Lemnian women’ 
(Harpocration and Plutarch do not mention the etknikon at all), but 
there is not much to support this reading. It thus seems impossible to 
say anything certain on the actual status of Theoris and the probabil-
ity of this case.
Apparently, there was no law which would prohibit introducing new 
gods to Athens (as suggested by later sources217), but—as Parker notes 
(see above)—trying to introduce them at the wrong moment could 
have proved rather hazardous. As noted earlier, it was certainly safer 
to honour the gods in agreement with tradition and the existing laws, 
and introduce new gods with approval of the Assembly and oracles218. 
In his treatise On The Sacred Disease (1.60-79), Hippocrates objects to 
214. A ἱέρεια, as opposed to μάντις, would have to be a priestess of a specific 
cult in Athens. It is likely that Plutarch confused the cases of Theoris and Ninos, 
cf. Collins 2011: 491; see also Eidinow 2010 (focusing on social envy in the trials 
for magic directed at women transgressing normative boundaries).
215. See Trampedach 2001: 146, with further references in n. 40.
216. Cf. Gagarin 1998.
217. See Joseph. Ap. 2.267; Serv. Verg. Aen. 8.187. Some decree on piety (τὸ 
ψήφισμα τοῦ δήμου … περὶ εὐσεβείας), though not copied with the text of the 
speech, was cited by Lycurgus (Leocr. 146) in the late fourth century, but we are 
in the dark about its content.
218. Parker 2005a: 65-68, 214-15; cf. Wallace 1996b, Arnaoutoglou 2003: 94.
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taking epilepsy for a heaven-sent disease and explains why dealing 
with magic could have been considered impious (he uses such terms as 
δυσσέβεια, δυσσεβέειν, ἀσεβές, and ἀνόσιον). It seems that such indi-
viduals claimed that they could cure the ‘sacred disease’ solely by the 
use of their own magic skills. According to the author, this is equal to 
stating that the gods do not exist or that those involved in magic are 
mightier and do not have to fear them, since they claim they are able 
even to control the Sun, the Moon, and the atmospheric phenomena219.
Politics after Chaeronea: philosophers and rhetores (ca. 323)
In some classical and, mainly, later sources (such as Plutarch, Ath-
enaeus, and Diogenes Laertius), one can encounter several alleged trials 
with religious background brought against pro-Macedonian philoso-
phers and politicians, and one against the philosopher Theodorus of 
Cyrene220. In these half-legendary cases from the late fourth century, 
one can easily distinguish some recognisable figures of Athenian his-
tory standing before the Areopagus Council, in the times of endangered 
Athenian independence and different political circumstances than in 
the previously discussed events. After the death of Alexander and the 
Lamian war, Athens was under two pro-Macedonian regimes with only 
a short and violent democratic interlude of 318-17 (Plut. Phoc. 34-37, 
Nep. Phoc. 4.1). It is difficult to ascertain the veracity of the accounts 
concerning the trials happening at this period, as most of it—again—is 
to be found only in later sources; however, as the numerous contempo-
rary remarks suggest221, we can certainly trace a shift in the Areopagus’ 
powers in the second half of the fourth century. The majority of these 
trials can be dated either just before or not long after the death of Alex-
ander in June 323, when Athenians were already subject to the Macedo-
nian rule. Nonetheless, they preserved much of their political structure 
from the times of independence, along with a handful of publicly active 
anti-Macedonian politicians-orators. At least some of the trials had to 
be genuine, though it seems impossible to assess how many were based 
on or resulted in a formal charge of impiety. It was a period of grave po-
litical conflict between the advocates of the pro-Macedonian option in 
foreign politics and elitist constitutional changes on the one hand, and 
those of anti-Macedonian and pro-democratic followers on the other (a 
distinction not always so straightforward). It is this tension that comes 
to the surface in most of the cases listed below.
219. Cf. Dickie 2007.
220. In particular, see O’Sullivan 1997, 2009: 149ff.
221. Nevertheless, at least some of the Areopagus’ capacities concerning 
prosecuting religious offences had to be earlier than this. For the late fourth-
century regulations, see Din. 1.3-5, 9, 62, 82-83, Lycurg. Leocr. 52, Dem. 18.133-
34, Aeschin. 1.81-83; cf. Dem. 23.65-70, [Dem.] 59.78-83; cf. IG II2 204.16-19 (= RO 
58.16-19); the need for conservative regulations linked to the Areopagus’ powers 
were already proposed by Isocrates in the 350s in his Areopagiticus (Isocr. 7); cf. 
Hansen 1991: 294-95, Wallace 1989: 106-19, 174-89, 195-98 et al., de Bruyn 1995: 
113-16, 126-42, Wallace 2000, Sullivan 2003, Carawan 1985.
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Demades the orator (ca. 380 – 318) was said to have been accused 
and sentenced to a fine for attempting to introduce Alexander as the 
Thirteenth God222 in autumn 324, not long before the ruler’s death223 
(the same allegation was reportedly put forward against Theophras-
tus). Demosthenes apparently backed the resolution out of political 
pragmatism (Din. 1.94, Hyp. Dem. 31)224. Aelian (ca. 175 – ca. 235 CE) 
notes in his Various History (5.12) that Demades was sentenced to a fine 
of one hundred talents for ἀσέβεια. The circumstances would prob-
ably imply the use of the γραφὴ παρανόμων, so the trial did not have 
to be a γραφὴ ἀσεβείας. Earlier, also Diodorus (18.18.2)—quite likely 
following Hieronymus of Cardia (Chamoux 1993: XXII-XXVI)—made 
a mention of Demades’ being convicted three times for unconstitu-
tional proposals and deemed ἄτιμος (deprived of civic rights, which 
he later regained). Plutarch (Phoc. 26.2), in a similar context, recalls 
seven sentences, while the Suda (s.v. Δημάδης) two. Athenaeus (VI, 
251b) gives the amount of ten talents rather than one hundred, but 
neither needs to be more plausible than the other225. At any rate, 
the trial itself—clearly a political one—apparently did take place, 
while the charge of impiety seems at least probable. Nevertheless,  
according to the extant sources, in most cases concerning the pro-
posal to treat Alexander with divine honours as the Thirteenth God, 
222. As a major addition to the Twelve Olympian Gods commonly recognised 
by the Athenians, cf. Atkinson 1973: 313, n. 14. For more on this proposal and 
reactions to it, see discussion in Atkinson 1973 (yet not always convincing; cf. 
Badian 1981: 54) and Brun 2000: 97-107; see also e.g. Lucian. Dial. mort. 13.2.10-12.
223. See Din. 1.94, 101; cf. Ael. Var. Hist. 2.19, Plut. Mor. 219d; cf. Atkinson 1973, 
Badian 1981, O’Sullivan 1997.
224. Badian (1981: 54) and Gunderson (1981: 189) find irony in this statement, 
but the irony does not disprove the fact that Demosthenes could have proposed 
expedient measures, while putting the ideology aside (τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ, in his own 
words; cf. Dem. 5.25). Curiously enough, soon he simply cherished the reputation 
solely for defending the traditional canon of the gods, see Polyb. 12.12b.3 citing 
Timaeus the historian (ca. 345 – ca. 250).
225. Cf. e.g. Hansen 1974: 41. By that time, Athenians were already familiar with 
proposals of fines as large as 100 talents, see Hansen 1974: 34, 1975: 101 (Timotheus 
in 356/5 was sentenced to such an amount instead of the death penalty proposed 
by the accusers for treason and bribery, after he had refused to act in the naval 
battle of Embata because of heavy sea, see Din. 1.14-17, 3.17, Isoc. 15.129: Τιμόθεον 
δὲ τοσούτοις ἐζημίωσε χρήμασιν ὅσοις οὐδένα πώποτε τῶν προγεγενημένων, Diod. 
16.21.4; another such fine—if not a rhetorical exaggeration—was proposed by Ly-
cinus, perhaps in 348, within a γραφὴ παρανόμων against Philocrates, sentenced 
several years later for treason, who tried to introduce a decree allowing Philip of 
Macedon to send a herald and envoys to Athens to negotiate a peace treaty, but 
the prosecutor did not even gain a fifth part of the votes, see Aeschin. 2.13-15, 20, 
109, 3.62, Din. 1.28). Fines of 10-15 talents were not uncommon in fourth-century 
trials, including γραϕαὶ παρανόμων (Dem. 21.182, 58.1, 31-32, 43, 70; [Dem.] 50.6; 
Aes. 2.99; cf. Hansen 1974: 34-35). Nevertheless, one should note that Athenae-
us does not necessarily cite a source known to him directly, as indicated by the 
references to Demochares that usually follow passages taken from Carystius (XI, 
508e, XIII, 610e), who could have been the main source of quotations from Demo-
chares’ speeches, cf. O’Sullivan 1997: 141.
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prosecutorial means other than impiety trials were used against the 
proposers of such innovations226. Pseudo-Plutarch (X or. 843d), in turn, 
recalls the example of Lycurgus prosecuting Demades, apparently in 
a series of indictments (see below), brought by the orator sometime 
before his death in 323, but there is not much we can discern based on 
this single remark.
The prosecution of Aristotle allegedly occurred just several months 
after the trial of Demades. The pro-Macedonian inclinations of the 
philosopher were not forgotten after the death of Alexander. Accord-
ing to later authors, Aristotle was accused of a series of impious acts, 
including the composition of a ‘paean’ (a song supposed to be dedi-
cated only to a god, even if poets in the fourth century started to di-
verge from this rule227) and an inscription in Delphi for Hermias, a 
ruler of Atarneus and Assos and a former disciple of Academia killed 
two decades(!) earlier, who had kept Aristotle as a guest after Plato’s 
death. The prosecutors claimed that the philosopher performed his 
‘paean’ daily during meals. Athenaeus (XV, 696a-b) and Diogenes Laer-
tius (5.5-9) give a more or less similar account of this story (frr. 645, 
674-75 Rose3 = T 1 Gigon), speaking of the γραφὴ ἀσεβείας brought 
by Demophilus and backed by Eurymedon the hierophant. Diogenes 
refers to the tradition of the inscription in Delphi based on the Favori-
nus’ Various History (fr. 68 Bar. = 36 Mensch. = 73 Am.)228.
Having heard the charges, Aristotle was said to have gone into exile 
to the Euboean Chalcis only to die there not long after. The charge is 
difficult to understand based on the wording of the ‘paean’, which is 
cited by a symposiast in Athenaeus’ Deipnosophistae and referred to as 
a ‘skolion’. Aelian, in turn, does not give a rationale for the trial, but 
claims that Aristotle fled Athens in fear of a trial (Var. Hist. 3.36; cf. Orig. 
Cels. 1.65.380). He then provides an anecdotal account of these events, 
in which Aristotle replies to someone asking for the reason of his flight: 
‘because I do not want the Athenians to wrong philosophy twice’, in 
reference to the prosecution of Socrates (as Aelian himself explains). It 
seems that a general animosity towards anti-democratic philosophers 
can be distinguished in the second half of the fourth century. According 
to various late testimonies229, it even led to a decree by a certain Sopho-
cles (soon to be deemed illegal and abolished), introducing the require-
ment for the philosophical schools to obtain an approval of the Assem-
bly and the Council before being allowed to operate, which in practice 
226. See n. 224 above, cf. Bauman 1990: 129-30 (cf. pp. 166-70 for possible later 
accusations and similar proposals concerning Demetrius Poliorcetes); cf. Mari 
2003: 84, with n. 8.
227. Cf. Ford 2011: 58-59 et al. (see also the ‘paean’ itself and the discussion on 
the context of its creation, p. 1-26, passim).
228. Later authors probably used Hermippus as their main source. For a de-
tailed discussion and a collection of testimonia, see Düring 1957: 272-83 and Bol-
lansée (1999b: 311-17; 2001b: 69-83).
229. D.L. 5.38, Poll. 9.42; cf. Athen. XIII, 610e; cf. O’Sullivan 2002.
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outlawed them under the threat of death230. The case of Aristotle is very 
unclear. The trial for impiety against him seems probable, although it 
is suspicious that we do not hear about its outcome, perhaps because 
he escaped in time, as suggested by Laertius (the case could have been 
dropped if the prosecutor was happy with the philosopher’s exile).
There also survived certain late and rather anecdotal testimonies 
referring to the trial of Theophrastus (ca. 371 – ca. 287). Diogenes 
Laertius (5.37) summarises it briefly: ‘so highly was he valued at Ath-
ens that, when Agnonides ventured to prosecute him for impiety, the 
prosecutor himself narrowly escaped punishment’ (T 1.14-15 Forten-
baugh et al.; trans. R.D. Hicks). We hear, perhaps, some echoes of the 
tradition concerning the trial of Theophrastus and charges concern-
ing the worship of the Twelve Gods in Aelian’s account (Var. Hist. 8.12 
= T 32A Fortenbaugh et al.). He relates Demochares’ supposed reply to 
the philosopher defending himself before the Areopagus: ‘the jurors 
were Athenians, not the Twelve Gods’231. The prosecution of Theo-
phrastus for impiety could indeed arouse anger of the Athenians, since 
he was known for his treatise On Piety (Περὶ εὐσεβείας), fragmentarily 
preserved in extensive quotations by Porphyry of Tyre (3rd/4th cent. 
CE)232. He wrote about the religious and ethical dimension of offer-
ing sacrifices to the gods, and reprimanded Queen Olympias for the 
extravagance in this domain. By doing so, he implicitly linked impi-
ety with practices of monarchs and deflected away from himself the 
charge of favouring Macedon, so popular among the fourth-century 
philosophers, including his master Aristotle (Mari 2003: 86). He was 
also known in the later tradition for defending democracy in his 
hometown Eresus233. The circumstances mentioned by the sources 
seem anecdotal, but the presence of Hagnonides indicates that it could 
have been one in the series of prosecutions by the anti-Macedonian 
rhetors targeting their political enemies. The most likely period for 
this would be the tense atmosphere of the democratic interlude of 
318-17 when Hagnonides could still be alive and prosecute political 
opponents, probably having survived the regime set by Antipater but 
not that of Demetrius (Plut. Phoc. 29-38, IG II2 448).
One should note the similarity of the trials of Demades and Aristotle, 
and perhaps one of Theophrastus, as clearly being targeted at the pro-
Macedonian circle234. It is generally assumed (not without doubts) that 
the prosecutors in the trial of Theophrastus were some well-known 
anti-Macedonian politicians and orators. For instance, the presence of 
230. See Haake 2007: 16-43.
231. It might have been a fragment of Demochares’ speech, cf. O’Sullivan 
1997: 138-39; see also Bauman 1990: 123-25 on Theophrastus’ trial.
232. Theophr. De piet. (T 584 A Fortenbaugh et al. = fr. 13 Pötscher) ap. Porph. 
De abst. 2.26.1. For details, see Meijer 1981: 250-9.
233. Plut. Moralia 1097b, 1126f; cf. Bayliss 2011: 100.
234. Cf. O’Sullivan 1997: 136, 145, 147, 152; Bauman 1990: 119-26.
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Hagnonides (T 1.14-15 Fortenbaugh et al. ap. D.L. 5.37) and, perhaps, 
Demochares the orator (Ael. Var. Hist. 8.12; cf. 5.12) could constitute 
an attempt to weaken the standing of Demetrius of Phalerum and his 
political supporters. Plutarch (Phoc. 38) notes that the prosecutors of 
Phocion, who was sentenced to death for treason, were Hagnonides, 
Epicurus, and Demophilus. Hagnonides was also said to have been the 
accuser of Demetrius (in a trial for the attempt to subvert the democ-
racy, κατάλυσις του = δήμου of 318235), while Demophilus – one of Aristo-
tle (frr. 645, 675 Rose3 = T 1 Gigon ap. Athen. XV, 696a-b, D.L. 5.5). The 
presence of both in our sources suggests the time frame falling out-
side the power game between the followers and opponents of Phocion 
(O’Sullivan 1997: 145).
Demetrius of Phalerum (ca. 350 – 283), a pupil of both Aristotle and 
Theophrastus, also faced various political charges and had to flee Ath-
ens soon after the overthrow of Phocion’s regime236 (ca. 318). As an 
envoy, he agreed to the proscription lists of Antipater, allowing his 
own brother’s, Himeraeus, death237. As seen in this context, an account 
by Carystius of Pergamum (2nd cent.), quoted by Athenaeus (XII, 542e 
= T 43A SOD = 9, 34, 35 Wehrli), seems quite improbable. He stated 
that Demetrius had been accused of offering sacrifices to a ‘phantom’ 
(τὰ ἐπιϕάνεια) of his brother. The rest of the surviving sources do not 
mention this charge, which appears as purely anecdotal, and even as 
such it bears no explicit mention of impiety.
Another tale which strikes the reader as mainly anecdotal is one 
of the philosopher Stilpo of Megara (ca. 360 – ca. 280), preserved in 
Diogenes Laertius’ account (2.116 = fr. 183 Döring = SSR II O 12). The 
biographer claims that Stilpo, a philosopher of the Megarian school, 
said of the statue of Athena by Pheidias that she was not a god, since 
Athena came from Zeus, while the statue from the sculptor. Explain-
ing himself before the Areopagus after his bold statement, he was sup-
posed to claim that he had told the truth, since Athena was not a god 
but a goddess, to which Theodorus was said to have replied by asking 
if Stilpo had ever raised her vestments to be so certain. As a result, 
Stilpo reportedly fled Athens by the order of the Areopagus. The en-
tire account seems a fib, though the times of Demetrius’ reign in Ath-
ens were perhaps not the most friendly to those wishing to propagate 
235. Demetrius T 15A-B SOD = 10-11 Wehrli ap. Plut. Phoc. 34.4-5, Nep. Phoc. 
3.1-2; cf. Diod. 18.65.6, 18.66.5; cf. O’Sullivan 1997: 140 with n. 25.
236. In 317 he returned as an ‘overseer’ or ‘governor’ (ἐπιμελητής) of Athens 
appointed by Cassandrus, and ruled a moderately oligarchic regime for another 
decade (T 16A-B SOD = 12-13 Wehrli; cf. T 23A-E SOD = 18-19 Wehrli), only to be 
expelled in 307 by his namesake, Demetrius I Poliorcetes (T 26-31 SOD = 47-51, 56 
Wehrli). Along with him fled a group of philosophers supporting his rule, inclu-
ding Theophrastus. See also Haake 2007: 60-82.
237. Numerous sources speak of this, see O’Sullivan 1997: 139-40 (nn. 19 & 20); 
cf. Banfi 2010: 12-14, 151-52.
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views inconsistent with the morality of the day238. It seems to have 
helped in the fabrication of this story that in the ancient biographical 
tradition Stilpo was regarded as a highly controversial figure due to 
his religious views (see frr. 159-60 Döring = SSR II O 20-21 ap. Plut. De 
prof. virt. 12.83c, Athen. X, 422d).
The Atheist: Theodorus of Cyrene (309-5?)
A case separate from other late fourth-century trials and one widely 
referred to in antiquity is that of a philosopher of the Cyrenaic school, 
Theodorus of Cyrene called ‘the Atheist’239 (borne ca. 340), the name-
sake of a fifth-century mathematician also from Cyrene. Philo of Alex-
andria (ca. 20 BCE – ca. 50 CE) recalls his example (Quod omnis probus 
liber sit 127-30 = T 5 Winiarczyk), saying that the philosopher, having 
fled Athens and stayed shortly in Alexandria, appeared at the Thra-
cian court of Lysimachus. The author makes someone from the court 
refer to the reason for Theodorus’ banishment, by saying it all hap-
pened after the Athenians sentenced him for atheism and corrupting 
the youth (ἀθεότητι καὶ διαϕθορᾳ ~ τῶν νέων), which naturally brings 
the charges against Socrates to mind. As previously described, all cas-
es of ‘impious’ characters could be and were linked remarkably easily 
throughout antiquity. 
Plutarch in his work On Exile (16, 606b = T 7 Win.) speaks of the 
unjustly sentenced, the exiles who were deprived of their παῤῥησία, 
and in this context also makes a mention of Theodorus and Lysima-
chus. Diogenes Laertius (2.101 = T 3 Win.), in turn, tells a variant of 
the story embellished with additional detail. He relates an anecdotal 
exchange of opinions based on dialectical wit, quite similar to that 
involving Stilpo. According to him, Theodorus was said to have told 
Euryclides the hierophant that the priest himself was guilty of profa-
nation of the Mysteries since he explained them to the uninitiated (in 
the process of initiation). The biographer first states that Demetrius 
of Phalerum saved the glib thinker from condemnation by the Are-
opagus (T 48 SOD = 43 Wehrli). He then admits that there is a vari-
ant of this story told by Amphicrates of Athens (1st cent.) in his On 
Illustrious Men. The author claimed that the Athenians had sentenced 
Theodorus to death and that he had accepted the sentence by drink-
ing hemlock. This is another obvious reproduction of the trial of So-
crates, and an improbable one, too, for we hear from various sources 
of Theodorus’ later adventures240. Immediately after this account, 
Diogenes Laertius (2.102 = T 6 Win.) presents another anecdotal tale, 
in which Lysimachus calls the philosopher ‘Theodorus who has been 
238. Cf. e.g. Wallace 1996b: 371-72.
239. An extensive collection of testimonies on the life, trial, and beliefs of 
Theodorus has been collected by Winiarczyk in his critical edition (1981b; suppl. 
1989) and his paper on ancient atheists (1984, suppl. 1992a; cf. 1981a).
240. Cf. Winiarczyk 1981a: 68-69.
76 Jakub Filonik
exiled from Athens’241 (it is likely that he actually had to leave his 
home city of Cyrene sometime earlier, see Winiarczyk 1981a: 66 and 
Philo’s passage mentioned above).
Earlier, the biographer reports radical views of Theodorus, who not 
only was said to have doubted, just like Protagoras, the very validity 
of judgments about the gods (T 26A Win. ap. D.L. 2.97), but also to have 
propagated quite an extraordinary belief, especially for the fourth 
century. He was said to have claimed that a wise man should not risk 
his life for his country to help the fools for whom all moral principles 
had been created, while nothing is wrong per se (T 21-23 Win. ap. D.L. 
2.98-99). Diogenes Laertius attributes to him the opinion that the en-
tire world is the sage’s homeland, which quite suspiciously resembles 
a similar view cited in the fifth century CE by Stobaeus as coming from 
Democritus (D-K B 247 ap. Ecl. 3.40.7), and perhaps attributed to Theo-
dorus by mistake (or the other way around, although it seems less 
likely). Athenaeus, in turn, when writing of philosophy and rhetoric, 
recalls that Theodorus was condemned to death just like Socrates, i.e. 
‘for words’ (XIII, 611a = T 3C Win.).
It remains possible that some accusations against Theodorus were 
historical, yet—again—all extant sources come from late antiquity and 
are mostly anecdotal. If true, there could have been an underlying po-
litical agenda behind the accusation, considering the involvement of 
Demetrius of Phalerum in the alleged proceedings242. It can be inferred 
from them that the prosecution should not be placed among the trials 
of the anti-democratic politicians in 318, at least if we accept Demetri-
us’ intervention, which does not seem improbable243. There can be no 
certainty whether any charges were brought against the philosopher, 
if Demertius was indeed able to save him from the trial before it even 
occurred. The existence of such a tradition is also attested by Pseudo-
Hesychius of Miletus (Vir. p. 29, 7- Flach = T 3B Win.). We could venture 
a tentative dating of these events around 309-5 based on the context 
in which Eusebius of Caesarea relates them in the fragments of his 
Chronicle translated into Latin by Jerome (p. 127.1 Helm = T 1A Win.; 
cf. T 1C). Various manuscripts244 mention the fourth year of the 117th 
Olympiad (309/8) or the 118th Olympiad (308-5). At any rate, it seems 
possible that Theodorus left Athens in fear of some charges, possibly 
of impiety. Based on the remaining sources, it can be assumed that 
since then he lived for many years in Cyrene, where he died sometime 
in the first half of the 3rd century245. It is, however, not enough to as-
sume that he was brought to trial.
241. Various anecdotal tales of his meeting with Lysimachus appeared also in 
other sources (see n. 240 above).
242. Cf. O’Sullivan 1997: 145-46.
243. Cf. O’Sullivan 1997: 144; Bauman 1990: 126.
244. See Winiarczyk 1981a: 69, with n. 22; cf. O’Sullivan 1997: 144.
245. Cf. Winiarczyk 1981a: 70-71.
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Trials forgotten and unknown
In the fourth-century sources we can also encounter some less 
well-known trials for ἀσέβεια. In Demosthenes’ Against Androtion from 
ca. 355, an accusation against a member of the Council by the γραφὴ 
παρανόμων, the speaker mentions (22.2) that Androtion tried to aim 
at his political enemy Diodorus (primarily by stating that he killed 
his own father), and thus he accused the latter’s uncle by the γραφὴ 
ἀσεβείας. He did not obtain even a fifth part of the votes, and the ac-
cused was acquitted, which is emphasised by Demosthenes, for the 
penalty for this in a γραφή would be a one-thousand drachmae fine 
and partial ἀτιμία (‘disfranchisement’; cf. Harris 1999), which could 
in turn be used against citizens’ lawfulness. Soon, both Androtion’s 
enemies appeared again in court as prosecutors, this time accusing 
Timocrates by the γραφὴ παρανόμων. Here Diodorus makes anoth-
er mention of the prosecution by Androtion; this time, however, he 
states that the charges of impiety were aimed directly at him (not his 
uncle) for his alleged murder of his father. Again, he mentions the 
fact that Androtion did not obtain a fifth part of the votes, and that he 
was fined with a penalty of one thousand drachmae for it (Dem. 24.7). 
It remains possible that the entire story was fabricated to depict An-
drotion as a sycophant246. Diodorus accused Androtion of the same of-
fences, claiming that he was ‘guilty of temple robbery, impiety, theft, 
and all the worst delinquencies’247, and maintained that each of these 
charges should result in capital punishment (Dem. 22.69).
In another Demosthenic speech (perhaps of 345), we hear that Eu-
bulides, opposed by a certain Euxitheus removed from the citizen-list, 
did not obtain a fifth part of the votes in his accusation by the γραφὴ 
ἀσεβείας against Lacedaemonius’ sister (Dem. 57.8). Both cases are 
briefly mentioned only as an argument highlighting the bias of the 
other party (according to Euxitheus, Eubulides aimed to retaliate in 
the present trial for the testimony given by the former in his defence 
of the accused woman). In numerous Athenian orations one party calls 
the other impious (ἀσεβής), though it rarely forms the basis for a legal 
charge and should be understood simply as a hyperbole within the 
rhetorical argumentation. It seems this was the case here, although 
backed by legal argumentation, since Eubulides later appeared as one 
of the prosecutors in Euxitheus’ case in Dem. 57, the very speech in 
which this case gets mentioned248.
246. Harris (1999: 129, 2006a: 410) notes that it is surprising that the accuser 
mentions the one-thousand drachmae penalty, but makes no mention of the ἀτιμία 
which would typically follow, but elsewhere—when defending a different point—
he takes the opposite stand, arguing that in Dem. 58.6 the speaker does not men-
tion ἀτιμία, ‘but he may be selective in his summary of the law and merely leave 
out the penalty’ (Harris 2006b: 68; cf. Wallace 2006: 60). See also n. 132 above.
247. Similarly, in the aforementioned trial of Neaira the prosecutor described 
with some rhetorical exaggeration actions of the accused as ‘impiety’ ([Dem.] 
59.73-77, 116-17), see n. 207 above; see also Lys. 30.17-21, 21.20.
248. Cf. Harris 1999: 128.
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The charge of ἀσέβημα appears also in the fragment of the unpre-
served speech by Lycurgus against Menesaechmus, his political oppo-
nent, found on a papyrus roll (fr. 14.1 Conomis ap. P. Berol. 11748; cf. fr. 
14.2-11). The main offence mentioned by the fragments of the speech 
seems to be an improper mode of offering sacrifices, apparently when 
Menesaechmus was sent to Delos as an ‘religious envoy’ (θεωρός; cf. 
Harris 2001: 216). There can be no certainty as to the nature of the 
formal charge and whether it was an ἀσέβεια trial or not. It was prob-
ably one of the numerous εἰσαγγελίαι brought by Lycurgus in the 330s-
320s. As we learn from Pseudo-Plutarch (X or. 843d = T 14.1 Conomis), 
the defendant lost the case, but the later activity of the convict in 
Athenian politics indicates that the penalty was not severe (Harris 
2001: 216). In the same passage, the biographer recalls Autolycus the 
Areopagite, Lysicles the general, Demades the orator (son of Demeas), 
and ‘numerous others’, all of whom he prosecuted (γραψάμενος) in 
a series of religious trials (εἰ ~πε … περὶ ἱερω ~ν πολλάκις). Apparently, 
the term γραψάμενος in this account should not be read as a techni-
cal term indicating the procedure of γραφή but rather a general one 
referring to a ‘written accusation’ (see nn. 134 and 153 above).
All cases mentioned in this section reflect publicly displayed ani-
mosities between actors on Athenian political scene. On the one 
hand, based on such evidence, it can be assumed that there were 
many more similar charges, not mentioned anywhere in the surviv-
ing sources and probably impossible to uncover in future (cf. [Lys.] 
6.12). On the other hand, there can be no certainty as to how many 
of these rhetorical accusations had their basis in reality and were 
enough to carry on with a legal case. In the surviving speeches, one 
party frequently accuses the other of various wrongdoings, including 
impiety. The adjective ἀσεβής (‘impious’) and the noun ἀσέβημα (‘im-
pious act’) often appear in this context, yet it does not form the basis 
for a legal charge. Rather, they present common rhetorical invec-
tive meant to stir outrage and emphasise the gravity of the crime249. 
Lycurgus’ forensic oration Against Leocrates provides an interesting 
example, in which we can distinguish not only a close relationship 
between the accusations of impiety, an attempt to subvert the de-
mocracy, and treason (147; cf. 8, 97, 66-67 et al.) but also a skilful 
manipulation of the dicasts’ decision by trying to convince them that 
those who vote ‘impiously’ in the present case will be punished by 
249. Cf. King 1955, Carey 2004b; it can prove problematic to tell, at times, 
whether any such formal charges appeared in a given case, see e.g. Lys. 30.17. 
Martin (2009: 7-8, 29, 83-84, 209-10, 245-47 et al.) believes that Demosthenes tried 
to avoid bringing charges of impiety and using in his speeches religious argu-
mentation which could lead to a formal charge. It seems, though, that in the 
speeches by both Demosthenes and Aeschines (see e.g. Aeschin. 3.106ff.), one 
can find plenty of religious calumnies that would not justify calling any of them 
more lenient than other speakers of the day. For instance, the entire oration 
Against Meidias (Dem. 21) forms an extensive manipulation of religious argumen-
tation, cf. MacDowell 1990: 17-18, Cohen 1991b, Wilson 1991.
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the wrath of the gods, just like the perjurers and their families250. The 
speech opens with a statement that the prosecutor has brought the 
case to court ‘on your [scil. dicasts’ – JF] behalf and for the sake of the 
gods’ (καὶ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν θεῶν; trans. Harris). It is perhaps 
not without irony that Lycurgus—an ardent prosecutor in numerous 
religious trials and a guardian of Athenian morals—was himself ac-
cused of impiety by his political enemy Diondas, as we learn from a 
fragment of Hyperides’ speech Against Diondas delivered in 334 (144v, 
19-20; see n. 138 above).
In the epigraphic material we can count over 200 occurrences of 
words from the ασεβ– stem (mainly in the inscriptions from Asia 
Minor)251. Just five are from classical Attica; they deal with poten-
tial pious or impious acts in sacred places or within the Mysteries252. 
Even so, one inscription from Ephesus dated at the late fourth century 
seems to form an interesting parallel (IEph 2 = SEG xxvii 733). Accord-
ing to the sentence or legal complaint253 comprised in it, over forty 
men from Sardis (listed by their Hellenised names) were to be con-
demned to death for impiety (ἠσέβησαγ) towards the sacred objects 
and for a violent act (ὕβρι[σαν]), perhaps an assault, against the en-
voys (θεωροί) sent with an offering to the Temple of Artemis in Ephe-
sus. The charges were brought by legal representatives of the temple 
(ὁι προήγοροι ὑπὲρ τη =ς θεου =).
As Momigliano (1973) notes, there are no testimonies indicating the 
persecution of philosophers in Athens after the fourth century. All 
extant accounts concerning other places are limited to nebulous re-
marks regarding the philosopher Hegesias in Alexandria, the expul-
sion of one or a group of philosophers from Thrace under Lysimachus’ 
reign, and of the banishment of philosophers from Syria (perhaps 
under the rule of Antiochus VI Dionysus) and Messenia. The motives 
behind these actions remain unknown. We hear quite a curious ex-
250. See e.g. Lycurg. Leocr. 79ff., 146, 94; cf. [Lys.] 6.53, [Dem.] 59.126, Dem. 
19.239; cf. Harris 2001: 201, n. 98. See Rubinstein 2004 on ‘stirring up dicastic 
anger’ in public cases.
251. See PHI s.v.; cf. Rudhardt 1960: 94-96, Delli Pizzi 2011.
252. These are: IG I³ 422, IG I³ 426, IG I³ 427, IG II² 204, and IG II² 1635. See n. 
57 above on IG II² 204 on the sacred land and n. 191 above on the trial for ἀσέβεια 
from IG II2 1635. In most cases and in most poleis, fines would typically follow, see 
Naiden 2008. Some inscriptions relating to (im)proper conduct in sacred places 
did not speak of impiety directly, see e.g. IG II² 1362.
253. The first part, before the long list of names, reads (ll. 1-11): οἱ προήγοροι 
ὑπὲρ τῆς θεοῦ κατε[δι]κάσαντο θάνατογ κατὰ τὴμ προγρ[α]φὴν τῆς δίκης ταύτην· 
“ὅτι θεωρῶν ἀποσταλέντων ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐπ[ὶ] χιτῶνας τῆι Ἀρτέμιδι κατὰ τὸν 
ν[ό]μον τὸμ πάτριογ, καὶ τῶν ἱερῶγ κα[ὶ] τῶν θεωρῶν παραγενομένων εἰς Σ[άρ]δεις 
καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος τὸ ἱδρυμένον ὑπὸ Ἐφεσίων τά τε ἱ[ερὰ] ἠσέβησαγ καὶ 
τοὺς θεωροὺς ὕβρι[σαν·] τίμημα τῆς δίκης θάνατος.”. P. Charneux (BCH 115, 1991: 
298, n. 6; cf. SEG xli 290) believes it to be a legal complaint rather than a decree 
because of the use of ὅτι in l. 3.
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planation only in the case of Hegesias of Cyrene, a philosopher who 
was said by late doxographers to have taught on the impossibility of 
reaching lasting happiness, while claiming that life should not consti-
tute any worth to the sage (SSR IV F 1 ap. D.L. 2.94). This was also the 
supposed reason why he was sometimes called πεισιθάνατος, ‘inciting 
to die’ (SSR IV F 2 ap. Epiph. Adv. haeres. 3.2.9 [3.507.18]). According to 
an ancient anecdote, Ptolemy I Soter forbade him to teach in public, 
for his lectures led the auditors to commit suicide (SSR IV F 3, 5 ap. Cic. 
Tusc. 1.34.83, Val. Max. 8.9 ext. 3).
Conclusion
I have argued in this paper, first, that most of the testimonies 
(including laws) found in the late sources regarding Athenian impi-
ety trials need to be treated with a fair amount of suspicion. They 
include a set of shared features, which point to the patterns of writ-
ing about classical Athens appealing to the contemporary readers 
and authors, rather than some inherent common characteristics of 
the former. They focus on atheism as an abstract concept, instead 
of the ‘lack of respect’ (ἀ-σέβεια) towards the gods and their prop-
erty emphasised by the classical sources. Second, a vast majority, 
if not all of the known Athenian trials for impiety can be deemed 
political254, or politically motivated in several ways. They were not 
only a display of the struggles for power by individuals (within at-
tempts to harm political opponents and promote oneself in public), 
but often also involved the political community in general, prepar-
ing the basis for public accusations in court. This is equally true for 
the philosophers, politicians, and priests of which we get to learn 
from the extant impiety cases. Thus the use of religion in those tri-
als appears as a purely instrumental measure, serving various forms 
of political agenda, even if feeding on existing superstition and fear. 
At the same time, the primacy of the community over the individual 
in the public sphere was applied just as everywhere else in Athenian 
political practice, based on what we can speculate from the surviv-
ing remarks.
The trials for impiety shared the characteristics of Athenian legal 
system, including its ‘open texture’ and Athenians’ willingness to take 
this feature into account (see n. 16 above). The Athenian dicasts and 
citizens each time had to interpret the general term, apply it to partic-
ular situations, and act accordingly, which some litigants found useful 
254. Bauman’s (1990: 1-11) definition seems too narrow even in the narro-
wer sense of the ‘political’ – he notes that ‘political trials’ in the fifth century 
involved mostly individuals of high importance to the state, while in the fourth 
century mainly magistrates and public speakers, rhetores (cf. Hansen 1983 for 
general remarks on Athenian ‘politicians’), while the substance of the trial was 
based on criminal charges and offences against the state, which was normally 
meant to lead to the expulsion of the accused (by the means of an adjudicated 
exile or, apparently, a common flight on one’s own after hearing the death 
sentence).
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to exploit, both in substance and procedure. This was of particular 
gravity in such a delicate matter as ἀσέβεια, where defendants risked 
not only their civic rights and property but also their life. We can 
rather be surprised that in so many testing moments for the commu-
nity, religious trials constituted a marginal problem, especially when 
juxtaposed with commonly imposed death sentences on generals and 
magistrates255, and the overall Athenian passion for litigation, so ea-
gerly mocked by Aristophanes. Apparently, the prosecution of the im-
pious was not the regular mode of displaying piety in Athens. This 
is not to say impiety was no serious matter. As demonstrated by the 
cases of the repeated curse against the Alcmaeonidae and the trials of 
415, the community could be very determinate to punish the impious 
and generously reward those willing to help in achieving that. As we 
learn from the historical examples, however, the rule of not sentenc-
ing anyone without trial (μηδένα ἄκριτον ἀποκτει =ναι) was apparently 
preserved at all times256, along with proper forensic procedures in-
stead of lynch law, even in the face of general unrest.
As discussed earlier, the decree of Diopeithes, often considered the 
earliest Athenian legal measure against impiety, has to be deemed a 
forgery on several grounds (including legal chronology), while the legal 
proceedings in the 415 trials are far from obvious (see n. 107ff. above). 
Additionally, a new way of reporting an impious act to the magistrate 
(φράζειν) emerges from an unbiased reading of the MSS to Dem. 22.27. 
Several procedures are attested up to 399, namely what was quite likely 
an εἰσαγγελία resulting in the γραϕαί in popular courts (the cases of 
415), γραφή (Socrates in 399), δίκη or γραφή before the archon basileus 
(Archippus ca. 415), and ἔνδειξις (Andocides in 400 or 399). Apparently, 
some of the trials could be based on the information given on the side 
of the main prosecution (μηνύσεις). No other procedure than γραφή 
(Lacedaemonius’ sister, Aristotle) and an unknown procedure before 
the basileus (Lycurgus in the late fourth century; perhaps a γραφή) is 
historically attested in the impiety trials after 399. Yet we do learn from 
one remark by Demosthenes about the possibility of initiating impiety 
cases by the procedures of arrest (ἀπαγωγή, presumably in the cases of 
thieves caught red-handed with sacred property), the act of reporting 
to the archon basileus (φράζειν) with φάσις to follow (see discussion 
above), and δίκη before the Eumolpidae, perhaps only in the case of the 
regulations of the Mysteries257. Based on the extant evidence, it should 
be assumed that the γραφή would be the most common procedure em-
ployed in impiety cases, unsurprisingly being also the most popular 
public procedure in Athens for a variety of offences. There is a trace of 
at least two individuals, Ninos and Theoris, sentenced and put to death 
255. Cf. Hansen 1975; see also section 2 above.
256. See [Lys.] 6.54; cf. Din. 2 & Dem. 25 hypoth. §§ 1-2; Dem. 25.87. See And. 
1.94 and notes on the trial of Socrates above on the case of Leon of Salamis dur-
ing the reign of the Thirty.
257. Perhaps—if at all—only after the emergence of the institution of the exe-
getai, see n. 31 & 129 above.
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in Athens after Socrates, either one of them (Theoris) or both charged 
with impiety, and of 22 men condemned after the affairs of 415, with 
only some sentences carried out. All other extant remarks indicate 
more lenient forms of punishment (presumably Archias; of uncertain 
charge: Demades and Menesaechmus). Quite likely there was also an 
Assembly proclamation which instructed to kill Diagoras. Supposedly, 
some of the accused fled Athens before their case appeared in court, 
particularly if they were non-Athenians and did not risk losing citizen-
ship and property in Athens.
About a dozen cases for impiety survives from the entire classical pe-
riod (if we count those against the mutilators and profaners of 415 as 
two, regardless of the number of the accused). The only cases before the 
trial of Socrates which can be undoubtedly deemed historical are the 
trials of 415 and the prosecution of Andocides in 400/399 directly linked 
to them. Later, we learn about more trials for impiety which appear as 
historical, perhaps partly due to the fact that many more sources from 
the fourth century survive, including most of the forensic orations. In 
the fourth century Phryne was probably tried for impiety by Euthias (ca. 
350?), Archias was brought to court for ritual misconduct, while Theo-
ris was sentenced to death for producing magic potions (both in the 
mid-fourth century?). Lacedaemonius’ sister (before 345) and Lycurgus 
(330s) were tried and acquitted. Another two late fourth-century cas-
es seem at least probable: that of Aristotle (ca. 323, escaped before the 
trial?) and Theophrastus (ca. 318-17, probably tried and acquitted). Out 
of all the historical cases only that of Theoris does not show any clear 
political background, but is also in every respect extremely vague and 
found only in some very brief remarks. Curiously enough, out of these 
few well-attested and probable trials one was backed by a hierophant 
(Eurymedon, directly or indirectly prosecuting Aristotle), another by 
a priest of the Kerykes (Callias, acting as a supporting speaker against 
Andocides); we hear of yet another priest possibly having a dispute 
with Theodorus (Euryclides), while at least once charges were brought 
against a hierophant (Archias). Probably not too much should be made 
out of this, but it is interesting to note that the priests may have been 
somehow involved in the ‘religious politics’, just as we know the Athe-
nian polis was involved in it in regard to the Eleusinian Mysteries at the 
time of the Peloponnesian War. In fact, all historical cases before that 
of Socrates involve the Mysteries in one way or another, while later at 
least two seem to bear some connection to them (Archias, Theodorus).
A number of other trials are quite certain but of unknown substance. 
This includes the case of the Alcmaeonidae sentenced to exile (late 7th 
cent.), the σηκός case before the Areopagus from Lys. 7 of unknown re-
sult (mid-390s, perhaps a γραφή), Ninos sentenced to death for produc-
ing magic potions (ca. 350), Demades fined with an enormous amount 
(ca. 323), and Menesaechmus most likely punished with some minor 
penalty (330s-320s). These might have been but need not have been tri-
als for ἀσέβεια. Other accusations of impiety did not have to result in 
a trial. These are the events concerning an unnamed Megarian citizen 
(ca. 432?), possibly Diagoras (415?), Theodorus (309-5?), and a series of 
trials with religious background brought by Lycurgus against Autolycus 
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the Areopagite, Lysicles the general, Demades the orator, and numer-
ous others sometime in the 330s-20s. Possible forgeries, literary inven-
tions, or misunderstandings include the alleged fifth-century cases of 
Aeschylus, Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Euripides, Prodicus, and Diogenes of 
Apollonia, and fourth-century cases of Demetrius of Phalerum, Stilpo of 
Megara, and possibly Diodorus from Dem. 22 and 24. We also learn of 
several attested cases for ἱεροσυλία in Athens (Theosebes ca. 367/6, one 
metic from Lys. 5, Hierocles ca. 332/1) and a few impiety accusations 
(maybe also trials) outside of Athens (several Delians in 376/5, possibly 
tried in Athens, and forty men from Sardis either condemned to death or 
just prosecuted in the late fourth century).
Analysing the surviving trials for impiety through the lens of Athe-
nian freedom of speech is very tempting but at times proves problem-
atic, for, first, most of them did not concern ‘speech’ as much as ‘ac-
tion’, and second, the Athenian democratic παῤῥησία rested upon the 
ideal of giving frank advice to one’s fellow citizens, rather than saying 
what one really thinks about Demeter. Nonetheless, it is not without 
significance that we do get to see a variety of beliefs about the gods and 
their nature in various genres of literature of the fifth and fourth cen-
turies, along with the intellectual climate and legal sphere that made 
it possible258. Socrates and Euripides were merely mocked at publicly 
on the stage for their ‘own’ beliefs about the gods, and we know of no 
Athenian citizen who would meet charges only because of his refusal to 
participate in cult practices. The foreigners, in turn, did not enjoy any 
real protection in Athenian law, yet the extant impiety cases do not re-
veal any severer treatment of them than of the citizens. There was no 
systematic religious repression in Athens. Rather, the historical record 
cites a handful of individual trials for impiety out of nearly two centu-
ries of Athenian democracy, more often than not placed in a very par-
ticular political context. Those individual trials or sometimes groups 
of trials reflect important turning points in the life of the community, 
more often than not being linked to various periods of instability, cri-
sis, anxiety, sometimes even coups d’état, war, and, last but not least, 
either a threat of falling under foreign domination or frustration at 
the defeat. They constituted one but not the only measure employed 
in such circumstances, as shown for example by the dramatic trial of 
Phocion259.
Athens was not the only polis to make use of the impiety accusations 
in struggles for power, as we learn from Thucydides’ remark about 
the role which such charges played during the stasis on Korkyra in 427 
(3.70.3-6). In connection with the aforementioned epigraphic material 
and the obvious prevalence of Athenian sources, we have to discard 
Momigliano’s (1973: 566) sentiment that impiety trials were a uniquely 
Athenian way of dealing with politics260. Unfortunately, very little could 
258. Cf. Wallace 1994, 1996b.
259. See Bayliss 2011: 148; cf. also Bauman 1990: 129-30.
260. A similar—even if not entirely comprehensible today—connection be-
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be said about the non-Athenian trials for ἀσέβεια, besides their appar-
ent existence. There is also no way for us to uncover all complexities 
surrounding the issues here described, not to mention all the trials un-
noticed by the surviving sources, the existence of which we can only 
surmise, applying the very method used by the ancient authors striving 
in their insatiable curiosity to supplement the missing pages of history.
Jakub Filonik
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